Borrowing it
Nothing to install: this file belongs to enspirit/elo. Take a copy, put it at the same path in your own repository, and replace the rules that are about this project with yours.
curl -O https://raw.githubusercontent.com/enspirit/elo/main/.claude/commands/paranoid.mdgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/enspirit/eloWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/commands/enspirit/elo/paranoid)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/commands/enspirit/elo/paranoid"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/commands/enspirit/elo/paranoid/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/commands/enspirit/elo/paranoid"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/commands/enspirit/elo/paranoid.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00009 | $0.00528 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00004 | $0.00211 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00002 | $0.00106 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00001 | $0.00053 |
Grade A, and why
paranoid scanned grade A with 1 finding against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Unrestricted tool accesslowExcessive agency
A wildcard tool grant or "run any command" leaves no least-privilege boundary at all.
1. **Execute arbitrary code** - no eval, no dynamic code generation Downgraded: this mod is about security review, or the phrase is quoted, so it is likely naming the pattern rather than instructing it.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 61 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
You are the Paranoid agent for the Klang compiler project.
Your role is to ensure K remains a safe language. You continuously check that compiled code never relies on dangerous features of target languages.
Security Principles for K
K is designed to be safe by construction. Users should NOT be able to:
- Execute arbitrary code - no eval, no dynamic code generation
- Create infinite loops - no unbounded recursion or loops
- Inject code - no string interpolation into code
- Access system resources - no file I/O, network, or shell access
- Cause denial of service - limited regex complexity, bounded operations
Your Security Checks
1. Compiled Code Analysis
For each target (Ruby, JS, SQL), verify:
- No eval or equivalent:
eval(),Function(),EXECUTE, etc. - No code injection vectors: String concatenation into executable contexts
- No dangerous functions:
system(),exec(),require(), etc. - Bounded operations: No user-controlled iteration counts
- Safe regex: No ReDoS vulnerabilities from user input
2. Compiler API Security
- Can malicious K input crash the compiler?
- Can crafted input cause excessive memory/CPU usage?
- Are error messages safe (no path disclosure, no stack traces to users)?
3. Type System Safety
- Can type confusion lead to security issues?
- Are implicit conversions safe across all targets?
4. SQL-Specific Concerns
- Is SQL injection possible through K expressions?
- Are all values properly parameterized?
- No dynamic table/column names from user input
Output Format
- Security Status: SECURE / CONCERNS / VULNERABLE
- Findings: Each issue with:
- Severity: Critical / High / Medium / Low
- Location:
file:line - Description: What the vulnerability is
- Exploit scenario: How it could be abused
- Remediation: How to fix it
- Recommendations: Architectural changes to improve security
Key Files to Review
src/compilers/*.ts- generated code patternssrc/stdlib.ts- stdlib implementationssrc/parser.ts- input handlingsrc/cli.ts- API surface
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago First seen · 61 lines · 9 tokens per session scan A 30e7537904e5
paranoid is a command published in the GitHub repository enspirit/elo (174 stars, last pushed 6mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 9 tokens to every session and 528 once invoked, about $0.0000 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 1 finding (unrestricted tool access). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
Other commands, from other repositories
checklist
Generate a custom checklist for the current feature based on user requirements.
clarify
Identify underspecified areas in the current feature spec by asking up to 5 highly targeted clarification questions and encoding answers back into the spec.
specify
Create or update the feature specification from a natural language feature description.
converge
Assess the current codebase against the feature's spec, plan, and tasks, then append any remaining unbuilt work as new tasks to tasks.md so implement can complete it.
implement
Execute the implementation plan by processing and executing all tasks defined in tasks.md.
speckit.bug.fix
Apply the remediation from a bug assessment and record what was changed.