threat-model

threat-model is a command for Claude Code from HermeticOrmus/LibreSecOps-Claude-Code. It costs 35 tokens per session (845 once invoked), scanned A, original, MIT.

A command that creates a structured threat model for a system or feature. It examines trust boundaries and data flows, then uses STRIDE, attack trees, and MITRE ATT&CK, a catalog of attacker tactics and techniques, to organize threats and mitigations.

In plain words
What is it for?
Use it during feature design, architecture reviews, or security audits to list threats, rank their risks, and define specific protections.
Why use it?
It turns an informal security discussion into a concrete review of what can go wrong, how likely or damaging it may be, and how to reduce the risk.

Command for Claude Code

Written for Claude Code: argument-hint in frontmatter.

Part of the threat-modeling plugin — 3 skills, 1 command, 2 agents shipped together

Good fit Use it during feature design, architecture reviews, or security audits to list threats, rank their risks, and define specific protections.

Compare 6 commands from other repositories ↓
Install with agentmods
npx agentmods add commands/hermeticormus/libresecops-claude-code/threat-model
Install

Getting it into your agent

One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.

Clone the repo
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/HermeticOrmus/LibreSecOps-Claude-Code

Made for: Claude Code.

Or install threat-modeling, the plugin that ships this one along with the rest of its 3 skills, 1 command, 2 agents.

Wrote this? Show the measurements

A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.

agentmods badge for threat-model

README.md
[![agentmods](https://agentmods.dev/badge/commands/hermeticormus/libresecops-claude-code/threat-model/github.svg)](https://agentmods.dev/commands/hermeticormus/libresecops-claude-code/threat-model)
Your own site
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/commands/hermeticormus/libresecops-claude-code/threat-model"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/commands/hermeticormus/libresecops-claude-code/threat-model/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>

Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.

agentmods 80×15 button for threat-model

Your own site · 80×15
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/commands/hermeticormus/libresecops-claude-code/threat-model"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/commands/hermeticormus/libresecops-claude-code/threat-model.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>
Per session 35 Only the description is in the session, so the agent can decide to use it. The body loads when it is invoked.
When invoked 845 The whole file, excluding the scripts and references it only reads on demand.
Security scan A 0 findings. A grade says what 26 rules found in the file — not that it is safe.
Origin original No closer match found in the catalogue.
Token cost

What it costs to keep this loaded

Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.

ModelPer sessionOnce invoked
Fable 5.1 $0.00035 $0.00845
Opus 5.5 $0.00014 $0.00338
Sonnet 5.5 $0.00007 $0.00169
Haiku 4.5 $0.00003 $0.00085

Measured 12d ago against content hash 72311b338634, method: parsed. Prices are Anthropic first-party input rates as of 2026-10-07, from the pricing page.

Security

Grade A, and why

threat-model scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 12d ago.

A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.

Nothing flagged

None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.

plugins/threat-modeling/commands/threat-model.md · 117 lines

How it starts

The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 117 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.

Threat model construction

You are a threat-modeler agent. Produce a structured threat model for the system or feature described.

Context

The user is designing a new feature, reviewing existing architecture, or preparing for a security audit. They need: STRIDE walk, attack tree, MITRE ATT&CK mapping, risk-ranked threat list, concrete mitigations.

Requirements

$ARGUMENTS

Instructions

1. Establish scope

Clarify:

  • What components are in scope?
  • What are the trust boundaries (user → app, app → DB, app → external API, etc.)?
  • What's the data classification (public, internal, confidential, restricted)?
  • What's the attacker model (external unauthenticated, authenticated user, insider, nation-state)?
  • What compliance frameworks apply (SOC 2, PCI DSS, HIPAA)?

Don't fabricate. Ask.

2. Map data flows

Identify every place data crosses a trust boundary:

User → CDN → App Server → Database
         ↓
    External API
         ↓
    3rd-Party Auth Provider

Each arrow is a potential threat surface.

3. Walk STRIDE per data flow

For each flow, ask all six STRIDE questions. Don't skip categories. Most systems have threats in every category.

4. Construct attack trees for high-stakes goals

For the 2-3 most important attacker goals (data exfiltration, account takeover, privilege escalation), decompose with AND/OR logic. Show concrete attack paths.

5. Score with DREAD

Per threat:

  • Damage (1-10): how bad
  • Reproducibility (1-10): how easy to reproduce
  • Exploitability (1-10): skill + effort required
  • Affected users (1-10): scope
  • Discoverability (1-10): how easy to find

Score = average. Rank threats by score.

6. Propose specific mitigations

For each threat, name:

  • The control (specific, not generic)
  • How to verify (test, audit, monitoring)
  • Residual risk after the control
  • Detection plan if the control fails

7. Output the document

Use the format from the agent definition. Save to ~/dev/threat-models/[feature]-threat-model.md for resumability.

Read the full file on GitHub · 117 lines

Changes

What this file has done since we first saw it

Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.

  1. 12d ago Changed · +5 lines · +35 tokens per session 72311b338634
  2. 1mo ago First seen · 112 lines · 0 tokens per session scan A 1999c504b3f4

Subscribe to this mod's changes

threat-model is a command published in the GitHub repository HermeticOrmus/LibreSecOps-Claude-Code (4 stars, last pushed 9d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 35 tokens to every session and 845 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.