Borrowing it
Nothing to install: this file belongs to IvanWng97/pixtuoid. Take a copy, put it at the same path in your own repository, and replace the rules that are about this project with yours.
curl -O https://raw.githubusercontent.com/IvanWng97/pixtuoid/main/.github/prompts/impl-plan.prompt.mdgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/IvanWng97/pixtuoidWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/commands/ivanwng97/pixtuoid/impl-plan)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/commands/ivanwng97/pixtuoid/impl-plan"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/commands/ivanwng97/pixtuoid/impl-plan.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00000 | $0.01659 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00000 | $0.00830 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00000 | $0.00332 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00000 | $0.00166 |
Grade A, and why
impl-plan scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured yesterday.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 107 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Implementation-plan brief — the review, shifted left
The upstream twin of pr-review.prompt.md: the review
protocol catches the repo's known failure classes after the code exists; this
brief front-loads the same classes while each costs one plan line instead of
a finding plus a fix round. Census grounding: at least 4 of the 7 post-merge
escapes and the one design-class miss (PR #86's parallel config structure)
were plan-preventable.
When to use: new feature, new config key / CLI flag, new seam or module, any change touching a documented sharp edge, or any change you expect to span ≥3 source files. Skip for (overrides the file count): typo/docs fixes, mechanical renames/moves, single-file bugfixes with an obvious pinning test — right-size the process; don't 700-line-plan a 300-line change.
The plan must answer (the mined failure classes, moved left)
Every section gets an answer; "n/a" counts only with a reason.
- Design gate cleared (arc-loop step 3) — before the sections below, the plan states the approach passed the gate: the idiomatic way is confirmed against real docs/source (not memory); the design survived an adversarial pass; the deepening lens ran (deletion test — does this deepen a module or add another shallow one = AI-slop?). Name any big-radius refactor the deepening warrants — a slop-reducing refactor is in-scope here, not deferred by default.
- Data shapes — for every NEW field, config key, map, or collection:
name its identity/key-space. If it overlaps an existing structure's
identity (two collections keyed by the same id; an attribute map
shadowing an entity list), the plan consolidates into one entity type or
justifies why not. Shared IDENTITY consolidates; shared TOPIC stays
separate (the
[pet-names]lesson). A JOIN of two existing collections names its join key and verifies it against the real production constants IN THE PLAN — the plan that ASSUMED registry id == install-target name shipped a CRITICAL caught only at review (R0613-16). - Consumers — every new field, parameter, or asset names the consumer
this same change wires up. A plan line "add X" without "Y reads X at Z"
is the unwired-addition smell (CONTRIBUTING pitfall 5) at its cheapest
fix point —
_snap_prevshipped unconsumed and defeated its own PR. - Siblings — every guard, fix, or NEW SURFACE enumerates its sibling
paths up front (Unix/Windows arms, twin call sites, parallel manifests —
for a config key: the docs and manifest twins) and says which get the
same treatment in this change (pitfall 2's in-diff form).
3b. Reachability — a guard protects an OUTCOME, so enumerate every path
that reaches that outcome, not just the one the bug arrived through, and
give each a disposition (guarded here / already guarded at X / genuinely
exempt because Y). Mechanical, not from memory:
rgthe function the outcome flows through and read EVERY call site. This is distinct from item 3 — siblings are parallel IMPLEMENTATIONS (a per-source decoder, a platform arm), reachability is the call sites into ONE implementation, and a plan can enumerate the first while missing the second entirely. The ghost-gate arc is the worked example: the first-sight gate was written, reviewed and live-verified against!knownfiles whileemit_first_sighthad a SECOND caller on the append path —rg emit_first_sightreturns both in seconds — so the shipped fix did nothing for the ordering a running pixtuoid actually meets. State the ORDERINGS too where the outcome is timing-dependent (boot-then-write vs write-then-boot): they are reachability in the time axis and the verification plan must exercise each. - Untrusted input — if the change touches transcript/hook/file/config input, name the decode boundary where it is sanitized (pitfall 3), and whether any user-visible truncation is char-safe (pitfall 1). A denylist's enumeration cites the platform's DOCUMENTED set, never memory (pitfall 6).
- Tests — name the failing test each implementation step starts with (the repo is TDD-first), then the refusal paths those tests will pin — BOTH sides of every window/threshold, with offsets derived from the constant under test (pitfall 4).
- Sharp edges — read the doc comment on every declaration this design touches and list the constraints they state (tests/, Raycast and site keep theirs in the guide). They are the documented hazards exactly where you are about to work: what looks like a bug and is deliberate.
- Verification plan — the gates to run, and any watch-it requirement:
motion/pose changes render an animation and WATCH it; sprite changes run
the
beautify-decorationloop. Verification steps are blocking plan items, not checkboxes — PR #61 shipped five walk regressions behind an unchecked "live run" checkbox. Name the CI-ONLY gates the change can red (semver, api-surface, doc-check, gen-check, wasm-check, windows-test, snapshots):just preflightis blind to all of them, so "preflight green" is a claim about a SUBSET and must say so — the ghost-gate arc reported all-green with api-surface and doc-check both red. And reproduce the REPORTED scenario, including its ordering (item 3b), not a convenient one: a repro built from the artifact left on disk re-runs the state you already fixed and proves nothing about how it got there. - Layering / orchestration boundary — if the change adds or crosses a
layer seam (a mechanism/foundation layer with an orchestrator over it,
like
install←sources), name the ONE orchestration entry point and design the lower layer's mechanism API aspub(crate), neverpub: callers reach it ONLY through the orchestrator, never directly. Do NOT expose an underlayer/foundation API as crate-public so something can call it around the facade — that is a design leakunreachable_pubcan't catch once the module itself is reachable, so the plan is where the single-gateway shape is decided (install/uninstall route SOLELY throughcrate::sources; the plan states "no second caller" and which existing direct calls collapse into the orchestrator). A new public seam on a lower layer needs a one-line justification of why the orchestrator can't own it.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- yesterday First seen · 107 lines · 0 tokens per session scan A 23dc244eadbe
impl-plan is a command published in the GitHub repository IvanWng97/pixtuoid (472 stars, last pushed today), licensed MIT. It costs nothing until one of its globs matches a file; then it loads 1,659 tokens. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-06.
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