challenge

challenge is a command for Claude Code from jaskaranhundal/usap-skills. It costs 30 tokens per session (1,466 once invoked), scanned A, original, Apache-2.0.

A command that tests a security-analysis agent against a fictional crisis involving eight simultaneous attack scenarios. It produces a 12-check comparison scorecard.

In plain words
What is it for?
Use it to evaluate the agent's handling of attacks such as ransomware, phishing, data theft, denial-of-service, and cloud or container attacks.
Why use it?
It provides a repeatable test of how the security agent handles many incident types and marks required unknown details as unverified.

Command for Claude Code

Written for Claude Code: installed under .claude/.

Part of the usap-skills plugin — 87 skills, 7 commands, 1 plugin shipped together

Good fit Use it to evaluate the agent's handling of attacks such as ransomware, phishing, data theft, denial-of-service, and cloud or container attacks.

Compare 6 commands from other repositories ↓
Install with agentmods
npx agentmods add commands/jaskaranhundal/usap-skills/challenge
Install

Getting it into your agent

One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.

Clone the repo
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/jaskaranhundal/usap-skills

Made for: Claude Code.

Or install usap-skills, the plugin that ships this one along with the rest of its 87 skills, 7 commands, 1 plugin.

Wrote this? Show the measurements

A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.

agentmods badge for challenge

README.md
[![agentmods](https://agentmods.dev/badge/commands/jaskaranhundal/usap-skills/challenge/github.svg)](https://agentmods.dev/commands/jaskaranhundal/usap-skills/challenge)
Your own site
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/commands/jaskaranhundal/usap-skills/challenge"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/commands/jaskaranhundal/usap-skills/challenge/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>

Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.

agentmods 80×15 button for challenge

Your own site · 80×15
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/commands/jaskaranhundal/usap-skills/challenge"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/commands/jaskaranhundal/usap-skills/challenge.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>
Per session 30 Only the description is in the session, so the agent can decide to use it. The body loads when it is invoked.
When invoked 1,466 The whole file, excluding the scripts and references it only reads on demand.
Security scan A 0 findings. A grade says what 26 rules found in the file — not that it is safe.
Origin original No closer match found in the catalogue.
Token cost

What it costs to keep this loaded

Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.

ModelPer sessionOnce invoked
Fable 5.1 $0.00030 $0.01466
Opus 5 $0.00015 $0.00733
Sonnet 5 $0.00006 $0.00293
Haiku 4.5 $0.00003 $0.00147

Measured 9d ago against content hash 13cc5464ec9b, method: parsed. Prices are Anthropic first-party input rates as of 2026-09-09, from the pricing page.

Security

Grade A, and why

challenge scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 9d ago.

A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.

Nothing flagged

None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.

.claude/commands/usap/challenge.md · 142 lines

How it starts

The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 142 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.

You are running the USAP Maximum Difficulty Challenge against cs-security-analyst.


Step 1 — Load Main Agent

Read agents/security/cs-security-analyst.md in full using the Read tool.

Adopt the full Alex persona (Tier 2 SOC, 12y experience). You are now operating under the AT (Alert Triage) workflow. Do not break persona until this command completes.


Step 2 — Load the Perfect Storm Scenario

Read tests/scenarios/nation-state-apt-crisis.json in full.

This is an 8-vector simultaneous compound crisis:

  • V1: Nation-state APT (Cobalt Strike, Mimikatz, domain controller compromise)
  • V2: FortiOS zero-day (CVSS 9.8, actively exploited)
  • V3: GitHub Actions supply chain poisoned (OIDC token theft, malicious image)
  • V4: AI-assisted spear phishing (480 Okta accounts compromised)
  • V5: BlackCat-successor ransomware (142 hosts, 20% of estate, 15% EDR blind spot)
  • V6: Insider threat — 2.3TB S3 exfiltration (UNCONFIRMED — forensic gate required)
  • V7: 140Gbps DDoS smokescreen (12,000 alerts/hour noise)
  • V8: Kubernetes container escape with IMDS hop attempt (aws_imds_version UNKNOWN)

Seven fields are deliberately UNKNOWN and must be labeled PREREQUISITE_UNVERIFIED — do NOT assume values.


Step 3 — Apply AT Workflow and Produce Output

Apply the full AT (Alert Triage) workflow from the agent's Reasoning Procedure to this scenario.

Strict rules:

  • All recommended actions MUST be expressed as USAP intent blocks — no raw CLI (no bash, no AWS CLI, no kubectl, no FortiOS CLI, no PowerShell)
  • UNKNOWN fields must be flagged as PREREQUISITE_UNVERIFIED — do not assume values
  • The insider threat (V6) must NOT be treated as malicious without forensic gate
  • The AWS blast radius (V8) must NOT be asserted without verifying aws_imds_version
  • The supply chain (V3) must NOT be suspended without scope assessment

Produce the full USAP output contract JSON with:

  • agent_slug, intent_type, action, rationale, confidence, severity
  • alert_triage — top 5 priority signals ranked from 12,000+/hour with DDoS noise suppressed
  • kill_chain_mapping — all 6 ATT&CK stages mapped across 8 vectors
  • threat_actors — two separate entries (nation-state APT + ransomware gang — NOT conflated)
  • severity_declaration — SEV-1 with justification points
  • agent_routingnext_agents: ["cs-incident-responder", "cs-ciso-advisor"] with per-agent justification
  • sequenced_containment_plan — ransomware → APT → insider → supply chain in that order
  • supply_chain_gate — scope audit before pipeline suspension
  • regulatory_flags — GDPR 72h + SEC 4-day with deadlines
  • prerequisite_checks — all 7 UNKNOWN fields labeled PREREQUISITE_UNVERIFIED
  • key_findings — 8 entries, one per vector with MITRE TTPs
  • evidence_references — 8 entries, one per vector with source, indicator, confidence
  • human_approval_required: true
  • timestamp_utc: current UTC

Read the full file on GitHub · 142 lines

Changes

What this file has done since we first saw it

Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.

  1. 9d ago First seen · 142 lines · 30 tokens per session scan A 13cc5464ec9b

Subscribe to this mod's changes

challenge is a command published in the GitHub repository jaskaranhundal/usap-skills (4 stars, last pushed 4d ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 30 tokens to every session and 1,466 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.