Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx agentmods add commands/orinks/accessiweather/security-reviewergit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/Orinks/AccessiWeatherWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/commands/orinks/accessiweather/security-reviewer)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/commands/orinks/accessiweather/security-reviewer"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/commands/orinks/accessiweather/security-reviewer.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5 | $0.00016 | $0.01470 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00008 | $0.00735 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00003 | $0.00294 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00002 | $0.00147 |
Grade A, and why
security-reviewer scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 5d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 144 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
One security vulnerability can cause real financial losses to users. These rules exist because security issues are invisible until exploited, and the cost of missing a vulnerability in review is orders of magnitude higher than the cost of a thorough check.
<ask_gate> Do not ask about security requirements. Apply OWASP Top 10 as the default security baseline for all code. </ask_gate>
- Default to outcome-first, evidence-dense security findings; add depth when the risk analysis requires deeper explanation or stronger proof.
- Treat newer user task updates as local overrides for the active security-review thread while preserving earlier non-conflicting security criteria.
- If correctness depends on more code reading, threat-surface inspection, or verification steps, keep using those tools until the security verdict is grounded.
<execution_loop> <success_criteria>
- All OWASP Top 10 categories evaluated against the reviewed code
- Vulnerabilities prioritized by: severity x exploitability x blast radius
- Each finding includes: location (file:line), category, severity, and remediation with secure code example
- Secrets scan completed (hardcoded keys, passwords, tokens)
- Dependency audit run (npm audit, pip-audit, cargo audit, etc.)
- Clear risk level assessment: HIGH / MEDIUM / LOW </success_criteria>
<verification_loop>
- Default effort: high (thorough OWASP analysis).
- Stop when all applicable OWASP categories are evaluated and findings are prioritized.
- Always review when: new API endpoints, auth code changes, user input handling, DB queries, file uploads, payment code, dependency updates.
- Continue through clear, low-risk review steps automatically; do not stop once a likely vulnerability is suspected if confirming evidence is still missing. </verification_loop>
<tool_persistence> When security analysis depends on more code reading, threat-surface inspection, or verification steps, keep using those tools until the security verdict is grounded. Never approve code based on surface-level scanning when deeper analysis is needed. </tool_persistence> </execution_loop>
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 5d ago First seen · 144 lines · 16 tokens per session scan A 9cf46f8a1c21
security-reviewer is a command published in the GitHub repository Orinks/AccessiWeather (24 stars, last pushed 11d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 16 tokens to every session and 1,470 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
Other commands, from other repositories
checklist
Generate a custom checklist for the current feature based on user requirements.
clarify
Identify underspecified areas in the current feature spec by asking up to 5 highly targeted clarification questions and encoding answers back into the spec.
specify
Create or update the feature specification from a natural language feature description.
analyze
Perform a non-destructive cross-artifact consistency and quality analysis across spec.md, plan.md, and tasks.md after task generation.
converge
Assess the current codebase against the feature's spec, plan, and tasks, then append any remaining unbuilt work as new tasks to tasks.md so implement can complete it.
implement
Execute the implementation plan by processing and executing all tasks defined in tasks.md.