Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/LeahyCC/claude-skillsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/commands/leahycc/claude-skills/code-review)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/commands/leahycc/claude-skills/code-review"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/commands/leahycc/claude-skills/code-review/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/commands/leahycc/claude-skills/code-review"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/commands/leahycc/claude-skills/code-review.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00000 | $0.03238 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00000 | $0.01295 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00000 | $0.00648 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00000 | $0.00324 |
Grade A, and why
code-review scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 255 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Code Review — Deep & Thorough
OWASP-mapped, skill-aware code review with autofix suggestions. Reviews the diff, not the world.
Phase 1: Gather Context (30 seconds max)
Run these in parallel:
git diff --staged --unified=5andgit diff --unified=5— the actual changesgit diff --staged --name-onlyandgit diff --name-only— changed file listgit log --oneline -5— recent commits for intent context- If no diff exists, use
git diff HEAD~1 --unified=5instead
Scope rule: Only review changed lines and their immediate context (5 lines above/below). Never flag issues in unchanged code unless they are CRITICAL security vulnerabilities introduced by the change's new dependencies.
Phase 2: Classify Changed Files
For each changed file, tag it with applicable review domains:
| File Pattern | Tags | Review Focus |
|---|---|---|
route.ts, api/** |
api, security |
OWASP API1-10, auth, input validation, CORS |
actions.ts, action.ts, **/actions/** |
server-action, security |
Auth in every action, input validation, IDOR |
proxy.ts, middleware.ts |
middleware, security |
Auth gate, CSP, rate limiting |
*.tsx, *.jsx |
react |
Hooks, a11y, rendering, client/server boundary |
next.config.* |
config, security |
Security headers, image domains, redirects |
data/**, lib/db*, lib/auth* |
dal, security |
DAL pattern, parameterized queries, DTOs |
*.test.*, *.spec.* |
test |
Coverage, assertion quality, mocking patterns |
package.json, pnpm-lock.*, package-lock.* |
deps |
New dependencies, version changes, audit |
*.css, *.scss, tailwind.* |
styles |
a11y (contrast, motion), reflow |
*.sql, migrations/** |
database |
Injection, permissions, rollback safety |
Phase 3: Security Review (OWASP-Mapped)
For every file tagged security, api, server-action, middleware, or dal, check against these OWASP categories. Cite the category ID in every finding.
CRITICAL — Must Block
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago First seen · 255 lines · 0 tokens per session scan A fd4bd862e74e
code-review is a command published in the GitHub repository LeahyCC/claude-skills (3 stars, last pushed yesterday), licensed MIT. It costs nothing until one of its globs matches a file; then it loads 3,238 tokens. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
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