Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx agentmods add commands/hermeticormus/libresecops-claude-code/crypto-auditgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/HermeticOrmus/LibreSecOps-Claude-CodeWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/commands/hermeticormus/libresecops-claude-code/crypto-audit)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/commands/hermeticormus/libresecops-claude-code/crypto-audit"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/commands/hermeticormus/libresecops-claude-code/crypto-audit.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5 | $0.00000 | $0.01368 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00000 | $0.00684 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00000 | $0.00274 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00000 | $0.00137 |
Grade A, and why
crypto-audit scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 3d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 147 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
/crypto-audit
Audit cryptographic implementations for algorithm selection, key management, and implementation errors.
Trigger
Use when you need to:
- Review cryptographic algorithm choices in application code
- Audit password hashing implementations
- Evaluate encryption-at-rest or encryption-in-transit configurations
- Check for hardcoded keys, weak algorithms, or insecure modes
- Assess TLS/SSL configuration
- Review JWT token implementation
- Evaluate key management practices
Input
One or more of:
- Application code: Source code using cryptographic libraries
- Configuration files: TLS configs (nginx, Apache, HAProxy), encryption configs
- Architecture documentation: Data flow diagrams showing where encryption is applied
- Key management documentation: Key storage, rotation, and access control policies
- Specific scope: Focus area (e.g., "password hashing", "TLS only", "encryption at rest")
Process
Phase 1: Algorithm Assessment
-
Symmetric encryption
- Algorithm: AES-128/256 or ChaCha20 (acceptable), DES/3DES/RC4/Blowfish (unacceptable)
- Mode: GCM or ChaCha20-Poly1305 (AEAD, correct), CBC without HMAC (vulnerable to padding oracle), ECB (broken for all practical purposes)
- Nonce/IV: Generated with CSPRNG, never reused with the same key (GCM nonce reuse is catastrophic)
-
Asymmetric encryption and signing
- RSA key size: >= 2048 bits (acceptable), >= 3072 bits (recommended for new systems)
- RSA padding: OAEP for encryption (correct), PKCS#1 v1.5 (vulnerable to Bleichenbacher), PSS for signatures (correct)
- ECC: P-256 or P-384 (NIST curves), Curve25519/Ed25519 (modern preferred)
-
Hashing
- General purpose: SHA-256 or SHA-3 (correct), MD5 or SHA-1 (broken for collision resistance)
- Password hashing: Argon2id (best), bcrypt (good), scrypt (good), PBKDF2-SHA256 (acceptable)
- Password hashing with SHA-256/MD5/SHA-1 alone (CRITICAL -- not a password hash)
-
Key derivation
- HKDF for deriving subkeys from a master key
- Argon2id or PBKDF2 for password-to-key derivation
- Custom key derivation (likely insecure)
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 3d ago First seen · 147 lines · 0 tokens per session scan A c3281bbf9960
crypto-audit is a command published in the GitHub repository HermeticOrmus/LibreSecOps-Claude-Code (4 stars, last pushed 3mo ago), licensed MIT. It costs nothing until one of its globs matches a file; then it loads 1,368 tokens. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
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