pixtuoid: Command for GitHub Copilot

.github/prompts/impl-plan.prompt.md

impl-plan is a command for GitHub Copilot from IvanWng97/pixtuoid. It costs 0 tokens per session (1,659 once invoked), scanned A, original, MIT.

An implementation-planning command for preparing changes before writing code. It turns known review risks into questions and plan steps, especially for features or changes spanning several files.

In plain words
What is it for?
Use it for new features, configuration options, command-line flags, modules, or changes touching several source files. It is not intended for simple documentation edits or obvious one-file fixes.
Why use it?
It helps catch design and architecture problems during planning, when they are cheaper to fix than after code and review are complete.

Command for GitHub Copilot

Written for GitHub Copilot: a Copilot chat mode or prompt.

This is IvanWng97/pixtuoid's own configuration. It tells GitHub Copilot how to work on pixtuoid itself, so it is not a mod to install elsewhere. Copy it as a starting point and replace the rules that are about this project. Everything pixtuoid configures →

Reuse

Borrowing it

Nothing to install: this file belongs to IvanWng97/pixtuoid. Take a copy, put it at the same path in your own repository, and replace the rules that are about this project with yours.

Copy the file
curl -O https://raw.githubusercontent.com/IvanWng97/pixtuoid/main/.github/prompts/impl-plan.prompt.md
Clone the repo
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/IvanWng97/pixtuoid

Made for: GitHub Copilot.

Wrote this? Show the measurements

A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.

agentmods badge for impl-plan

README.md
[![agentmods](https://agentmods.dev/badge/commands/ivanwng97/pixtuoid/impl-plan.svg)](https://agentmods.dev/commands/ivanwng97/pixtuoid/impl-plan)
Your own site
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/commands/ivanwng97/pixtuoid/impl-plan"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/commands/ivanwng97/pixtuoid/impl-plan.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>
Per session 0 Only the description is in the session, so the agent can decide to use it. The body loads when it is invoked.
When invoked 1,659 The whole file, excluding the scripts and references it only reads on demand.
Security scan A 0 findings. A grade says what 26 rules found in the file — not that it is safe.
Origin original No closer match found in the catalogue.
Token cost

What it costs to keep this loaded

Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.

ModelPer sessionOnce invoked
Fable 5.1 $0.00000 $0.01659
Opus 5 $0.00000 $0.00830
Sonnet 5 $0.00000 $0.00332
Haiku 4.5 $0.00000 $0.00166

Measured yesterday against content hash 23dc244eadbe, method: parsed. Prices are Anthropic first-party input rates as of 2026-09-07, from the pricing page.

Security

Grade A, and why

impl-plan scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured yesterday.

A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.

Nothing flagged

None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.

.github/prompts/impl-plan.prompt.md · 107 lines

How it starts

The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 107 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.

Implementation-plan brief — the review, shifted left

The upstream twin of pr-review.prompt.md: the review protocol catches the repo's known failure classes after the code exists; this brief front-loads the same classes while each costs one plan line instead of a finding plus a fix round. Census grounding: at least 4 of the 7 post-merge escapes and the one design-class miss (PR #86's parallel config structure) were plan-preventable.

When to use: new feature, new config key / CLI flag, new seam or module, any change touching a documented sharp edge, or any change you expect to span ≥3 source files. Skip for (overrides the file count): typo/docs fixes, mechanical renames/moves, single-file bugfixes with an obvious pinning test — right-size the process; don't 700-line-plan a 300-line change.

The plan must answer (the mined failure classes, moved left)

Every section gets an answer; "n/a" counts only with a reason.

