Borrowing it
Nothing to install: this file belongs to rjwalters/kicad-tools. Take a copy, put it at the same path in your own repository, and replace the rules that are about this project with yours.
curl -O https://raw.githubusercontent.com/rjwalters/kicad-tools/main/.claude/commands/repo/sudo.mdgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/rjwalters/kicad-toolsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/commands/rjwalters/kicad-tools/sudo)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/commands/rjwalters/kicad-tools/sudo"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/commands/rjwalters/kicad-tools/sudo.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00048 | $0.05493 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00024 | $0.02746 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00010 | $0.01099 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00005 | $0.00549 |
Grade D, and why
sudo scanned grade D with 2 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 3d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Asks for rootmediumPrivilege escalation
A mod that escalates privileges can change anything on the machine, not only the project.
description: "Opt-in passwordless sudo for a dev machine — install a visudo-validated /etc/sudoers.d drop-in (ALL or a scoped command list) so an agent over SSH isn't blocked on password prompts, always confirmed first" Recursive force deletehighDestructive command
rm -rf with a variable or a broad path is one typo away from removing the wrong tree.
commands (`rm -rf /`, force-push to `main`, cloud destruction, …). Granting How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 416 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
/repo:sudo — Passwordless-sudo setup for dev machines
Install (or inspect, or remove) a NOPASSWD: sudoers drop-in for the
current user on this machine, so an agent driving the box over SSH isn't
stopped dead by a sudo password prompt it can't answer. A non-interactive SSH
session has no TTY to type a password into, so every root-level remediation —
launchctl bootout, killing a runaway root process, spctl, renice — stalls
until a human runs the command by hand. This command installs the standard fix
once, safely, so agent-driven remote sessions can finish end-to-end.
This is machine-global, consequential setup: the drop-in grants anyone
holding the user's SSH key effective root on this box. It is therefore in the
same always-confirm-first class as /repo:remote, /repo:followups, and
/repo:update-tools — it shows the exact file contents it will write and
never applies silently, even without --ask. There is nothing to opt into;
confirmation is the only mode. The reasonable trade this makes — passwordless
root for personal dev machines on a private tailnet — is a deliberate operator
choice, so the operator makes it explicitly every time a scope changes.
Touch ID is the better answer for local, interactive use — enabling
pam_tid.soin/etc/pam.d/sudolets a Mac authorizesudowith a fingerprint. But Touch ID does not work over SSH (there is no local fingerprint reader on the remote end), which is exactly why aNOPASSWD:drop-in is the right tool for agent sessions and this command exists.
The destructive-command guard still applies on top. Passwordless sudo
removes the password gate, not the guard's ask/block gates on risky
commands (rm -rf /, force-push to main, cloud destruction, …). Granting
passwordless root does not weaken any of those checks.
Run this from a host session, not from inside a Loom-managed repo session.
/repo:sudo configures the machine, not this repository's contents, and its
write step (step 5) is deliberately built around mktemp — a path this repo's
worktree-write-confinement guard can never resolve, so it is denied
fail-closed whenever a managed worktree exists here. That denial is
expected and must not be worked around: invoke /repo:sudo from a session
outside a Loom-managed checkout, or have the operator run step 5's commands
by hand in a plain shell/SSH login. Full explanation, and why the temp file
must stay mktemp-created, is in the guard note in
step 5.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 3d ago First seen · 416 lines · 48 tokens per session scan D 2053993121c5
sudo is a command published in the GitHub repository rjwalters/kicad-tools (56 stars, last pushed today), licensed MIT. It adds 48 tokens to every session and 5,493 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it D with 2 findings (asks for root, recursive force delete). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.
Other commands, from other repositories
checklist
Generate a custom checklist for the current feature based on user requirements.
clarify
Identify underspecified areas in the current feature spec by asking up to 5 highly targeted clarification questions and encoding answers back into the spec.
specify
Create or update the feature specification from a natural language feature description.
analyze
Perform a non-destructive cross-artifact consistency and quality analysis across spec.md, plan.md, and tasks.md after task generation.
converge
Assess the current codebase against the feature's spec, plan, and tasks, then append any remaining unbuilt work as new tasks to tasks.md so implement can complete it.
implement
Execute the implementation plan by processing and executing all tasks defined in tasks.md.