Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx agentmods add commands/robofinsystems/robosystems/security-auditgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/RoboFinSystems/robosystemsWhat it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5 | $0.00016 | $0.03606 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00008 | $0.01803 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00003 | $0.00721 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00002 | $0.00361 |
Grade A, and why
security-audit scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 2d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 162 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Run a read-only AWS + GitHub security-posture review, then produce a findings report and a prioritized remediation plan.
Scope boundary. This is an infrastructure/cloud posture audit — detective controls, live findings, data protection. It is not a code review. /security-review reviews pending code changes on the current branch; /pr-review covers a PR's diff. Those look at what the code does; this looks at what the account is running. Keep them separate — don't fold diff review into this sweep.
Pairs with the security-posture-audit runbook in local/RoboSystems/runbooks/ — read it alongside this file. This file is the public, generic methodology; the runbook is the live, account-specific record of what's currently enabled, suppressed, accepted, or retired, and it is authoritative for this environment.
Scope & guardrails
- Read-only by default. Use only
describe-*/list-*/get-*andghreads. Never runget-secret-value. Any change — enabling a service, creating a suppression/archive rule, deleting a resource, deploying a stack — requires explicit in-the-moment user confirmation, and destructive/CloudFormation actions are the user's to run. One carve-out:generate-credential-reportis technically a write (it produces a report) but carries no configuration change — it's in scope for Phase 4. - Outputs are sensitive — never commit them. This skill (the methodology) is safe in a public repo; its output — a report of live findings, exposed resources, and disabled controls — is a reconnaissance roadmap for an attacker. Write reports to a git-ignored path (
local/, the scratchpad) or an ephemeral private Artifact. Never commit a findings report, account ID, resource ARN, or CVE inventory to the repo. - Never state live posture in this file. Naming the configuration — a stack, a log group, an ECR repo, a GitHub variable — is fine and makes the sweep usable; it's already in the public IaC. Naming its current value is not: no "X is enabled", no finding counts, no account IDs or ARNs. Those rot silently and are a disclosure besides. Every posture question below resolves to a command you run now; anything you learn from running it belongs in the runbook, not here.
- Context. Discover the account at runtime (
aws sts get-caller-identity); region defaults tous-east-1; the robosystems deployment runsprod+stagingin one shared account, so expect per-environment resource pairs. Detective services are account-global singletons gated by GitHub variables (see Phase 6). Frontend images live in ECR reposrobosystems-app/roboledger-app/roboinvestor-app; the backend image isrobosystems. Confirm what's actually deployed withaws cloudformation list-stacks --stack-status-filter CREATE_COMPLETE UPDATE_COMPLETE. - Parallelize the sweep. Phases 1–6 are independent read-only sweeps — fan them out with the Agent tool (one agent per phase) and synthesize the results in the main loop. A denied/empty CLI call is itself a finding (service not enabled, or the role lacks the read perm — say which).
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 2d ago First seen · 162 lines · 16 tokens per session scan A 56d1e706a6a5
security-audit is a command published in the GitHub repository RoboFinSystems/robosystems (24 stars, last pushed 3d ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 16 tokens to every session and 3,606 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
Other commands, from other repositories
fill-event-triage
체결(fill) 이벤트, 특히 매도 체결 후 현금 재배치 판단을 read-only 트리아지로 자동 기동해 dry-run 제안을 남긴다. ROB-755.
crypto-alert-triage
Command "crypto-alert-triage" from mgh3326/auto_trader, covering crypto-alert-triage, 입력, 1. 맥락 복원 (반드시 이 순서), 2. 분석 and 3. dryrun 미리보기 (read-only).
akb-production-review
Review AKB production-governance docs and hooks.
os-meeting
快速创建和管理AI团队会议.
archive-ledger
../../../shared/commands/archive-ledger.md.
rclone_config_dump
Dump the config file as JSON.