Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/hamr0/agentic-toolkitWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/commands/hamr0/agentic-toolkit/branch-review)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/commands/hamr0/agentic-toolkit/branch-review"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/commands/hamr0/agentic-toolkit/branch-review/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/commands/hamr0/agentic-toolkit/branch-review"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/commands/hamr0/agentic-toolkit/branch-review.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00000 | $0.06831 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00000 | $0.02732 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00000 | $0.01366 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00000 | $0.00683 |
Grade A, and why
branch-review scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 20d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
This is a copy
100% identical to branch-review — 0 lines differ, which has more behind it and is treated as the original. This page carries a canonical link to it rather than competing with it.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 306 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
description: Review a branch before merge argument-hint: [commit hashes | from..to | blank = this branch] [low|medium|high|max]
Pre-merge review gate. General review, then a full security audit, then an adversarial verify pass, then a docs sweep. It never edits code: findings are reported and handed back, and fixing is a separate, separately authorized action. The docs sweep is the one stage that writes, and only to docs — it updates the project's docs for what this branch changed and commits exactly that.
Only Critical and High findings block the merge. Everything else is appended to the fix ledger (.factory/remember/fix-ledger.md) — a local, cumulative list, living beside MEMORY.md, usually gitignored, that /refactor (no arguments) works through between features. The report is blockers plus the ledger count. This command never runs /refactor itself — it nudges.
Run this before /release, which refuses to run without a review at the current HEAD SHA.
Guardrails
- Spawn a worker, mid tier stated explicitly (omitted inherits the parent's, not the balanced one; not cheapest/fastest either — judgment degrades there; never a vendor model name), and hand it this file's path — a worker has no skill text of its own. Fall back to running inline if your tool has no subagent mechanism.
- Escalate, never assume. Anything you cannot decide, cannot verify, or that this spec does not cover → stop and report it to the orchestrator (the main session). Never improvise, never widen scope, never fix a side issue you noticed along the way.
- The worker does the work itself — no delegation. The review subagent must not spawn subagents of its own. Everything it reports has to be something it read, ran, or grepped with its own tool calls; a relayed "I executed X" is hearsay. (Same rule
/securitycarries inside stage 2.) - No edits — three exceptions. You have no authorization to change code, even for a finding you are certain about. Report it. The only files you may write are
.factory/remember/fix-ledger.md(append bullets; never rewrite or delete),.factory/remember/last-review.md(overwrite; the review record described at the end of this file), and the doc files Stage 4 touches — edited and then committed by that stage alone, never for code, skills, config, or tests. - Prove it with two checks, because neither sees what the other does.
git status --porcelain, at start and again before you report, proves the tree is clean — no code or config changed, and, when Stage 4 ran (review settled), that its doc edits landed as the last act before you report. It cannot police your own two.factory/writes (.factory/is normally gitignored), so also hash the files there before you start and again before you report:
and show the comparison: onlyfind .factory/remember -maxdepth 1 -type f -exec md5sum {} + | sort -k2fix-ledger.mdandlast-review.mdmay differ. And rungit diff --name-only <reviewed sha>..HEADbefore you report: it must list only the files on the record'sdocs:line — anything else means an edit escaped Stage 4's scope. Both results are shown on theproof:line of the closing block.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 20d ago Changed · -128 lines 5757c104aa88
- 21d ago Changed · +2 lines e0d6906700c8
- 1mo ago Changed · +5 lines 4e1f327584ca
- 1mo ago Changed · +56 lines 32c0e747814c
- 1mo ago Changed · +17 lines 79506bc2107d
- 1mo ago Changed · +11 lines scan B → A 1f03f6986084
- 1mo ago First seen · 343 lines · 0 tokens per session scan B 39a67cf7cdba
branch-review is a command published in the GitHub repository hamr0/agentic-toolkit (22 stars, last pushed today), licensed Apache-2.0. It costs nothing until one of its globs matches a file; then it loads 6,831 tokens. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. It is 100% identical to branch-review, differing in 0 lines, and is treated as a copy.
Other commands, from other repositories
delegate-review
Run OCR in delegation mode — OCR handles file selection and rules, the host agent performs the actual review.
review.v1
Review code changes: /review [commit|branch|PR].
review-team
Parallel code review with 3 specialist lenses plus the kit-default kit:advisor extra lens. Dispatches the security, architecture, and test-coverage lenses simultaneously, adds the cross-cutting kit:advisor (critique mode), then merges findings.
devs-team
Parallel multi-lens critique of a solution design (the active spec if present, else the decision brief). Dispatches 5 engineering lenses, merges findings, reports a verdict. Report-only, never blocks.
branch-review
Review a branch before merge.
bug-check
Run automated tests and build checks first, then agent code review. For each bug found, propose or document a regression test.