Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/sifxprime/kodelyth-eccWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/commands/sifxprime/kodelyth-ecc/verify-supply-chain)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/commands/sifxprime/kodelyth-ecc/verify-supply-chain"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/commands/sifxprime/kodelyth-ecc/verify-supply-chain.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00032 | $0.00683 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00016 | $0.00342 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00006 | $0.00137 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00003 | $0.00068 |
Grade A, and why
verify-supply-chain scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 3d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 60 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
/verify-supply-chain
Run the supply-chain verification surface in one shot.
Usage
/verify-supply-chain # quick: verify current install against shipped manifest
/verify-supply-chain --emit # generate SBOM + manifest in cwd
/verify-supply-chain --root /path/to/ecc --manifest /path/to/manifest.json
Behavior
- If a manifest is provided (or the default
manifest.jsonexists in--root), runsverifyagainst it. Reports modified, missing, and extra files. Exits non-zero on any tamper. - If
--emitis set, generates freshkodelyth-ecc-sbom.cdx.jsonandkodelyth-ecc-manifest.jsonin the current directory. - If neither, prints a quick summary of what's available and what to do next.
Flags
| Flag | Effect |
|---|---|
--root DIR |
Treat DIR as the kodelyth-ecc install root (default: package root). |
--manifest FILE |
Path to a manifest to verify against (default: <root>/manifest.json). |
--emit |
Generate fresh sbom.cdx.json + manifest.json in cwd. |
--json |
Machine-readable output (verify report or generated docs). |
Use cases
- Audit response. Generate fresh SBOM + manifest for a SOC 2 / ISO 27001 review.
- Tamper check. Confirm that an installed copy hasn't been modified after install (matches the manifest shipped with the release).
- Reproducibility check. Compare the manifest of an arbitrary downloaded release archive against the one published on GitHub.
- CI gate. Pair with
--jsonto fail a build when an installed dependency is tampered.
Companion commands
/security-audit— full red-team sweep using the devil-mode crew (focuses on app code)./devil-mode— adversarial review of recent changes./release— release-captain handoff. Should always run/verify-supply-chain --emitbefore tagging.
Hard rules
- Never suppress a non-zero exit from
verify. If a tamper is found, escalate. - Don't publish without the SBOM + manifest attached to the GitHub release. The publish workflow handles this automatically.
- Treat the on-release manifest as authoritative — don't substitute a freshly-generated one when verifying a customer's install.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 3d ago First seen · 60 lines · 32 tokens per session scan A c75f46061781
verify-supply-chain is a command published in the GitHub repository sifxprime/kodelyth-ecc (11 stars, last pushed 4d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 32 tokens to every session and 683 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.
Other commands, from other repositories
maintainer-review-error-handling
Review the PR for error-handling correctness — surfaced errors, no silent swallows, consistent error patterns (Pi-tuned).
maintainer-review-test-coverage
Review the PR for test coverage — does new behavior have tests, are critical paths exercised, do existing tests still cover what they should (Pi-tuned).
review-scope
Establish exactly what this review round examines, and write it down for the reviewer or reviewers that follow. You do not judge anything; you make the target precise.
validate
Run the project's own checks and report the truth. You fix nothing and judge nothing beyond pass or fail — running the gate is the whole job.
checklist
Generate a custom checklist for the current feature based on user requirements.
clarify
Identify underspecified areas in the current feature spec by asking up to 5 highly targeted clarification questions and encoding answers back into the spec.