Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/omermaksutii/RugProofWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/commands/omermaksutii/rugproof/exploit)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/commands/omermaksutii/rugproof/exploit"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/commands/omermaksutii/rugproof/exploit/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/commands/omermaksutii/rugproof/exploit"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/commands/omermaksutii/rugproof/exploit.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00018 | $0.00941 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00007 | $0.00376 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00004 | $0.00188 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00002 | $0.00094 |
Grade A, and why
exploit scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 106 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
/exploit — write a working PoC
This is the headline feature. For a given finding ID, produce a Foundry test that:
- Sets up the vulnerable state.
- Executes the exploit.
- Asserts the attacker gained value or the protocol was broken.
- Compiles.
- The test passes when run.
If --story is set, also produce a narrative "attack walkthrough" — punchy prose suitable for a tweet thread or blog post.
Procedure
Step 1 — Read the finding and the target
- Pull finding
$ARGUMENTS[0]from the latest audit. - Read the affected file and all imports it needs.
- Note the function signatures, state vars, and any setup needed (e.g. funded balances, deployed dependencies like a Uniswap V2 pair).
Step 2 — Dispatch exploit-poc-writer subagent
The subagent writes the Foundry test. Use Foundry's Test base + vm.prank, vm.deal, vm.warp, vm.expectRevert, vm.startPrank, etc.
Structure:
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
pragma solidity ^0.8.20;
import "forge-std/Test.sol";
import {Vault} from "src/Vault.sol";
import {MaliciousReceiver} from "./MaliciousReceiver.sol";
contract ExploitREENT001 is Test {
Vault vault;
address attacker = makeAddr("attacker");
address victim = makeAddr("victim");
function setUp() public {
vault = new Vault();
vm.deal(victim, 10 ether);
vm.deal(attacker, 1 ether);
vm.prank(victim);
vault.deposit{value: 10 ether}();
}
function test_Reentrancy_Drain() public {
MaliciousReceiver bad = new MaliciousReceiver(vault);
vm.deal(address(bad), 1 ether);
vm.startPrank(attacker);
bad.attack{value: 1 ether}(); // ← seed deposit + trigger reentrancy
assertGt(address(bad).balance, 1 ether, "exploit failed to drain");
assertLt(address(vault).balance, 1 ether, "vault not drained");
}
}
Plus any auxiliary attacker contract.
Step 3 — Compile and run
Use the forge-runner MCP:
mcp__forge-runner__build()
mcp__forge-runner__test(test="test_Reentrancy_Drain")
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago First seen · 106 lines · 18 tokens per session scan A dee25e8efcb7
exploit is a command published in the GitHub repository omermaksutii/RugProof (10 stars, last pushed 2mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 18 tokens to every session and 941 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
Other commands, from other repositories
krait-fuzz
Run an invariant-based fuzzing campaign: Understand → Extract Invariants → Generate Foundry Tests → Run & Fix Iteratively → Report.
krait-poc
Write and run a valid Foundry proof-of-concept that proves (or disproves) a Solidity exploit by asserting the actual harm on a forked chain or against local source.
portfolio
Multi-chain portfolio (tokens + NFTs) for a wallet.
setup
Connect and select an Alchemy app for this session.
watch-wallet
Watch Wallet operates online and manages public keys only. It creates unsigned transactions, sends signed transactions, and monitors transaction status.
verify-e2e-flow
Verify that the E2E scripts for the specified chain follow the documented transaction flow.