log-query

log-query is a command for Claude Code from HermeticOrmus/LibreSecOps-Claude-Code. It costs 41 tokens per session (1,057 once invoked), scanned A, original, MIT.

A command for writing or adapting searches in Splunk, Elastic, Microsoft Sentinel, or Sigma, a shared format for security detection rules.

In plain words
What is it for?
Use it to detect attack techniques, investigate incidents, search for known indicators, convert Sigma rules, or reduce false alerts.
Why use it?
It avoids having to translate every investigation or detection manually between different security platforms.

Command for Claude Code

Written for Claude Code: argument-hint in frontmatter.

Part of the siem-log-management plugin — 2 skills, 2 commands, 2 agents shipped together

Good fit Use it to detect attack techniques, investigate incidents, search for known indicators, convert Sigma rules, or reduce false alerts.

Compare 6 commands from other repositories ↓
Install with agentmods
npx agentmods add commands/hermeticormus/libresecops-claude-code/log-query
Install

Getting it into your agent

One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.

Clone the repo
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/HermeticOrmus/LibreSecOps-Claude-Code

Made for: Claude Code.

Or install siem-log-management, the plugin that ships this one along with the rest of its 2 skills, 2 commands, 2 agents.

Wrote this? Show the measurements

A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.

agentmods badge for log-query

README.md
[![agentmods](https://agentmods.dev/badge/commands/hermeticormus/libresecops-claude-code/log-query/github.svg)](https://agentmods.dev/commands/hermeticormus/libresecops-claude-code/log-query)
Your own site
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/commands/hermeticormus/libresecops-claude-code/log-query"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/commands/hermeticormus/libresecops-claude-code/log-query/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>

Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.

agentmods 80×15 button for log-query

Your own site · 80×15
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/commands/hermeticormus/libresecops-claude-code/log-query"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/commands/hermeticormus/libresecops-claude-code/log-query.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>
Per session 41 Only the description is in the session, so the agent can decide to use it. The body loads when it is invoked.
When invoked 1,057 The whole file, excluding the scripts and references it only reads on demand.
Security scan A 0 findings. A grade says what 26 rules found in the file — not that it is safe.
Origin original No closer match found in the catalogue.
Token cost

What it costs to keep this loaded

Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.

ModelPer sessionOnce invoked
Fable 5.1 $0.00041 $0.01057
Opus 5.5 $0.00016 $0.00423
Sonnet 5.5 $0.00008 $0.00211
Haiku 4.5 $0.00004 $0.00106

Measured 12d ago against content hash 1a8f6bdcb82d, method: parsed. Prices are Anthropic first-party input rates as of 2026-10-07, from the pricing page.

Security

Grade A, and why

log-query scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 12d ago.

A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.

Nothing flagged

None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.

plugins/siem-log-management/commands/log-query.md · 124 lines

How it starts

The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 124 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.

/log-query

Build a detection or investigation query for a specific threat or scenario, with syntax for Splunk SPL, Elastic KQL, or Microsoft Sentinel KQL.

Trigger

Use when you need to:

  • Write a detection rule for a specific MITRE ATT&CK technique
  • Build an investigation query for an active incident
  • Convert a Sigma rule to a specific platform syntax
  • Create a threat hunting query
  • Tune an existing detection rule to reduce false positives

Input

  • Threat/scenario: What to detect or investigate. Can be:
    • MITRE ATT&CK technique ID (e.g., "T1059.001 - PowerShell")
    • Specific attack pattern (e.g., "DCSync attack detection")
    • Investigation scenario (e.g., "trace lateral movement from compromised host")
    • IOC search (e.g., "find all connections to this IP across last 30 days")
    • Sigma rule to convert
  • Platform: Splunk SPL, Elastic KQL/EQL, Microsoft Sentinel KQL, or Sigma (all platforms)
  • Available log sources: What data is indexed (Sysmon, Windows Security, CloudTrail, etc.)
  • Tuning context (optional): Known false positive sources to exclude, environment-specific filters

Process

  1. Requirement analysis -- Understand what needs to be detected and the available data sources. Map the threat to specific observable events.

  2. Log source identification -- Determine which log sources contain the events needed for detection:

    • Process creation: Sysmon Event ID 1, Windows 4688, EDR process logs
    • Network connections: Sysmon Event ID 3, firewall logs, proxy logs, Zeek conn.log
    • Authentication: Windows 4624/4625, Okta system logs, Azure AD sign-in logs
    • File operations: Sysmon Event IDs 11/15/23, auditd, EDR file logs
    • Registry: Sysmon Event IDs 12/13/14, Windows Security logs
    • DNS: Sysmon Event ID 22, DNS server query logs, Zeek dns.log
    • Cloud: CloudTrail, Azure Activity, GCP Audit
  3. Query construction -- Build the query with:

    • Core detection logic (the pattern that identifies the threat)
    • Context enrichment (user, host, process details for triage)
    • False positive filtering (known-good patterns excluded)
    • Performance optimization (indexed fields, efficient operators)

Read the full file on GitHub · 124 lines

Changes

What this file has done since we first saw it

Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.

  1. 12d ago Changed · +5 lines · +41 tokens per session 1a8f6bdcb82d
  2. 1mo ago First seen · 119 lines · 0 tokens per session scan A bdf4bc692b54

Subscribe to this mod's changes

log-query is a command published in the GitHub repository HermeticOrmus/LibreSecOps-Claude-Code (4 stars, last pushed 9d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 41 tokens to every session and 1,057 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.