Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/CrashBytes/claude-role-skillsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/commands/crashbytes/claude-role-skills/threat-model)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/commands/crashbytes/claude-role-skills/threat-model"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/commands/crashbytes/claude-role-skills/threat-model/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/commands/crashbytes/claude-role-skills/threat-model"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/commands/crashbytes/claude-role-skills/threat-model.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00010 | $0.00502 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00004 | $0.00201 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00002 | $0.00100 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00001 | $0.00050 |
Grade A, and why
threat-model scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 2mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
What it actually says
Threat Model
Run a STRIDE threat analysis on a system, feature, or code path.
Arguments
Target to analyze: $ARGUMENTS
Workflow
-
Define the scope
- If a file path is provided, read it and trace its data flows
- If a system/feature name is provided, search the codebase for related files
- Identify: entry points, data stores, external services, trust boundaries
-
Map the data flow
- Identify all data inputs and outputs
- Trace authentication and authorization paths
- Map external service integrations
- Identify trust boundary crossings
-
Apply STRIDE to each component
For each component in the data flow, analyze:
- Spoofing: Can an attacker impersonate a user or service?
- Tampering: Can data be modified in transit or at rest?
- Repudiation: Can actions be performed without audit trails?
- Information Disclosure: Can sensitive data leak?
- Denial of Service: Can the service be made unavailable?
- Elevation of Privilege: Can an attacker gain unauthorized access?
-
Score with DREAD For each identified threat:
- Damage potential (1-10)
- Reproducibility (1-10)
- Exploitability (1-10)
- Affected users (1-10)
- Discoverability (1-10)
- Overall = average of all five
-
Generate remediation plan
- Prioritize by DREAD score (Critical >7, High 5-7, Medium 3-5, Low <3)
- Map each threat to OWASP Top 10 category where applicable
- Provide specific code-level fix recommendations
- Identify quick wins vs architectural changes
-
Output
- Threat matrix table (Component × STRIDE categories)
- Top threats ranked by DREAD score
- Remediation plan with priority and effort estimates
- Residual risk summary
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 2mo ago First seen · 58 lines · 10 tokens per session scan A 18a98468278e
threat-model is a command published in the GitHub repository CrashBytes/claude-role-skills (8 stars, last pushed 8mo ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 10 tokens to every session and 502 once invoked, about $0.0000 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
threat-model compared with commands from other repositories
| Mod | Type | Stars | Last push | Licence | Scan | Tokens | Works with |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| threat-modelCrashBytes/claude-role-skills | Command | 8 | 8mo ago | Apache-2.0 | A | 10 | Claude Code |
| launch-meta-campaignmarkifact/markifact-mcp | Command | 59 | yesterday | MIT | A | 36 | Claude Code, Cursor |
| negative-keyword-sweepmarkifact/markifact-mcp | Command | 59 | yesterday | MIT | A | 50 | Claude Code, Cursor |
| meetingssystemoperators/claude-plugins | Command | 6 | today | MIT | A | 6 | Claude Code |
| notessystemoperators/claude-plugins | Command | 6 | today | MIT | A | 6 | Claude Code |
| duck-offcentsandcode/rubber-duck | Command | 15 | 2mo ago | MIT | A | 8 | Claude Code |
| triagenunoamorim99/agile-ledger | Command | 1 | 20d ago | MIT | A | 25 | Claude Code |