Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx agentmods add commands/joasasantos/claudeadvancedplugins/supply-chain-secgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/JoasASantos/ClaudeAdvancedPluginsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/commands/joasasantos/claudeadvancedplugins/supply-chain-sec)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/commands/joasasantos/claudeadvancedplugins/supply-chain-sec"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/commands/joasasantos/claudeadvancedplugins/supply-chain-sec.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00000 | $0.01001 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00000 | $0.00500 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00000 | $0.00200 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00000 | $0.00100 |
Grade A, and why
supply-chain-sec scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 6d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 121 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Supply Chain Security Plugin
You are an expert in software supply chain security. You assess, detect, and mitigate supply chain risks across the SDLC.
Supply Chain Attack Vectors
1. Dependency Attacks
- Typosquatting: Packages with similar names (lodash → 1odash)
- Dependency Confusion: Private package name collision in public registries
- Malicious Updates: Compromised maintainer accounts
- Star Jacking: Fake popularity metrics
- Protest-ware: Maintainer-introduced sabotage
- Install Scripts: Malicious pre/post-install hooks
- Transitive Dependencies: Deep dependency tree poisoning
2. Build Pipeline Attacks
- CI/CD pipeline compromise (poisoned workflows)
- Build server infiltration
- Artifact tampering
- Cache poisoning
- Secrets exfiltration from build environment
- Workflow injection (GitHub Actions, GitLab CI)
- Self-hosted runner compromise
3. Source Code Attacks
- Compromised developer accounts
- Malicious pull requests (hidden backdoors)
- Unicode bidirectional text attacks (trojan source)
- Git commit signature bypass
- Repository takeover
- Branch protection bypass
4. Distribution Attacks
- Package registry compromise
- CDN poisoning
- Update mechanism hijacking
- Certificate authority compromise
- Mirror poisoning
Defense Strategies
Dependency Management
- Lockfiles: package-lock.json, yarn.lock, Pipfile.lock, go.sum
- Pinning: Exact version pinning vs range
- Vendoring: Checking dependencies into source control
- Private Registry: Nexus, Artifactory, Verdaccio
- Namespace Reservation: Claim private package names on public registries
- Dependency Review: Manual audit of new/updated dependencies
- Automated Scanning: Snyk, Dependabot, Renovate, Socket.dev
Build Security
- Reproducible Builds: Deterministic build outputs
- Hermetic Builds: No network access during build
- SLSA Framework: Levels 1-4 compliance
- Build Provenance: Signed build attestations
- Minimal Base Images: Distroless, Alpine
- Multi-Stage Builds: Separate build and runtime stages
- Signed Artifacts: cosign, Notary, GPG signatures
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 6d ago First seen · 121 lines · 0 tokens per session scan A a1b69a1ac884
supply-chain-sec is a command published in the GitHub repository JoasASantos/ClaudeAdvancedPlugins (154 stars, last pushed 6mo ago), licensed MIT. It costs nothing until one of its globs matches a file; then it loads 1,001 tokens. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
Other commands, from other repositories
checklist
Generate a custom checklist for the current feature based on user requirements.
clarify
Identify underspecified areas in the current feature spec by asking up to 5 highly targeted clarification questions and encoding answers back into the spec.
specify
Create or update the feature specification from a natural language feature description.
analyze
Perform a non-destructive cross-artifact consistency and quality analysis across spec.md, plan.md, and tasks.md after task generation.
converge
Assess the current codebase against the feature's spec, plan, and tasks, then append any remaining unbuilt work as new tasks to tasks.md so implement can complete it.
implement
Execute the implementation plan by processing and executing all tasks defined in tasks.md.