Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/Mikacr1138/claude-bug-bountyWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/commands/mikacr1138/claude-bug-bounty/report)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/commands/mikacr1138/claude-bug-bounty/report"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/commands/mikacr1138/claude-bug-bounty/report/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/commands/mikacr1138/claude-bug-bounty/report"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/commands/mikacr1138/claude-bug-bounty/report.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00000 | $0.00926 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00000 | $0.00463 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00000 | $0.00185 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00000 | $0.00093 |
Grade A, and why
report scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 9d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
This is a copy
86% identical to report — 22 lines differ, which has more behind it and is treated as the original. This page carries a canonical link to it rather than competing with it.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 116 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
/report
Generate a submission-ready bug bounty report.
Pre-Conditions
Run /validate first. All 4 gates must pass before running this command.
Never write a report before validating. N/A submissions hurt your validity ratio.
Usage
/report
Provide when prompted:
- Platform (HackerOne / Bugcrowd / Intigriti / Immunefi)
- Bug class
- Affected endpoint
- Your two test accounts and their IDs
- The exact HTTP request that demonstrates the bug
- The exact response that shows the impact
- Tech stack (for CVSS and remediation advice)
What This Generates
- Title following the formula:
[Bug Class] in [Endpoint] allows [actor] to [impact] - Summary paragraph (impact-first, no "could potentially")
- Vulnerability details with CVSS 3.1 score and vector string
- Steps to Reproduce with copy-paste HTTP requests
- Impact statement with quantification
- Recommended fix (1-2 sentences, specific)
- Supporting materials section
Platform Selection
HackerOne Format
- Markdown sections: Summary, Vulnerability Details, Steps to Reproduce, Impact, Recommended Fix
- Include CVSS 3.1 score + vector string
- Include two test account setup instructions
- Keep under 600 words
Bugcrowd Format
- Title with VRT category:
[VRT Category] > [Subcategory] > P[1-4] - Expected vs Actual Behavior section
- Severity Justification section referencing Bugcrowd VRT
Intigriti Format
- CVSS score prominent at top
- Clear reproduction steps
- Business impact focused
Immunefi Format (Web3)
- Root cause in Solidity code
- Foundry PoC test included
- Economic impact quantified in $ value
- Comparison evidence (same check present elsewhere, missing here)
Writing Rules
- Never use: "could potentially", "may allow", "might be possible"
- Always prove: show actual data/action, not just "200 OK"
- Impact first: sentence 1 = what attacker gets, not what the bug is
- Quantify: how many users affected, what data type, $ amount
- Short: triagers skim. < 600 words.
- Human: write to a person, not a system
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 9d ago First seen · 116 lines · 0 tokens per session scan A 8dc2ab489c16
report is a command published in the GitHub repository Mikacr1138/claude-bug-bounty (2 stars, last pushed yesterday), licensed MIT. It costs nothing until one of its globs matches a file; then it loads 926 tokens. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. It is 86% identical to report, differing in 22 lines, and is treated as a copy.
Other commands, from other repositories
sicario.assess
Assess the repository against SicarioSpec guardrails.
sicario.review
Review the active spec, plan, tasks, staged changes, or branch for security and governance gaps.
triage-release-check
Triage a failed make release-check — read the captured log, identify the failing gate stage, and recommend the producer-side fix. Analysis only; applies nothing unless asked.
checklist
Generate a custom checklist for the current feature based on user requirements.
clarify
Identify underspecified areas in the current feature spec by asking up to 5 highly targeted clarification questions and encoding answers back into the spec.
specify
Create or update the feature specification from a natural language feature description.