Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx agentmods add commands/emasoft/claude-plugins-validation/cpv-batch-security-auditgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/Emasoft/claude-plugins-validationWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/commands/emasoft/claude-plugins-validation/cpv-batch-security-audit)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/commands/emasoft/claude-plugins-validation/cpv-batch-security-audit"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/commands/emasoft/claude-plugins-validation/cpv-batch-security-audit.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5 | $0.00111 | $0.02077 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00056 | $0.01038 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00022 | $0.00415 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00011 | $0.00208 |
Grade A, and why
cpv-batch-security-audit scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 3d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 220 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
/cpv-batch-security-audit — Security audit every plugin in a marketplace
For users who maintain a marketplace and need a fleet-wide security
snapshot, this command dispatches one cpv-plugin-validator-agent per plugin
in batch_security_audit mode. The agent runs only the
validate_security checker (faster than full plugin validation,
and covers the most important signal: external CC-Audit / Tirith /
TruffleHog / Semgrep / Cisco AI Defense / in-process rule findings).
Same input grammar and dispatch shape as /cpv-batch-validate —
single plugin / single plugin URL / marketplace local / marketplace
URL / list / @listfile / comma-separated.
You are the orchestrator
You — the model running THIS turn — orchestrate the batch from the main session. You do NOT scan anything yourself.
Step 0 — Resolve arguments
The user supplies a target spec (required; first positional — accepts
every shape listed above) plus an optional --max-parallel N (default
8, cap 16).
If no target was given, ask plain-text:
Which marketplace, plugin, or list should I security-audit? Provide a path, URL, or @listfile.
Step 1 — Build the batch plan
# Separate the positional target specs from the --max-parallel flag in a
# single pass. We must NOT collapse to "$1": the input grammar above lists
# a whitespace-separated LIST (`./a ./b ./c`) as a valid shape, and the
# orchestrator's `plan` subcommand declares its inputs as `nargs="+"`, so
# every positional must be forwarded — using only "$1" would silently
# audit the first plugin and drop the rest.
#
# Both --max-parallel N (two tokens) and --max-parallel=N (one token) are
# handled, because argparse accepts the `=` form and a user may type it.
# Default 8; the orchestrator re-caps at 16, so a larger N is safe to pass.
BATCH_SPECS=()
MAX_PARALLEL=8
while [ "$#" -gt 0 ]; do
case "$1" in
--max-parallel)
MAX_PARALLEL="$2"
shift 2
;;
--max-parallel=*)
MAX_PARALLEL="${1#--max-parallel=}"
shift
;;
*)
BATCH_SPECS+=("$1")
shift
;;
esac
done
if [ "${#BATCH_SPECS[@]}" -eq 0 ]; then
echo "ERROR: no target spec given to /cpv-batch-security-audit" >&2
exit 1
fi
python3 "${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/scripts/cpv_batch_orchestrator.py" plan \
"${BATCH_SPECS[@]}" \
--agent cpv-plugin-validator-agent \
--mode batch_security_audit \
--max-parallel "$MAX_PARALLEL"
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 3d ago First seen · 220 lines · 111 tokens per session scan A 60d5fec7bc32
cpv-batch-security-audit is a command published in the GitHub repository Emasoft/claude-plugins-validation (4 stars, last pushed 5d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 111 tokens to every session and 2,077 once invoked, about $0.0006 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
Other commands, from other repositories
git
Git operations with intelligent commit messages and workflow optimization.
checklist
Generate a custom checklist for the current feature based on user requirements.
clarify
Identify underspecified areas in the current feature spec by asking up to 5 highly targeted clarification questions and encoding answers back into the spec.
specify
Create or update the feature specification from a natural language feature description.
analyze
Perform a non-destructive cross-artifact consistency and quality analysis across spec.md, plan.md, and tasks.md after task generation.
converge
Assess the current codebase against the feature's spec, plan, and tasks, then append any remaining unbuilt work as new tasks to tasks.md so implement can complete it.