Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/HermeticOrmus/LibreSecOps-Claude-CodeWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/commands/hermeticormus/libresecops-claude-code/supply-chain-audit)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/commands/hermeticormus/libresecops-claude-code/supply-chain-audit"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/commands/hermeticormus/libresecops-claude-code/supply-chain-audit/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/commands/hermeticormus/libresecops-claude-code/supply-chain-audit"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/commands/hermeticormus/libresecops-claude-code/supply-chain-audit.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00025 | $0.01044 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00010 | $0.00418 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00005 | $0.00209 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00003 | $0.00104 |
Grade A, and why
supply-chain-audit scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 12d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 119 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
/supply-chain-audit
Audit a project's dependencies for known vulnerabilities, license risks, integrity issues, and supply chain health.
Trigger
Use when you need to assess the security posture of a project's dependency tree. Appropriate for:
- Pre-release security review
- Onboarding to a new codebase
- Periodic dependency hygiene checks
- Compliance requirements (EO 14028, NIS2, FDA cybersecurity)
- After a public supply chain incident to check exposure
Input
The command operates on the current project directory. It needs:
- Required: At least one package manager lockfile or manifest (package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, Cargo.lock, go.sum, requirements.txt, poetry.lock, Gemfile.lock, composer.lock, pom.xml, build.gradle)
- Optional flag:
--sbom-- generate a full SBOM in addition to the audit report - Optional flag:
--format [spdx|cyclonedx]-- SBOM output format (default: CycloneDX 1.5) - Optional flag:
--deep-- include maintainer health analysis and typosquatting checks (slower, more thorough)
Process
-
Ecosystem Detection: Scan the project root and subdirectories for package manager lockfiles and manifests. Identify all ecosystems in use (monorepos often use multiple).
-
Dependency Tree Mapping: Parse lockfiles to build the complete dependency tree including all transitive dependencies. Count direct vs. transitive. Identify maximum depth.
-
Vulnerability Scan: Cross-reference every dependency and version against:
- National Vulnerability Database (NVD)
- OSV (Open Source Vulnerabilities)
- GitHub Advisory Database
- CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog
-
Severity Prioritization: For each finding, assess:
- CVSS v3.1 base score
- EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) probability
- CISA KEV status (actively exploited in the wild)
- Whether the vulnerable code path is reachable from the project
-
License Analysis: Check each dependency's declared license against:
- SPDX license identifier validity
- Copyleft vs. permissive classification
- License compatibility with the project's own license
- Missing or ambiguous license declarations
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 12d ago Changed · +5 lines · +25 tokens per session 4acb151621fe
- 1mo ago First seen · 114 lines · 0 tokens per session scan A e9695f3c072d
supply-chain-audit is a command published in the GitHub repository HermeticOrmus/LibreSecOps-Claude-Code (4 stars, last pushed 9d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 25 tokens to every session and 1,044 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.
Other commands, from other repositories
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checklist
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clarify
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specify
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converge
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