presence-unlock

Create an unlock marker so the next settings-modifying operation (preset switch via /presence-preset use, or any direct ~/.claude/presence/settings.json edit) is permitted under the zerotrust preset.

If $ARGUMENTS contains --ttl <seconds>, use that TTL; otherwise default 60 seconds.

PRESENCE_ROOT="${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT:-$(realpath ~/.claude/plugins/presence 2>/dev/null || echo .)}"
TTL=60
if [[ "$ARGUMENTS" =~ --ttl[[:space:]]+([0-9]+) ]]; then
  TTL="${BASH_REMATCH[1]}"
fi
PYTHONPATH="$PRESENCE_ROOT/lib" python3 -c "
import unlock
expire = unlock.unlock(ttl_seconds=$TTL)
import time
print(f'unlocked: settings writes permitted for the next $TTL second(s) (until {time.strftime(\"%H:%M:%S\", time.localtime(expire))})')
"

After this command, the user has the unlock window to make settings changes. If they don't make changes within the window, the marker expires and immutability resumes automatically.

If the active preset is NOT zerotrust (or any preset that sets settings.immutable: true), this command runs but has no practical effect: settings are already writable.

Note: this is a tamper-resistance signal, not a security barrier. A user with filesystem access can always remove ~/.claude/presence/.unlocked directly. The unlock flow exists to make accidental settings changes during a sensitive session require an explicit conscious step.