Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/nicelight/DevRails-26Wrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/commands/nicelight/devrails-26/red-verify)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/commands/nicelight/devrails-26/red-verify"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/commands/nicelight/devrails-26/red-verify/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/commands/nicelight/devrails-26/red-verify"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/commands/nicelight/devrails-26/red-verify.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00015 | $0.02219 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00006 | $0.00888 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00003 | $0.00444 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00002 | $0.00222 |
Grade A, and why
red-verify scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 214 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
/red-verify - Adversarial semantic verification
/verify owns functional evidence. /red-verify owns semantic evidence and one
exact SEMANTIC_VERDICT: semantic-pass|semantic-concern|semantic-fail.
Zero reportable findings is a normal result of sufficient adversarial coverage.
<input_contract>
Expected $ARGUMENTS:
TASK-NNN-TN-FT-NNN-WN: per-task semantic verification;--feature FT-<ID>: T2 feature-completion semantic verification.
Reject --feature FT-000. Foundation closes through normal FT-000 tasks and
the final gate.
Load .memory-bank/workflows/tier-policy.md#tier-obligations and
#closure-authority for permitted modes, required gates, and lifecycle
ownership. Apparent scope growth also loads
#tier-classification-and-escalation and routes through tier rebuild before
semantic verification.
Require indexed task/feature identity, tier policy, task/feature intent and mapped REQ/AC, successful functional verification evidence, actual diff/change surface, tests/runtime artifacts, tier-selected protocol, direct task-linked canonical SDD specs for T2/T3, and only the additional provenance-linked context needed to assess system impact.
For per-task T2/T3, feature links and spec-index.md alone do not replace
direct task links. Missing direct applicable coverage is a blocker, not a basis
for semantic-pass.
</input_contract>
<hard_invariants>
- Before the semantic verdict, load and apply this installed skill's
references/finding-adjudication.mdsemantic pack. - Use an independent verifier context; do not trust task prose, writer claims,
or
VERDICT: PASSas proof of semantic correctness. - Route only by task tier and the loaded tier-policy sections; never use legacy
risk. - Scheduler mode:
/red-verifynever closes/fails/blocks/reopens tasks, promotes dependents, or writes scheduler status. It returns verdict/evidence and a recommended owner action. - Manual lifecycle or BUG/follow-up mutation is allowed only under explicit standalone ownership and canonical tier policy.
- T3 semantic-pass does not replace functional PASS.
- T2 feature semantic-pass must be recorded in the matching feature document; per-task evidence is not a substitute.
- Do not invent a separate failure artifact, status, task schema, or lifecycle. </hard_invariants>
<operator_decisions> If the semantic verdict depends on an ambiguous product/spec interpretation, canonical identity, acceptance meaning, architecture/contract/state/data/ storage/security/compatibility decision, task boundary, tier, dependency, or verification policy, the verifier does not pick a favorable reading.
- Return
semantic-concernwhen an unresolved operator-owned decision is necessary to judge the accepted outcome or a proved realistic material risk. - Return
semantic-failonly when evidence proves a material break of an unambiguous accepted outcome. - State the exact operator question, competing interpretations, affected closure/dependents, and repair owner.
- Do not manufacture an operator question from a speculative, unreachable, or immaterial candidate.
- Interactive flow asks the operator; recommendation/default/silence is not an
accepted decision. The answer must be durably applied by
/feature-doctor,/feature-to-tasks, or/spec-redesign, then functional and semantic gates rerun as applicable. - Unattended flow returns the blocker to the scheduler for
HALT_CLARIFICATION_REQUIREDorHALT_BLOCKING_QUESTIONSand names the exact resume route. </operator_decisions>
<finding_admission> Generate and assess hostile hypotheses privately. Do not write hypotheses, admission notes, rejected candidates, scorecards, or a target finding count to protocols, reports, task records, specs, or tests.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago First seen · 214 lines · 15 tokens per session scan A dc5924e5cb32
red-verify is a command published in the GitHub repository nicelight/DevRails-26 (23 stars, last pushed 1mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 15 tokens to every session and 2,219 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
Other commands, from other repositories
audio-pass
Functional audio review for implementation, mix coverage, clarity, and player feedback.
test-value-review
Use when a diff adds or changes test files, when a PR claims coverage for config, CI workflows, templates, or HTML output, or when tests look written only to satisfy a "must have tests" rule; not for Playwright selector or performance hygiene (use /playwright-review).
auditar-refactor
Invoca refactor-safety-auditor — gate canônico antes de qualquer refactor. Coleta evidências (linhas, contrato externo, coverage, mutation) e retorna veredito GO/BLOCK/WARN/GO-OVERRIDE.
quality-check-command
This command performs comprehensive code quality checks. Use it before commits or when implementation is complete.
bug-check
Run automated tests and build checks first, then agent code review. For each bug found, propose or document a regression test.
claude-loop
Use a fresh headless Claude session (Fable by default) as an independent reviewer of the whole repo, area by area (or of one branch's diff with --base), fix every real finding with regression tests, and loop until each area comes back clean twice in a row. The /codex-loop pattern on Anthropic usage. Runs autonomously.