A command for examining .NET program files, which are compiled applications that run on Microsoft’s .NET platform. It extracts metadata, checks for code obfuscation, and can decompile or deobfuscate assemblies.

Analyzing a .NET binary, listing its types and assembly details, identifying common obfuscators, and producing a deobfuscated copy when needed.

Compiled .NET code is difficult to read directly, especially when its names and control flow have been deliberately hidden. This command gives a defined process for inspecting it and keeps output in the project directory.

dotnet — Command by ogrodev

Install

Getting it into your agent

One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.

agentmods

npx agentmods add commands/ogrodev/fsociety/dotnet

Clone the repo

git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/ogrodev/fsociety

Per session 15 Only the description is in the session, so the agent can decide to use it. The body loads when it is invoked.

When invoked 662 The whole file, excluding the scripts and references it only reads on demand.

Security scan A 0 findings. Scan, not verified.

Origin original No closer match found in the catalogue.

Token cost

What it costs to keep this loaded

Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.

Model	Per session	Once invoked
Fable 5	$0.00015	$0.00662
Opus 5	$0.00008	$0.00331
Sonnet 5	$0.00003	$0.00132
Haiku 4.5	$0.00002	$0.00066

Measured 2d ago against content hash 1864c34e2923, method: parsed. Prices are Anthropic first-party input rates as of 2026-08-30, from the pricing page.

Security

Grade A, and why

dotnet scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 2d ago.

A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.

Nothing flagged

None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.

romero/commands/dotnet.md · 86 lines

How it starts

The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 86 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.

Storage Policy: ALL output files MUST be saved in the project directory. NEVER write to /tmp/ or any system temporary directory.

.NET Assembly Analysis

Parse $ARGUMENTS to get the binary path.

Step 1 — Verify .NET Binary

r2 -qc 'ii' <binary> | grep -i mscoree
file <binary> | grep -i "\.NET\|Mono\|CLR"

If not a .NET binary, inform the user and suggest /analyze instead.

Step 2 — Metadata Extraction

monodis --typedef <binary>             # Class/type listing
monodis --assembly <binary>            # Assembly metadata
monodis --typeref <binary>             # Referenced types

Step 3 — Obfuscation Detection

Look for signs of obfuscation:

Garbled/non-readable class and method names
Single-character namespaces
Unusual control flow in IL code
Known obfuscator watermarks:
- ConfuserEx: ConfuserEx in metadata or garbled names starting with \u
- Dotfuscator: DotfuscatorAttribute
- .NET Reactor: .reacto section or __EncryptedAssembly__ resource
- Babel: BabelAttribute
- Eazfuscator: EazAttribute

Step 4 — Deobfuscation (if needed)

de4dot <binary> -o extracted/deobfuscated-<binary-name>

de4dot will auto-detect the obfuscator and apply appropriate cleaning.

Verify deobfuscation succeeded:

monodis --typedef extracted/deobfuscated-<binary-name>

Step 5 — Full Decompilation

Using ILSpy CLI (if available):

ilspycmd <binary> -o extracted/dotnet-<binary-name>/

Or using monodis for IL:

monodis --method <binary>

Step 6 — Extract Interesting Data

Look for:

Connection strings: Data Source=, Server=, mongodb://
API endpoints: http://, https://, /api/
Embedded resources: Check .rsrc section
Hardcoded credentials: password, secret, key, token
Encryption keys: AES/RSA key material in code

Log findings:

node "${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/scripts/findings-tracker.js" add "<binary>" "<type>" "<value>" "<severity>" "<title>"

Read the full file on GitHub · 86 lines

Changes

What this file has done since we first saw it

Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.

2d ago First seen · 86 lines · 15 tokens per session scan A 1864c34e2923

Subscribe to this mod's changes

dotnet is a command published in the GitHub repository ogrodev/fsociety (20 stars, last pushed 5mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 15 tokens to every session and 662 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.

Security Writing and docs claude-code claude-code-plugin offensive-security pentesting

pr

Create a PR to main branch using conventional commit style for the title.

KeygraphHQ/shannon · 13 tokens

engage.scope

Execute Phase 0 - Scope Definition and Rules of Engagement.

hypnguyen1209/offensive-claude · 11 tokens

pentest

Activate pentest mode — displays ASCII art, configures session isolation, collects engagement scope, then OWNS the engagement: pre-flight, recon, planning (via the pentester-orchestrator planner), executor dispatch, a time-budget quota loop, aggregation, and report generation.

Stickman230/claude-pentest · 58 tokens

dotnet