supply-chain

supply-chain is a command for Claude Code from postrv/narsil-mcp. It costs 11 tokens per session (274 once invoked), scanned A, original, Apache-2.0.

A command for checking a repository's software supply chain: the third-party libraries it uses, known security vulnerabilities, available upgrades, and license issues. A software bill of materials is a detailed list of those components.

In plain words
What is it for?
Use it to generate an SBOM, scan direct and development dependencies for CVEs, find upgrade paths, check license compatibility, and summarize prioritized actions.
Why use it?
It brings dependency and licensing risks into one review instead of requiring separate manual checks.

Command for Claude Code

Written for Claude Code: $ARGUMENTS substitution.

Part of the narsil-plugin plugin — 1 skill, 5 commands shipped together

Good fit Use it to generate an SBOM, scan direct and development dependencies for CVEs, find upgrade paths, check license compatibility, and summarize prioritized actions.

Compare 6 commands from other repositories ↓
Install with agentmods
npx agentmods add commands/postrv/narsil-mcp/supply-chain
Install

Getting it into your agent

One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.

Clone the repo
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/postrv/narsil-mcp

Made for: Claude Code.

Or install narsil-plugin, the plugin that ships this one along with the rest of its 1 skill, 5 commands.

Wrote this? Show the measurements

A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.

agentmods badge for supply-chain

README.md
[![agentmods](https://agentmods.dev/badge/commands/postrv/narsil-mcp/supply-chain/github.svg)](https://agentmods.dev/commands/postrv/narsil-mcp/supply-chain)
Your own site
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/commands/postrv/narsil-mcp/supply-chain"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/commands/postrv/narsil-mcp/supply-chain/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>

Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.

agentmods 80×15 button for supply-chain

Your own site · 80×15
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/commands/postrv/narsil-mcp/supply-chain"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/commands/postrv/narsil-mcp/supply-chain.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>
Per session 11 Only the description is in the session, so the agent can decide to use it. The body loads when it is invoked.
When invoked 274 The whole file, excluding the scripts and references it only reads on demand.
Security scan A 0 findings. A grade says what 26 rules found in the file — not that it is safe.
Origin original No closer match found in the catalogue.
Token cost

What it costs to keep this loaded

Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.

ModelPer sessionOnce invoked
Fable 5.1 $0.00011 $0.00274
Opus 5 $0.00005 $0.00137
Sonnet 5 $0.00002 $0.00055
Haiku 4.5 $0.00001 $0.00027

Measured 9d ago against content hash 76b61af8afaf, method: parsed. Prices are Anthropic first-party input rates as of 2026-09-09, from the pricing page.

Security

Grade A, and why

supply-chain scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 9d ago.

A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.

Nothing flagged

None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.

narsil-plugin/commands/supply-chain.md · 35 lines

What it actually says

Supply Chain Analysis

Perform a comprehensive supply chain security analysis on a repository.

Workflow

  1. Identify repository: If $ARGUMENTS is provided, use it as the repo name. Otherwise, use list_repos and ask which one to analyze.

  2. Generate SBOM: Use generate_sbom with format="cyclonedx" to create a software bill of materials

  3. Check for vulnerabilities: Use check_dependencies with include_dev=true and severity_threshold="low" to find all known CVEs

  4. Find upgrade paths: Use find_upgrade_path to identify safe upgrades for vulnerable dependencies

  5. Check license compliance: Use check_licenses to identify license issues. If the user specifies a project license, pass it via project_license.

  6. Summarize findings:

    • Total dependencies (direct and transitive)
    • Vulnerable dependencies with severity breakdown
    • Available safe upgrades
    • License compatibility issues
    • Recommended actions prioritized by risk

Arguments

Repository to analyze: $ARGUMENTS

Example usage:

  • /narsil:supply-chain
  • /narsil:supply-chain myproject
Changes

What this file has done since we first saw it

Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.

  1. 9d ago First seen · 35 lines · 11 tokens per session scan A 76b61af8afaf

Subscribe to this mod's changes

supply-chain is a command published in the GitHub repository postrv/narsil-mcp (182 stars, last pushed 4mo ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 11 tokens to every session and 274 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.