Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/nitinjain999/platform-skillsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/commands/nitinjain999/platform-skills/zizmor)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/commands/nitinjain999/platform-skills/zizmor"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/commands/nitinjain999/platform-skills/zizmor/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/commands/nitinjain999/platform-skills/zizmor"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/commands/nitinjain999/platform-skills/zizmor.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00175 | $0.06195 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00088 | $0.03097 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00035 | $0.01239 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00017 | $0.00619 |
Grade A, and why
zizmor scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 10d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 396 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Audit GitHub Actions workflows for security findings — before an attacker reads them for you.
Read references/zizmor.md before responding. It contains bootstrap steps, the full 41-audit catalogue with persona and online gating, zizmor.yml schema and discovery rules, exit-code semantics, auto-fix blast radius, and the CI and pre-commit templates.
This command is interactive by default. With no arguments, run the three-layer wizard below. Never dump a raw zizmor invocation and stop — the useful output is a triaged verdict, not a finding list.
Ownership boundary (enforced at the menu)
| Question | Authoritative command |
|---|---|
| "Is this workflow valid?" (syntax, schema, shell bugs) | /platform-skills:github-actions — actionlint |
| "Is this workflow safe?" (injection, permissions, pinning) | this command |
"Is my action.yml well designed?" |
/platform-skills:composite-actions |
| "How do I keep these SHA pins current?" | /platform-skills:renovate |
| "Is there a misconfig in my Terraform / Helm / Dockerfile?" | /platform-skills:checkov |
| "Does this image or dependency have CVEs?" | /platform-skills:trivy |
| "How do I sign images / generate an SBOM?" | /platform-skills:supply-chain |
Zizmor and actionlint are complements. A workflow can be perfectly valid and still hand an attacker a shell. When the user asks for "workflow checks" without qualifying, run both and say which tool produced which finding.
Mode dispatch
Parse the first word of $ARGUMENTS as the mode. When $ARGUMENTS is empty, run the three-layer interactive wizard.
| Mode | What it does |
|---|---|
scan |
Default-persona audit of the current repo — the everyday run |
audit |
Deep sweep: --persona=auditor --min-confidence=low, all collectors, online |
fix |
--fix=safe (or all on request), show the diff, re-audit what remains |
triage |
Walk existing findings one at a time → fix / inline-ignore / config-ignore / remap / disable |
config |
Generate or repair .github/zizmor.yml — pinning policy, allowlists, suppressions |
ci |
Emit the GitHub Actions workflow — SARIF alerts, hard-fail gate, or both |
precommit |
Add the zizmor-pre-commit hook and explain the offline caveat |
explain |
Explain one audit id or one finding, and how to fix it properly |
| (empty) | Three-layer interactive wizard |
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 10d ago First seen · 396 lines · 175 tokens per session scan A 775fe704a169
zizmor is a command published in the GitHub repository nitinjain999/platform-skills (41 stars, last pushed yesterday), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 175 tokens to every session and 6,195 once invoked, about $0.0009 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
Other commands, from other repositories
announce
Draft X/Twitter announcement post (or thread) for the latest plugin release.
ia-test-browser
Run browser tests on pages affected by current PR or branch.
ia-verify
Run pre-PR verification chain -- build, types, lint, tests, security scan, diff review.
ia-agent-native-audit
Score each of the 5 agent-native principles (parity, granularity, composability, emergent capability, improvement-over-time) against a codebase and report gaps.
release
Generate changelog, bump version, and create git tag.
ia-report-bug
Report a bug in the whetstone plugin.