Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx agentmods add commands/omermaksutii/rugproof/audit-strictgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/omermaksutii/RugProofWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/commands/omermaksutii/rugproof/audit-strict)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/commands/omermaksutii/rugproof/audit-strict"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/commands/omermaksutii/rugproof/audit-strict.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00025 | $0.00665 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00013 | $0.00332 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00005 | $0.00133 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00003 | $0.00067 |
Grade A, and why
audit-strict scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 6d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 75 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
/audit-strict — consensus-based audit
Same surface as /audit, but each finding must be independently produced by two passes to be reported.
Procedure
Step 1 — Pass A: bottom-up
Read the code function by function. For each function:
- Apply the vuln skills.
- Emit candidate findings.
Step 2 — Pass B: top-down
Dispatch the attacker subagent (fresh context, no prior findings shared). Ask it:
- "What would you steal here?"
- "What's the cheapest exploit?"
- Let it identify findings without skill-priors.
Step 3 — Consensus
Compute the intersection:
- Findings that appear in both passes → keep, confidence HIGH.
- Findings that appear in only one pass → keep with confidence MEDIUM, flag as single-source.
- Findings produced by skill-checks that match the attacker's exploit narrative → consensus, even if the wording differs.
Step 3b — Specialist panel (deep mode, optional)
For the highest-stakes audits, escalate consensus from 2 passes to an N-of-M
panel. Dispatch every specialist relevant to the detected protocol type (per the
/audit dispatch table) in parallel, each with fresh context, plus
attacker and defender. Require a finding to be surfaced by ≥3 independent
agents (or ≥2 for a Critical) before it reaches the HIGH-confidence tier;
single-agent findings drop to MEDIUM with a single-source flag. This trades cost
for the strongest false-positive suppression Rugproof offers.
Step 4 — Output
Strict audit (two-pass consensus):
Pass A findings: 8
Pass B findings: 6
Consensus (both): 5 ← reported as HIGH confidence
Pass-A-only: 3 ← reported as MEDIUM confidence with disclaimer
Pass-B-only: 1 ← reported as MEDIUM confidence with disclaimer
Final report: 5 high-confidence findings, 4 needing user judgment.
When to use
- Pre-launch audits where false-positive avoidance is critical
- Audit-of-audits (when you don't trust the prior tool's output)
- Generating a "we found this twice independently" claim for reports
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 6d ago First seen · 75 lines · 25 tokens per session scan A 4af84bd9f66e
audit-strict is a command published in the GitHub repository omermaksutii/RugProof (9 stars, last pushed 1mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 25 tokens to every session and 665 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
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