Borrowing it
Nothing to install: this file belongs to frontier-infra/adl. Take a copy, put it at the same path in your own repository, and replace the rules that are about this project with yours.
curl -O https://raw.githubusercontent.com/frontier-infra/adl/main/.claude/commands/goal-verify.mdgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/frontier-infra/adlWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/commands/frontier-infra/adl/goal-verify)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/commands/frontier-infra/adl/goal-verify"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/commands/frontier-infra/adl/goal-verify.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00013 | $0.00527 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00006 | $0.00264 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00003 | $0.00105 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00001 | $0.00053 |
Grade C, and why
goal-verify scanned grade C with 1 finding against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 7d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Recursive force deletehighDestructive command
rm -rf with a variable or a broad path is one typo away from removing the wrong tree.
- Check command unsafe in a verification context (e.g. `rm -rf`, network mutations) → refuse, surface to operator How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 38 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Verify a /goal manifest by running every declared check and writing the proof artifact. This is the only way a worker's slice can be marked done — the Stop hook reads the proof and refuses to unblock the worker until signed_off: true.
What to do
-
Adopt the Warden role. Read
.claude/agents/WARDEN.mdand apply its discipline strictly. You are not the worker. You do not patch failures. You do not edit the manifest. -
Load the manifest at
.claude/goals/$ARGUMENTS.yaml. If the file does not exist, refuse — there is nothing to verify against. Compute its SHA-256 and record it in the proof. -
Run each check in declaration order. Do not short-circuit on failure. Capture exit codes, stdout, stderr, and duration for each.
-
Compute the diff. Diff against
manifest.base_ref(default HEAD's parent). Validatetouches_onlyandforbiddenglobs against the actual changed paths. A path outsidetouches_onlyor matchingforbiddenis a check failure, not a warning. -
Apply sign-off rules per
WARDEN.md:- All machine checks passed, no human-review present →
signed_off: true - Any machine check failed →
signed_off: false, populatekickback_reason - All machine checks passed, human-review present →
signed_off: "pending", populatekickback_reasonwith the items awaiting operator
- All machine checks passed, no human-review present →
-
Write the proof to
.claude/goals/$ARGUMENTS.proof.json. Overwrite any prior proof for the same task-id (re-verification is allowed; the latest proof wins). -
Report to the operator per Warden's handoff protocol: task-id, manifest SHA, per-check results, final
signed_off, kickback target role if applicable, proof path.
Refusals
- Manifest missing or unreadable → refuse, surface to operator
- Check
typenot in the schema → refuse, do not invent semantics - Check command unsafe in a verification context (e.g.
rm -rf, network mutations) → refuse, surface to operator
Argument
The task-id to verify follows. It must match an existing manifest filename (without .yaml).
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 7d ago First seen · 38 lines · 13 tokens per session scan C be7e97046ac0
goal-verify is a command published in the GitHub repository frontier-infra/adl (2 stars, last pushed 2mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 13 tokens to every session and 527 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it C with 1 finding (recursive force delete). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
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