Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/ogrodev/fsocietyWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/commands/ogrodev/fsociety/unpack)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/commands/ogrodev/fsociety/unpack"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/commands/ogrodev/fsociety/unpack/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/commands/ogrodev/fsociety/unpack"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/commands/ogrodev/fsociety/unpack.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00007 | $0.00641 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00003 | $0.00256 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00001 | $0.00128 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00001 | $0.00064 |
Grade A, and why
unpack scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 83 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Storage Policy: ALL output files MUST be saved in the project directory. NEVER write to
/tmp/or any system temporary directory.
Packer Detection & Unpacking
Parse $ARGUMENTS to get the binary path.
Step 1 — Identify Packing
-
Entropy analysis:
r2 -qc 'iS' <binary>Sections with entropy > 7.0 are likely packed.
-
File identification:
file <binary> -
Known packer signatures:
- UPX:
UPX0,UPX1sections, orUPX!magic at offset - ASPack:
.aspack,.adatasections - Themida/WinLicense:
.winlicense,.themidasections - VMProtect:
.vmp0,.vmp1sections - Enigma:
.enigmasection - .NET Reactor:
.reactosection - Confuser: Garbled section names in .NET
- UPX:
Step 2 — Attempt Unpacking
If UPX detected:
mkdir -p extracted
upx -d <binary> -o extracted/unpacked-<binary-name>
Verify the unpacked file:
file extracted/unpacked-<binary-name>
r2 -qc 'iS' extracted/unpacked-<binary-name>
If other packer: Document the packer type and suggest manual approaches:
- ASPack: Try generic unpackers or dump from memory
- Themida/VMProtect: Requires dynamic unpacking (run under debugger, dump at OEP)
- .NET obfuscation: Use
/dotnetwith de4dot - Custom packer: Use Frida for runtime memory dumping
Ask the user which approach to take:
AskUserQuestion: The binary is packed with <packer>. Options:
1. Attempt automated unpacking
2. Dynamic memory dump (requires wine + frida)
3. Skip unpacking, analyze packed binary
4. Manual approach (provide guidance)
Step 3 — Verify Unpacked Binary
- Check that the unpacked file is a valid PE:
file extracted/unpacked-<binary-name> - Compare entropy before/after:
r2 -qc 'iS' extracted/unpacked-<binary-name> - Verify imports are now visible:
r2 -qc 'ii' extracted/unpacked-<binary-name>
Step 4 — Re-analyze
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago First seen · 83 lines · 7 tokens per session scan A aecd65d50a00
unpack is a command published in the GitHub repository ogrodev/fsociety (20 stars, last pushed 7mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 7 tokens to every session and 641 once invoked, about $0.0000 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
Other commands, from other repositories
pentest
Activate pentest mode — displays ASCII art, configures session isolation, collects engagement scope, then OWNS the engagement: pre-flight, recon, planning (via the pentester-orchestrator planner), executor dispatch, a time-budget quota loop, aggregation, and report generation.
pentest-attacks
Define the attack profile for an engagement — select which attack categories and skills to use. Saves to .pentest-attacks.json. If run before /pentest:pentest, the orchestrator will respect the selection. If run standalone, does not launch a pentest.
pentest-scope
Define or update engagement scope — saves scope to disk without launching a pentest. Can be run before or during an engagement. If a pentest is active and the target changes drastically, warns the operator and suggests a new engagement.
pentest-kali
Connect to a Metasploit-Kali Server (MKS) REST API — verifies connectivity, discovers available Kali tools, and configures agents to prefer MKS endpoints over local Bash equivalents.
pentest-exit
Close pentest session — summarizes findings, ensures outputs are saved, lifts isolation, and prompts for /clear.
bb-ad
Active Directory enumeration and attack techniques. Includes LDAP enumeration, Kerberos attacks (Kerberoasting, AS-REP Roasting), SMB attacks, and domain privilege escalation. Use this when targeting Windows domain environments.