Getting it into your agent
It runs from inside its repository, so the clone comes first — what it calls does not travel with the file alone.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/Sahib-Sawhney-WH/sahibs-claude-plugin-marketplacenpx agentmods add commands/sahib-sawhney-wh/sahibs-claude-plugin-marketplace/securityWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/commands/sahib-sawhney-wh/sahibs-claude-plugin-marketplace/security)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/commands/sahib-sawhney-wh/sahibs-claude-plugin-marketplace/security"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/commands/sahib-sawhney-wh/sahibs-claude-plugin-marketplace/security/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/commands/sahib-sawhney-wh/sahibs-claude-plugin-marketplace/security"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/commands/sahib-sawhney-wh/sahibs-claude-plugin-marketplace/security.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00019 | $0.00860 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00008 | $0.00344 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00004 | $0.00172 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00002 | $0.00086 |
Grade A, and why
security scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 2mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 150 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
DAPR Security Scanner
Scan your DAPR project for security issues and best practice violations.
Behavior
When the user runs /dapr:security:
-
Locate Configuration Files
- Find all component YAML files in
components/ - Find
dapr.yamlif present - Find any Configuration or Resiliency resources
- Find all component YAML files in
-
Run Security Checks
Critical Checks (Fail deployment)
- Plain-text secrets in component files
- Hardcoded connection strings with passwords
- API keys or tokens in plain text
- Missing
secretKeyReffor sensitive fields
High Severity Checks
- Secret stores without scope restrictions
- mTLS disabled in production config
- No access control policies defined
- Missing resiliency policies for external services
Medium Severity Checks
- Components without scope restrictions
- Using connection strings instead of managed identity
- Missing circuit breakers for service invocation
- No timeout policies defined
Low Severity Checks
- Missing metadata fields
- Non-optimal retry configurations
- Missing tracing configuration
-
Generate Report
DAPR Security Scan Results ========================== Files Scanned: 5 CRITICAL Issues (1): ✗ components/statestore.yaml:15 Plain-text password in 'redisPassword' → Use secretKeyRef instead of value HIGH Issues (0): None MEDIUM Issues (2): ⚠ components/pubsub.yaml No scope restrictions defined → Add scopes to limit access ⚠ dapr.yaml No resiliency policy referenced → Create resiliency.yaml for production LOW Issues (1): ○ components/secretstore.yaml Using connectionString instead of managed identity → Consider azureClientId for managed identity auth Summary: 1 critical, 0 high, 2 medium, 1 low Status: FAILED (critical issues found) -
Suggest Fixes For each issue, provide:
- The problematic configuration
- The recommended fix
- Code snippet showing the correction
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 2mo ago First seen · 150 lines · 19 tokens per session scan A 4f3988198278
security is a command published in the GitHub repository Sahib-Sawhney-WH/sahibs-claude-plugin-marketplace (4 stars, last pushed 10mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 19 tokens to every session and 860 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
security compared with commands from other repositories
| Mod | Type | Stars | Last push | Licence | Scan | Tokens | Works with |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| securitySahib-Sawhney-WH/sahibs-claude-plugin-marketplace | Command | 4 | 10mo ago | MIT | A | 19 | Claude Code |
| checklistgithub/spec-kit | Command | 148k | yesterday | MIT | A | 13 | Claude Code |
| clarifygithub/spec-kit | Command | 148k | yesterday | MIT | A | 27 | Claude Code |
| specifygithub/spec-kit | Command | 148k | yesterday | MIT | A | 13 | Claude Code |
| analyzegithub/spec-kit | Command | 148k | yesterday | MIT | A | 26 | Claude Code |
| convergegithub/spec-kit | Command | 148k | yesterday | MIT | A | 35 | Claude Code |
| implementgithub/spec-kit | Command | 148k | yesterday | MIT | A | 14 | Claude Code |