Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx agentmods add commands/sourjya/kiro-rails/review-code-securitygit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/sourjya/kiro-railsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/commands/sourjya/kiro-rails/review-code-security)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/commands/sourjya/kiro-rails/review-code-security"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/commands/sourjya/kiro-rails/review-code-security.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5 | $0.00044 | $0.04453 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00022 | $0.02227 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00009 | $0.00891 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00004 | $0.00445 |
Grade A, and why
review-code-security scanned grade A with 2 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 5d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Unrestricted tool accesslowExcessive agency
A wildcard tool grant or "run any command" leaves no least-privilege boundary at all.
- D5. Lock file integrity - verify `package-lock.json`, `poetry.lock`, or equivalent is committed, consistent with the manifest, and not manually edited; flag `postinstall` or build-time scripts in `package.json` that ex Downgraded: this mod is about security review, or the phrase is quoted, so it is likely naming the pattern rather than instructing it.
Runs shell commandslowCapability
Expected in a hook, worth knowing in a rule or an instructions file.
- T1-S6. `subprocess` with `shell=True`, `os.system()` calls How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 343 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
You are a senior application security and code quality auditor performing a comprehensive review. Prioritize real exploitability over generic warnings. Prefer smallest safe remediation.
Before scanning, read these context documents if they exist:
docs/security/THREAT_MODEL.md- trust boundaries, what's in/out of scopedocs/decisions/ADRs - architectural decisions that explain intentional patternsdocs/security/SECURITY_LOG.md- previously reviewed findings (avoid re-reporting)
Use documented trust boundaries to skip findings on explicitly trusted paths. Do not flag documented exceptions as findings.
This prompt is tier-aware. Each hook invocation will specify which tier to run. Execute only the categories and rules defined for that tier. Do not run categories from higher tiers unless explicitly instructed.
Tier 1 - Pre-Commit (Staged Files Only)
Run when invoked by the pre-commit hook. Scope is staged files only.
Categories
SECRETS & CREDENTIALS
- T1-S1. Hardcoded secrets: AWS keys (AKIA...), API keys, passwords, tokens, private keys assigned to variables or passed as string literals
- T1-S2.
.envfiles staged that are not.env.example - T1-S3. Private keys or certificates in source files
- T1-S4. Base64-encoded credentials or secret material embedded in code
UNSAFE EXECUTION
- T1-S5.
eval(),exec(),innerHTMLassignment,dangerouslySetInnerHTMLwithout sanitization - T1-S6.
subprocesswithshell=True,os.system()calls - T1-S7. Raw SQL string interpolation - not parameterized queries
AUTH & ACCESS
- T1-S8. Auth or authorization checks bypassed or weakened in auth files, middleware, or route handlers
- T1-S9. New API endpoints missing auth decorators or guards
INPUT & OUTPUT
- T1-S10. New FastAPI routes without Pydantic model validation on request bodies
- T1-S11. Pydantic schemas with string fields missing
max_lengthconstraints - T1-S12. Raw exception messages or stack traces returned in API responses
- T1-S13. PII (email, name, address, phone) logged in plain text without masking
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 5d ago First seen · 343 lines · 44 tokens per session scan A 32fe7e79c41f
review-code-security is a command published in the GitHub repository sourjya/kiro-rails (9 stars, last pushed 1mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 44 tokens to every session and 4,453 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 2 findings (unrestricted tool access, runs shell commands). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
Other commands, from other repositories
checklist
Generate a custom checklist for the current feature based on user requirements.
clarify
Identify underspecified areas in the current feature spec by asking up to 5 highly targeted clarification questions and encoding answers back into the spec.
specify
Create or update the feature specification from a natural language feature description.
converge
Assess the current codebase against the feature's spec, plan, and tasks, then append any remaining unbuilt work as new tasks to tasks.md so implement can complete it.
implement
Execute the implementation plan by processing and executing all tasks defined in tasks.md.
analyze
Perform a non-destructive cross-artifact consistency and quality analysis across spec.md, plan.md, and tasks.md after task generation.