Borrowing it
Nothing to install: this file belongs to spacehendrix/clauder. Take a copy, put it at the same path in your own repository, and replace the rules that are about this project with yours.
curl -O https://raw.githubusercontent.com/spacehendrix/clauder/main/.claude/commands/guardrails.mdgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/spacehendrix/clauderWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/commands/spacehendrix/clauder/guardrails)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/commands/spacehendrix/clauder/guardrails"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/commands/spacehendrix/clauder/guardrails/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/commands/spacehendrix/clauder/guardrails"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/commands/spacehendrix/clauder/guardrails.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00000 | $0.00694 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00000 | $0.00278 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00000 | $0.00139 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00000 | $0.00069 |
Grade A, and why
guardrails scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 12d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 19 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Project Guardrails
Review this project and propose permission guardrails: shell commands that should be allowed without prompting because they are routine and safe here, and commands that should be denied because an accidental run would damage this project, its data, or its infrastructure. If a user direction is provided, focus on it.
Steps
- Understand the project and its purpose. Read the top-level layout, manifests, build and test configuration, CI files, deployment and infrastructure files, scripts, and
CLAUDE.mdif present. Delegate deeper exploration to theinvestigatoragent so your own context stays small. Note the stack, the package manager, the test runner, the linters, the databases, the cloud or hosting providers, and any production-facing tooling. - Read the current rules:
permissions.allowandpermissions.denyin.claude/settings.jsonand in.claude/settings.local.jsonif it exists. The deny list is the single source of truth for blocked shell commands; there is no separate unsafe-command hook. - Propose allow rules for commands this project runs constantly and that only read or build: the test runner, linters, type checkers, formatters in check mode, builds, dependency listing, and read-only invocations of the project's own CLI. Never propose broad patterns such as
Bash(*), a whole package manager, or anything that installs, publishes, deploys, or deletes. - Propose deny rules for commands whose accidental use would be hard to reverse in this project specifically: deploy and release commands, infrastructure apply or destroy, production database CLIs and migration tools, container and cluster deletion, cloud CLIs with write access, publishing to registries, bulk deletion of data or generated directories the project depends on, and anything that rotates or prints credentials. Prefer the narrowest pattern that catches the dangerous form and leaves the safe form usable.
- Present the proposal as two short tables, one for allow and one for deny. Each row: the exact rule, a one-line description of what it covers, and why it belongs here. Mark rules that duplicate an existing hook or rule as redundant and leave them out. Keep the lists short; a guardrail nobody understands gets removed.
- Ask the user for approval or feedback on each list. Use
AskUserQuestionwhen available, otherwise ask in plain text and wait. Do not change anything before the user answers. Apply their edits and re-present only the rows that changed. - Apply the approved rules to
.claude/settings.local.json, creating the file with{"permissions": {"allow": [], "deny": []}}if it is missing and preserving everything else in it. Never remove an existing clauder rule from.claude/settings.json, and never add an allow rule for a command that a deny rule covers. - Report what was written, what was declined, and remind the user that a new session is needed for permission changes to take effect.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 12d ago First seen · 19 lines · 0 tokens per session scan A 1ab29aca9674
guardrails is a command published in the GitHub repository spacehendrix/clauder (58 stars, last pushed 12d ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It costs nothing until one of its globs matches a file; then it loads 694 tokens. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-10-16.
Other commands, from other repositories
amby.converge
Check the codebase against spec, plan, and tasks after implementing; append gap tasks, never edit code.
amby.revise
Continue an existing feature's spec (or design) — add and refine in place, with a done-guard.
amby.analyze
Cross-check spec, plan, and tasks for coverage, consistency, and dependency-graph health.
amby.design
Design the UI — wireframes, component specs, and design tokens — with a sign-off gate.
amby.implement
Execute the task list, checking off tasks and updating story status as you go.
amby.plan
Produce the technical implementation plan (the HOW) from an approved spec and UI.