Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx agentmods add commands/hermeticormus/libresecops-claude-code/detection-rulegit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/HermeticOrmus/LibreSecOps-Claude-CodeWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/commands/hermeticormus/libresecops-claude-code/detection-rule)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/commands/hermeticormus/libresecops-claude-code/detection-rule"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/commands/hermeticormus/libresecops-claude-code/detection-rule.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5 | $0.00000 | $0.00794 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00000 | $0.00397 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00000 | $0.00159 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00000 | $0.00079 |
Grade A, and why
detection-rule scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 3d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 102 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
/detection-rule
Create a detection rule for a specific ATT&CK technique or threat behavior, in Sigma format with SIEM-specific translations.
Trigger
Use when you need to:
- Build a detection rule for a specific ATT&CK technique
- Detect a specific adversary behavior observed in threat intelligence
- Create a rule for a finding from a red team exercise or penetration test
- Add detection for a specific CVE exploitation pattern
- Convert a hunting query into an automated detection
Input
- Required: One of the following:
- ATT&CK technique ID (e.g.,
T1059.001,T1003.001) - Description of the behavior to detect (e.g., "detect PowerShell download cradle execution")
- Log sample showing the malicious activity
- ATT&CK technique ID (e.g.,
- Optional flag:
--siem [splunk|elastic|sentinel|qradar]-- include SIEM-specific translation - Optional flag:
--yara-- generate a YARA rule instead of (or in addition to) Sigma - Optional flag:
--test-- include Atomic Red Team test command for validation
Process
-
Technique Analysis: Understand the ATT&CK technique -- what the adversary does, what telemetry it generates, and what the detection surface looks like.
-
Data Source Identification: Determine the required data sources:
- Windows Event IDs (Security, Sysmon, PowerShell, etc.)
- Linux log sources (auditd, syslog, journald)
- Network data (DNS, HTTP, NetFlow)
- Cloud audit logs (CloudTrail, Cloud Audit Logs, Azure Activity Log)
-
Detection Logic Design: Build the detection logic:
- Selection criteria: What fields and values identify the malicious behavior?
- Filter conditions: What legitimate activity looks similar and should be excluded?
- Aggregation: Does the detection need counting, grouping, or time windows?
- Correlation: Does the detection need multiple events correlated together?
-
False Positive Assessment: Identify known benign activities that will trigger the rule:
- Administrative tools that produce similar telemetry
- Legitimate automation that matches the pattern
- System processes that mimic adversary behavior
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 3d ago First seen · 102 lines · 0 tokens per session scan A 8ddc839a43e9
detection-rule is a command published in the GitHub repository HermeticOrmus/LibreSecOps-Claude-Code (4 stars, last pushed 3mo ago), licensed MIT. It costs nothing until one of its globs matches a file; then it loads 794 tokens. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
Other commands, from other repositories
token-scan
Meme coin and token security scan — checks for rug pull vectors (hidden mint, honeypot, fee manipulation, LP lock bypass, authority retention, bonding curve exploits, fake renounce, sandwich amplification). Manual 8-class grep audit (with an optional automated scanner if present). Usage: /token-scan [--chain solana].
scope
Mandatory pre-flight scope check — verify an asset is in scope BEFORE any HTTP touch. Deterministic (deny-wins, default-deny) via engine/scope.py against the engagement's scope.md. Blocks out-of-scope testing. Usage: /scope [ ...].
aod.project-plan
Create implementation plan with dual sign-off (PM + Architect) - Streamlined v2.
aod.roadmap
Scaffold a quarterly roadmap document from completed PRDs with PM sign-off.
aod.score
Re-score an existing idea's ICE rating when circumstances change.
aod.blueprint
Unified project setup & story generation — auto-detects new vs existing projects.