Getting it into your agent
It runs from inside its repository, so the clone comes first — what it calls does not travel with the file alone.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/Sahib-Sawhney-WH/sahibs-claude-plugin-marketplacenpx agentmods add commands/sahib-sawhney-wh/sahibs-claude-plugin-marketplace/securityWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/commands/sahib-sawhney-wh/sahibs-claude-plugin-marketplace/security)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/commands/sahib-sawhney-wh/sahibs-claude-plugin-marketplace/security"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/commands/sahib-sawhney-wh/sahibs-claude-plugin-marketplace/security/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/commands/sahib-sawhney-wh/sahibs-claude-plugin-marketplace/security"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/commands/sahib-sawhney-wh/sahibs-claude-plugin-marketplace/security.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00019 | $0.00860 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00010 | $0.00430 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00004 | $0.00172 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00002 | $0.00086 |
Grade A, and why
security scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 12d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 150 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
DAPR Security Scanner
Scan your DAPR project for security issues and best practice violations.
Behavior
When the user runs /dapr:security:
-
Locate Configuration Files
- Find all component YAML files in
components/ - Find
dapr.yamlif present - Find any Configuration or Resiliency resources
- Find all component YAML files in
-
Run Security Checks
Critical Checks (Fail deployment)
- Plain-text secrets in component files
- Hardcoded connection strings with passwords
- API keys or tokens in plain text
- Missing
secretKeyReffor sensitive fields
High Severity Checks
- Secret stores without scope restrictions
- mTLS disabled in production config
- No access control policies defined
- Missing resiliency policies for external services
Medium Severity Checks
- Components without scope restrictions
- Using connection strings instead of managed identity
- Missing circuit breakers for service invocation
- No timeout policies defined
Low Severity Checks
- Missing metadata fields
- Non-optimal retry configurations
- Missing tracing configuration
-
Generate Report
DAPR Security Scan Results ========================== Files Scanned: 5 CRITICAL Issues (1): ✗ components/statestore.yaml:15 Plain-text password in 'redisPassword' → Use secretKeyRef instead of value HIGH Issues (0): None MEDIUM Issues (2): ⚠ components/pubsub.yaml No scope restrictions defined → Add scopes to limit access ⚠ dapr.yaml No resiliency policy referenced → Create resiliency.yaml for production LOW Issues (1): ○ components/secretstore.yaml Using connectionString instead of managed identity → Consider azureClientId for managed identity auth Summary: 1 critical, 0 high, 2 medium, 1 low Status: FAILED (critical issues found) -
Suggest Fixes For each issue, provide:
- The problematic configuration
- The recommended fix
- Code snippet showing the correction
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 12d ago First seen · 150 lines · 19 tokens per session scan A 4f3988198278
security is a command published in the GitHub repository Sahib-Sawhney-WH/sahibs-claude-plugin-marketplace (4 stars, last pushed 8mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 19 tokens to every session and 860 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
Other commands, from other repositories
checklist
Generate a custom checklist for the current feature based on user requirements.
clarify
Identify underspecified areas in the current feature spec by asking up to 5 highly targeted clarification questions and encoding answers back into the spec.
specify
Create or update the feature specification from a natural language feature description.
converge
Assess the current codebase against the feature's spec, plan, and tasks, then append any remaining unbuilt work as new tasks to tasks.md so implement can complete it.
implement
Execute the implementation plan by processing and executing all tasks defined in tasks.md.
analyze
Perform a non-destructive cross-artifact consistency and quality analysis across spec.md, plan.md, and tasks.md after task generation.