  1. Design gate cleared (arc-loop step 3) — before the sections below, the plan states the approach passed the gate: the idiomatic way is confirmed against real docs/source (not memory); the design survived an adversarial pass; the deepening lens ran (deletion test — does this deepen a module or add another shallow one = AI-slop?). Name any big-radius refactor the deepening warrants — a slop-reducing refactor is in-scope here, not deferred by default.
  2. Data shapes — for every NEW field, config key, map, or collection: name its identity/key-space. If it overlaps an existing structure's identity (two collections keyed by the same id; an attribute map shadowing an entity list), the plan consolidates into one entity type or justifies why not. Shared IDENTITY consolidates; shared TOPIC stays separate (the [pet-names] lesson). A JOIN of two existing collections names its join key and verifies it against the real production constants IN THE PLAN — the plan that ASSUMED registry id == install-target name shipped a CRITICAL caught only at review (R0613-16).
  3. Consumers — every new field, parameter, or asset names the consumer this same change wires up. A plan line "add X" without "Y reads X at Z" is the unwired-addition smell (CONTRIBUTING pitfall 5) at its cheapest fix point — _snap_prev shipped unconsumed and defeated its own PR.
  4. Siblings — every guard, fix, or NEW SURFACE enumerates its sibling paths up front (Unix/Windows arms, twin call sites, parallel manifests — for a config key: the docs and manifest twins) and says which get the same treatment in this change (pitfall 2's in-diff form). 3b. Reachability — a guard protects an OUTCOME, so enumerate every path that reaches that outcome, not just the one the bug arrived through, and give each a disposition (guarded here / already guarded at X / genuinely exempt because Y). Mechanical, not from memory: rg the function the outcome flows through and read EVERY call site. This is distinct from item 3 — siblings are parallel IMPLEMENTATIONS (a per-source decoder, a platform arm), reachability is the call sites into ONE implementation, and a plan can enumerate the first while missing the second entirely. The ghost-gate arc is the worked example: the first-sight gate was written, reviewed and live-verified against !known files while emit_first_sight had a SECOND caller on the append path — rg emit_first_sight returns both in seconds — so the shipped fix did nothing for the ordering a running pixtuoid actually meets. State the ORDERINGS too where the outcome is timing-dependent (boot-then-write vs write-then-boot): they are reachability in the time axis and the verification plan must exercise each.
  5. Untrusted input — if the change touches transcript/hook/file/config input, name the decode boundary where it is sanitized (pitfall 3), and whether any user-visible truncation is char-safe (pitfall 1). A denylist's enumeration cites the platform's DOCUMENTED set, never memory (pitfall 6).
  6. Tests — name the failing test each implementation step starts with (the repo is TDD-first), then the refusal paths those tests will pin — BOTH sides of every window/threshold, with offsets derived from the constant under test (pitfall 4).
  7. Sharp edges — read the doc comment on every declaration this design touches and list the constraints they state (tests/, Raycast and site keep theirs in the guide). They are the documented hazards exactly where you are about to work: what looks like a bug and is deliberate.
  8. Verification plan — the gates to run, and any watch-it requirement: motion/pose changes render an animation and WATCH it; sprite changes run the beautify-decoration loop. Verification steps are blocking plan items, not checkboxes — PR #61 shipped five walk regressions behind an unchecked "live run" checkbox. Name the CI-ONLY gates the change can red (semver, api-surface, doc-check, gen-check, wasm-check, windows-test, snapshots): just preflight is blind to all of them, so "preflight green" is a claim about a SUBSET and must say so — the ghost-gate arc reported all-green with api-surface and doc-check both red. And reproduce the REPORTED scenario, including its ordering (item 3b), not a convenient one: a repro built from the artifact left on disk re-runs the state you already fixed and proves nothing about how it got there.
  9. Layering / orchestration boundary — if the change adds or crosses a layer seam (a mechanism/foundation layer with an orchestrator over it, like installsources), name the ONE orchestration entry point and design the lower layer's mechanism API as pub(crate), never pub: callers reach it ONLY through the orchestrator, never directly. Do NOT expose an underlayer/foundation API as crate-public so something can call it around the facade — that is a design leak unreachable_pub can't catch once the module itself is reachable, so the plan is where the single-gateway shape is decided (install/uninstall route SOLELY through crate::sources; the plan states "no second caller" and which existing direct calls collapse into the orchestrator). A new public seam on a lower layer needs a one-line justification of why the orchestrator can't own it.

Read the full file on GitHub · 107 lines

Changes

What this file has done since we first saw it

Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.

  1. yesterday First seen · 107 lines · 0 tokens per session scan A 23dc244eadbe

Subscribe to this mod's changes

impl-plan is a command published in the GitHub repository IvanWng97/pixtuoid (472 stars, last pushed today), licensed MIT. It costs nothing until one of its globs matches a file; then it loads 1,659 tokens. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-06.