Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/TheLobbi/claudeWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/commands/thelobbi/claude/cc-council)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/commands/thelobbi/claude/cc-council"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/commands/thelobbi/claude/cc-council/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/commands/thelobbi/claude/cc-council"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/commands/thelobbi/claude/cc-council.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00045 | $0.08952 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00018 | $0.03581 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00009 | $0.01790 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00005 | $0.00895 |
Grade A, and why
cc-council scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 1,058 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Agent Council Review
Target: ${target} | Protocol: ${protocol} | Preset: ${preset} | Depth: ${depth}
State Machine
INIT → PLAN → FAN_OUT → ANALYZE → FAN_IN → DELIBERATE → SCORE → DECIDE → OUTPUT → [AUTO_FIX] → COMPLETE
│ │
└── RESUME (from saved state) ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
Each state is checkpointed. Use --resume <session-id> to restart from any failed state.
Protocols
| Protocol | Agents Interact? | Rounds | Best For | Cost |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| expert-panel | After analysis | 1 | General code review | Medium |
| red-blue-team | Adversarial pairs | 2 | Security hardening | High |
| six-thinking-hats | Structured parallel | 6 perspectives | Architecture decisions | High |
| rapid-fire | No deliberation | 1 | Quick feedback, small PRs | Low |
| delphi | Anonymous rounds | 2-3 | Contentious decisions | High |
| blackboard | Shared knowledge space | Async | Large PRs, cross-cutting | Medium |
Analysis Scopes & Scoring
Each scope is independently scored. The final decision uses either weighted combination or pass-fail gates.
Security Scope (default weight: 0.30, pass threshold: 85/100)
Checks: OWASP Top 10, secrets exposure, SQL/NoSQL injection, XSS/CSRF, auth bypass, input validation, insecure dependencies, .env file exposure, CORS misconfiguration, rate limiting gaps
Scoring deductions:
Base 100
-50 Hardcoded secrets or credentials
-40 SQL/NoSQL injection vulnerability
-30 XSS vulnerability
-25 Authentication/authorization bypass
-20 Critical dependency vulnerability (CVE)
-15 Missing input validation on user-facing endpoint
-10 High-severity dependency vulnerability
-10 Missing CSRF protection
-8 Insecure CORS configuration
-5 Missing rate limiting
-5 Validation gaps (non-critical)
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago First seen · 1,058 lines · 45 tokens per session scan A e3d4d8a8cec7
cc-council is a command published in the GitHub repository TheLobbi/claude (21 stars, last pushed 3d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 45 tokens to every session and 8,952 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
Other commands, from other repositories
deep-review
Multi-pass deep code review — security, quality, and test gaps.
cto-advisor
Run CTO-level technical review of the current execution plan - architecture, tech debt, engineering excellence.
phase-review
Run post-execution quality gate - verifies all deliverables before marking a track complete.
evaluate-execution
Verify implementation quality. Evaluate-Loop Step 4.
fierce-review
Deterministic adversarial code review (Workflow tier) for high-stakes scope.
design-review
Compare design (Figma URL or mockup image) against implementation to detect UI mismatches (colors, layout, typography).