verify

A command that runs the checks listed in Tink's current task contract and records the evidence. Tink is a task-harness system for Claude Code, and a contract is its written list of success conditions and checks.

In plain words
What is it for?
Verifying code or workflow changes before release, publishing, deployment, or a public pull request.
Why use it?
It replaces assumptions that work is finished with recorded results from the agreed checks.

Command for Claude Code

Install

Getting it into your agent

One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.

agentmods
npx agentmods add commands/dotoricode/tink-harness/verify
Clone the repo
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/dotoricode/tink-harness

Made for: Claude Code.

Per session 14 Only the description is in the session, so the agent can decide to use it. The body loads when it is invoked.
When invoked 3,401 The whole file, excluding the scripts and references it only reads on demand.
Security scan A 0 findings. Scan, not verified.
Origin original No closer match found in the catalogue.
Token cost

What it costs to keep this loaded

Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.

ModelPer sessionOnce invoked
Fable 5 $0.00014 $0.03401
Opus 5 $0.00007 $0.01700
Sonnet 5 $0.00003 $0.00680
Haiku 4.5 $0.00001 $0.00340

Measured yesterday against content hash a5fca4ed6196, method: parsed. Prices are Anthropic first-party input rates as of 2026-08-30, from the pricing page.

Security

Grade A, and why

verify scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured yesterday.

A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.

Nothing flagged

None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.

.claude/commands/tink/verify.md · 318 lines

How it starts

The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 318 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.

/tink:verify

Run the verification commands and manual checks listed in .tink/current/contract.json.

Use this when a Tink run needs evidence before it can be called done, especially before release, publish, deploy, public PR, or broad workflow changes.

Purpose

Tink should not rely on "I think it passed." It should run the checks named in the current contract, record what happened, and send failures back into weave as improvement signals.

Inputs

Read these files if present:

  • .tink/current/contract.json
  • .tink/current/checks.md
  • .tink/current/plan.md
  • .tink/current/notes.md
  • .tink/current/verification.json
  • .tink/current/evidence.md
  • .tink/schemas/verification.schema.json
  • .tink/maintenance/weave-queue.json
  • .tink/maintenance/ledger.jsonl
  • .tink/maintenance/friction.jsonl

If contract.json is missing, do not invent one silently. Summarize the missing contract and ask whether to create it from the current run files.

Contract fields

The command expects this shape:

{
  "task_type": "release",
  "risk": ["public_publish"],
  "success_conditions": [],
  "forbidden": [],
  "verification": {
    "commands": [],
    "manual_checks": []
  },
  "evidence": {
    "required": []
  }
}

Unknown fields are allowed. Missing required fields should be reported as contract gaps.

Verify runner contract

Use one runner model for Claude Code /tink:verify and Codex $tink:verify.

The runner has four phases:

  1. Contract Coverage: map the semantic contract before commands can create a false sense of completion.
  2. Plan: read the contract, normalize checks into a short runner plan, and classify each check as command or manual.
  3. Run: execute safe command checks and inspect manual checks.
  4. Record: write .tink/current/verification.json, write .tink/current/evidence.md, update notes, and append maintenance signals only when their files already exist.

Phase 0 — Contract Coverage

Before planning command checks:

  • For every success_conditions[] item, assign SC-1, SC-2, and so on, then record whether it has a plan step, implementation result, verification item, and evidence. Use proven, missing_plan, missing_implementation, missing_check, or missing_evidence.
  • For every forbidden[] item, assign F-1, F-2, and so on, then record proven_absent, violated, or not_proven with diff or review evidence.
  • Review intent.open_questions[]; unresolved blocking questions must remain visible and cannot be treated as agent decisions.
  • Review intent.assumptions[]; list every assumption whose status is not approved and that affected implementation.
  • Review approval; record the revision as approved, unapproved, or legacy. A contract without the optional Understanding fields remains a supported legacy contract.

Read the full file on GitHub · 318 lines

Changes

What this file has done since we first saw it

Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.

  1. yesterday First seen · 318 lines · 14 tokens per session scan A a5fca4ed6196

Subscribe to this mod's changes

verify is a command published in the GitHub repository dotoricode/tink-harness (1 stars, last pushed 1mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 14 tokens to every session and 3,401 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.