Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/mertjane/awesome-claude-commandsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/commands/mertjane/awesome-claude-commands/security-scan)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/commands/mertjane/awesome-claude-commands/security-scan"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/commands/mertjane/awesome-claude-commands/security-scan/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/commands/mertjane/awesome-claude-commands/security-scan"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/commands/mertjane/awesome-claude-commands/security-scan.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00030 | $0.01446 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00012 | $0.00578 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00006 | $0.00289 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00003 | $0.00145 |
Grade A, and why
security-scan scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 2mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 176 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Security Vulnerability Scan
Scan the project's source code for security vulnerabilities and produce a prioritized report.
If $ARGUMENTS is provided, limit the scan to that path. Otherwise scan the entire project.
Step 1 — Discover Source Files
Glob for files to scan (exclude node_modules, .git, dist, .next, build, coverage):
**/*.{ts,tsx,js,jsx,mjs,cjs}
**/*.{py,go,rb,php,java}
**/*.{sql,env,yaml,yml,json,toml}
If $ARGUMENTS is provided, scope the glob to that directory.
Step 2 — Hardcoded Secrets
For every file, search for patterns that suggest embedded credentials:
API keys and tokens:
- Patterns:
sk-[a-zA-Z0-9]{20,},ghp_[a-zA-Z0-9]{36},AIza[0-9A-Za-z-_]{35},AKIA[0-9A-Z]{16} - Variable assignments where key contains
SECRET,API_KEY,TOKEN,PASSWORD,PRIVATE_KEYand value is a non-empty string literal (notprocess.env.*, not${...})
Connection strings with passwords:
- Patterns:
(mongodb|postgresql|mysql|redis):\/\/[^:]+:[^@]+@ password\s*[:=]\s*["'][^"']{3,}["'](inline password assignment)
Private keys:
-----BEGIN (RSA|EC|OPENSSH|PGP) PRIVATE KEY-----
Severity: CRITICAL — these must be rotated and moved to environment variables.
Step 3 — SQL Injection
Search for raw SQL string concatenation patterns in .ts, .js, .py, .php, .java files:
Dangerous patterns:
`SELECT * FROM ${`or"SELECT * FROM " +(template literal or concat with variable)query("... WHERE id = " + req.params)execute(f"SELECT ... {user_input}")(Python f-string in SQL).raw(calls without parameterization
Safe patterns to ignore:
$1,?,:paramplaceholders- ORM query builders (
.where({ id: userId }),.findOne(id))
Severity: HIGH for any raw concatenation with request/user data.
Step 4 — Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)
In .tsx, .jsx, .html, .ejs, .hbs files:
Dangerous patterns:
dangerouslySetInnerHTML={{ __html:with a variable (not a static string)innerHTML =assigned from user input or request datadocument.write(with variable contenteval(ornew Function(with non-literal argumentv-html="in Vue templates with variable
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 2mo ago First seen · 176 lines · 30 tokens per session scan A 9686b4a31977
security-scan is a command published in the GitHub repository mertjane/awesome-claude-commands (2 stars, last pushed 8mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 30 tokens to every session and 1,446 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
security-scan compared with commands from other repositories
| Mod | Type | Stars | Last push | Licence | Scan | Tokens | Works with |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| security-scanmertjane/awesome-claude-commands | Command | 2 | 8mo ago | MIT | A | 30 | Claude Code |
| index-skillsOKHP3/skillz | Command | 3 | yesterday | MIT | A | 0 | Claude Code, Codex |
| catalog-skillsOKHP3/skillz | Command | 3 | yesterday | MIT | A | 0 | Claude Code, Codex |
| prepAlessandroCaula/dot-claude | Command | 3 | 1mo ago | none | A | 0 | Claude Code |
| add-api-railwayAshikparvez89/larouex-fullstack-plugin | Command | 3 | 25d ago | MIT | A | 0 | Claude Code |
| checklistgithub/spec-kit | Command | 148k | today | MIT | A | 13 | Claude Code |
| clarifygithub/spec-kit | Command | 148k | today | MIT | A | 27 | Claude Code |