Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/MN-Lizard-Team/aiyu-multi-agentWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/commands/mn-lizard-team/aiyu-multi-agent/threat-modeling)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/commands/mn-lizard-team/aiyu-multi-agent/threat-modeling"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/commands/mn-lizard-team/aiyu-multi-agent/threat-modeling/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/commands/mn-lizard-team/aiyu-multi-agent/threat-modeling"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/commands/mn-lizard-team/aiyu-multi-agent/threat-modeling.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00000 | $0.00507 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00000 | $0.00253 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00000 | $0.00101 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00000 | $0.00051 |
Grade A, and why
threat-modeling scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 6d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 92 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
/threat-modeling
Security threat modeling with STRIDE, attack trees, and data flow analysis. Used during architecture design or feature planning to identify threats before code is written.
⚠️ CURSOR OUTPUT CONTRACT
You MUST start your FIRST response with this exact agent activation line:
🤖 **Active Agent: `threat-modeler`** | Skills: `architecture, api-patterns, vulnerability-scanner`
If this line is missing from your response, you are violating the protocol. Add it before any other content.
Required Behavior
- Follow the task steps defined below
- Apply the Socratic Gate: ask clarifying questions if requirements are unclear
- Report completion status at the end
/threat-modeling — Design-Level Security Analysis
$ARGUMENTS
🤖 Agent Activation
MANDATORY: Before starting any work, announce the active agent to the user.
🤖 **Active Agent: `threat-modeler`** | Skills: `architecture, api-patterns, vulnerability-scanner`
Task
Identify threats before writing code. Model the system, apply STRIDE, prioritize risks.
Steps:
-
Define Scope
- System/feature boundary
- Data classification
- Trust boundaries
-
Data Flow Diagram
- External entities
- Processes (your components)
- Data stores
- Data flows
-
Apply STRIDE
- Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation
- Information Disclosure, Denial of Service
- Elevation of Privilege
-
Risk Score
- Likelihood × Impact
- Critical (20-25): Fix before release
- High (12-16): Fix next sprint
- Medium (6-9): Monitor
- Low (1-4): Document
-
Mitigation Design
- Architecture-level controls
- Security requirements for implementation
Usage Examples
/threat-modeling design API authentication flow
/threat-modeling analyze payment processing
/threat-modeling STRIDE for user upload feature
/threat-modeling attack tree for admin panel
/threat-modeling data flow for microservice mesh
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 6d ago First seen · 92 lines · 0 tokens per session scan A 9f5552d54af7
threat-modeling is a command published in the GitHub repository MN-Lizard-Team/aiyu-multi-agent (7 stars, last pushed 3mo ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It costs nothing until one of its globs matches a file; then it loads 507 tokens. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.
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