Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx agentmods add commands/omermaksutii/rugproof/audit-deepgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/omermaksutii/RugProofWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/commands/omermaksutii/rugproof/audit-deep)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/commands/omermaksutii/rugproof/audit-deep"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/commands/omermaksutii/rugproof/audit-deep.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5 | $0.00028 | $0.00650 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00014 | $0.00325 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00006 | $0.00130 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00003 | $0.00065 |
Grade A, and why
audit-deep scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 4d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 58 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
/audit-deep — multi-pass adversarial audit
Like /audit, but slower and more thorough. Use this for pre-launch or pre-mainnet-fork reviews where time is acceptable but escapes are not.
Differences vs /audit
- Two-pass review. First pass: per-skill findings. Second pass: cross-finding analysis — can any two findings be combined into an exploit chain?
- More specialist dispatches. Always invoke
attackerANDdefenderANDgas-optimizerAND any matching protocol specialists. - Cross-contract reachability. Trace external call graphs: which functions can call which, with what authorizations? Look for trust violations across the call graph.
- Invariant generation pass. Spawn
invariant-writerto identify protocol invariants that the contract intends to hold; check each one against the code. - Historical context. Use
c4-historyandsherlock-historyMCPs to look for similar findings in the historical database — protocols of this type have lost funds via X; does this code have X?
Procedure
Run /audit end-to-end first. Then:
Pass 2: Exploit-chain hunt
For each (high or critical) finding F:
- Could F be amplified by another finding? E.g. flash-loan + price oracle + missing access control → drain.
- Could F be amplified by an external integration (a specific token, a specific oracle behavior)?
- Generate at least one candidate exploit chain per Critical finding.
Pass 3: Invariant violation hunt
Run invariant-writer to extract:
- Token:
totalSupply == sum(balanceOf) - Vault:
totalAssets >= sum(convertToAssets(balanceOf)) - AMM:
K = reserve0 * reserve1monotonically non-decreasing after swap fees - Lending:
sumDebt <= sumCollateralAtPrice * MAX_LTV
For each invariant, prove or break it. If broken, emit a finding.
Pass 4: Historical pattern match
For each Critical / High finding, query c4-history-mcp and sherlock-history-mcp:
- Has a protocol of this type ever lost funds to this exact pattern?
- Cite the historical incident in the finding write-up.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 4d ago First seen · 58 lines · 28 tokens per session scan A 25fbeab47f3a
audit-deep is a command published in the GitHub repository omermaksutii/RugProof (9 stars, last pushed 1mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 28 tokens to every session and 650 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
Other commands, from other repositories
krait-fuzz
Run an invariant-based fuzzing campaign: Understand → Extract Invariants → Generate Foundry Tests → Run & Fix Iteratively → Report.
krait-poc
Write and run a valid Foundry proof-of-concept that proves (or disproves) a Solidity exploit by asserting the actual harm on a forked chain or against local source.
krait-quick
Run a streamlined audit: Recon → Detection → Verification → Report. Skips state inconsistency analysis and cross-feed iteration for speed.
verify-e2e-flow
Verify that the E2E scripts for the specified chain follow the documented transaction flow.
fix-btc-e2e-p2
Fix errors in BTC E2E test (Pattern 2: P2PKH 2-of-3 Multisig).
fix-bch-e2e-p3
Fix errors in BCH E2E test (Pattern 3: P2SH 3-of-3 Multisig).