Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/FlorianBruniaux/claude-code-pluginsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/commands/florianbruniaux/claude-code-plugins/security-check)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/commands/florianbruniaux/claude-code-plugins/security-check"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/commands/florianbruniaux/claude-code-plugins/security-check/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/commands/florianbruniaux/claude-code-plugins/security-check"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/commands/florianbruniaux/claude-code-plugins/security-check.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00011 | $0.01658 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00004 | $0.00663 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00002 | $0.00332 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00001 | $0.00166 |
Grade B, and why
security-check scanned grade B with 4 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Reads agent configuration directorieslowAgent snooping
.claude/, .codex/, .gemini/ hold keys, settings and other credentials a mod has no legitimate need for.
find .claude/hooks/ -type f 2>/dev/null Downgraded: this mod is about security review, or the phrase is quoted, so it is likely naming the pattern rather than instructing it.
Reads MCP configurationlowAgent snooping
mcp.json carries server URLs and auth tokens; reading it lets a mod discover and abuse other integrations.
cat .mcp.json 2>/dev/null Downgraded: this mod is about security review, or the phrase is quoted, so it is likely naming the pattern rather than instructing it.
Enumerates other installed skillslowAgent snooping
Other skills' SKILL.md files reveal prompts, capabilities and secrets that should be invisible to peers.
ls -la .claude/skills/ 2>/dev/null Downgraded: this mod is about security review, or the phrase is quoted, so it is likely naming the pattern rather than instructing it.
Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
grep -rn "curl\|wget\|nc \|ncat\|netcat\|base64\|eval\|exec\|/dev/tcp\|/dev/udp" .claude/hooks/ 2>/dev/null How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 179 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Security Check
Quick configuration security check against known threats database. Verifies your Claude Code setup for known malicious skills, vulnerable MCPs, dangerous patterns, and exposed secrets.
Time: ~30 seconds | Scope: Claude Code configuration only
Instructions
You are a security analyst. Check the user's Claude Code configuration against the threat intelligence database bundled at examples/commands/resources/threat-db.yaml. Produce a concise, actionable report.
Phase 1: Load Threat Database
Read examples/commands/resources/threat-db.yaml from this repository to load:
- Known malicious authors and skills
- CVE database for MCP servers
- Suspicious patterns for hooks, agents, and config
Phase 2: MCP Server Audit
Read the user's MCP configuration:
# Global MCP config
cat ~/.claude.json 2>/dev/null | jq '.mcpServers // empty'
# Project MCP config
cat .mcp.json 2>/dev/null
Check against threat-db.yaml:
- Any MCP server matching a CVE entry? → CRITICAL
- Version pinning: are all MCP servers pinned to exact versions (not
@latest)? → HIGH if unpinned - Any
--dangerous-*flags in MCP args? → CRITICAL - Any MCP servers not on the Safe List (see
guide/security-hardening.md§1.1)? → MEDIUM (flag for manual review)
Phase 3: Skills & Agents Audit
# List installed skills
ls -la .claude/skills/ 2>/dev/null
ls -la ~/.claude/skills/ 2>/dev/null
# List agents
ls -la .claude/agents/ 2>/dev/null
ls -la ~/.claude/agents/ 2>/dev/null
# Check agent tools field
grep -r "^tools:" .claude/agents/ 2>/dev/null
grep -r "^tools:" ~/.claude/agents/ 2>/dev/null
Check against threat-db.yaml:
- Any skill/agent name matching
malicious_skillsentries? → CRITICAL - Any skill/agent author matching
malicious_authorsentries? → CRITICAL - Any agent with
tools: Bashonly? → HIGH - Any agent with overly broad tool access + vague description? → MEDIUM
Phase 4: Hook Security
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago First seen · 179 lines · 11 tokens per session scan B bcab06eed43a
security-check is a command published in the GitHub repository FlorianBruniaux/claude-code-plugins (42 stars, last pushed 1mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 11 tokens to every session and 1,658 once invoked, about $0.0000 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it B with 4 findings (reads agent configuration directories, reads mcp configuration, enumerates other installed skills). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-04.
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