Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/HermeticOrmus/LibreSecOps-Claude-CodeWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/commands/hermeticormus/libresecops-claude-code/k8s-rbac-audit)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/commands/hermeticormus/libresecops-claude-code/k8s-rbac-audit"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/commands/hermeticormus/libresecops-claude-code/k8s-rbac-audit/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/commands/hermeticormus/libresecops-claude-code/k8s-rbac-audit"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/commands/hermeticormus/libresecops-claude-code/k8s-rbac-audit.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00030 | $0.01403 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00012 | $0.00561 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00006 | $0.00281 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00003 | $0.00140 |
Grade A, and why
k8s-rbac-audit scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 12d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 148 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
/k8s-rbac-audit
Focused audit of Kubernetes RBAC configuration, identifying overly permissive roles and privilege escalation paths.
Trigger
Use when you need to:
- Audit who has access to what in a Kubernetes cluster
- Identify overly permissive roles and role bindings
- Find privilege escalation paths through RBAC
- Review RBAC after organizational changes (team restructuring, offboarding)
- Prepare for a security review focused on access control
Input
One of:
- Live cluster:
kubectlaccess with RBAC read permissions - RBAC manifests: Role, ClusterRole, RoleBinding, ClusterRoleBinding YAML files
- Helm charts: Charts defining RBAC resources
- Specific scope: Focus on a namespace, team, or service account
Process
Phase 1: Cluster-Level RBAC
-
cluster-admin bindings
kubectl get clusterrolebindings -o json | jq -r ' .items[] | select(.roleRef.name == "cluster-admin") | "Binding: \(.metadata.name)\nSubjects: \(.subjects | map(.kind + ":" + .name) | join(", "))\n"'- Every cluster-admin binding (should be minimal -- operators, break-glass only)
- system:masters group members (equivalent to cluster-admin, cannot be restricted by RBAC)
-
Overprivileged ClusterRoles
kubectl get clusterroles -o json | jq -r ' .items[] | select(.rules[]? | .resources[]? == "*" and .verbs[]? == "*") | .metadata.name'- ClusterRoles with
*on all resources and all verbs - ClusterRoles with
createonpodsordeployments(code execution) - ClusterRoles with access to
secretsacross all namespaces
- ClusterRoles with
-
Dangerous permission combinations
create pods+get secrets= create a pod that mounts any secretcreate pods+create serviceaccounts+create rolebindings= escalate to any rolepatch nodes= modify node labels to bypass nodeSelector constraintsimpersonate users/groups= act as any userescalateon roles = create roles with more permissions than you havebindon roles = bind any role to any subject
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 12d ago Changed · +5 lines · +30 tokens per session 11547bff6652
- 1mo ago First seen · 143 lines · 0 tokens per session scan A 321022065b7c
k8s-rbac-audit is a command published in the GitHub repository HermeticOrmus/LibreSecOps-Claude-Code (4 stars, last pushed 9d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 30 tokens to every session and 1,403 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.
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