Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx agentmods add commands/threatcl/claude-plugin/threat-cigit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/threatcl/claude-pluginWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/commands/threatcl/claude-plugin/threat-ci)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/commands/threatcl/claude-plugin/threat-ci"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/commands/threatcl/claude-plugin/threat-ci.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00027 | $0.02646 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00014 | $0.01323 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00005 | $0.00529 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00003 | $0.00265 |
Grade A, and why
threat-ci scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 5d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 174 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
You are scaffolding CI integration for Threatcl. The flavor is $ARGUMENTS — one of: github-actions, gitlab-ci, pre-commit, drift. If the argument is empty, ask the user which flavor and stop.
The first three flavors scaffold Threatcl Cloud validation and policy evaluation. The drift flavor scaffolds threatcl/drift-action, which reviews each PR for threat-model drift — it needs no Threatcl Cloud account and uses a different auth model. They're complementary: a repo can run both.
Before generating anything, scan the repo for existing CI config (.github/workflows/, .gitlab-ci.yml, .pre-commit-config.yaml, .github/workflows/threat-drift.yml, .threatcl-ci.hcl) and prefer to extend those rather than overwrite. If a Threatcl-related file already exists, show the user the diff before writing.
Auth in CI
For the Threatcl Cloud flavors (github-actions, gitlab-ci, pre-commit), CI authenticates via API tokens, not the OAuth/device flow. Those scaffolds must:
- Reference a secret named
THREATCL_API_TOKEN(the user creates it in the Threatcl Cloud UI and stores it as a CI secret) - Set
THREATCL_API_URLto the org's API endpoint (currentlyhttps://beta-api.threatcl.com; document this) - Optionally set
THREATCL_CLOUD_ORGto pin the org
The drift flavor does not use THREATCL_API_TOKEN. drift-action is self-hosted: your code and threat model go only to the LLM provider you configure, under your own key, never to Threatcl. Its secret is ANTHROPIC_API_KEY (or OPENAI_API_KEY).
What each flavor produces
github-actions
Write .github/workflows/threatcl.yml with two jobs:
- validate (on
pull_request) — checks out the repo, installs the threatcl CLI, runsthreatcl cloud validateon every*.hclfile changed in the PR. Fails the job on any validation error. - policy-evaluate (on
pushtomainorpull_requestif the user prefers) — for each pushed model, runthreatcl cloud policy evaluate -model-id <id> -fail-on-error. The model IDs come from the backend block in each HCL file — parse it. The backend block carriesorganizationandthreatmodelonly; never emit asegmentattribute, which was removed in spec 0.6.0 and is now an "Unsupported argument" parse error.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 5d ago First seen · 174 lines · 27 tokens per session scan A e1b16d0a7336
threat-ci is a command published in the GitHub repository threatcl/claude-plugin (4 stars, last pushed 21d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 27 tokens to every session and 2,646 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
Other commands, from other repositories
monitor-ci
You are the orchestrator for monitoring Nx Cloud CI pipeline executions and handling self-healing fixes. You spawn the ci-monitor-subagent subagent to poll CI status and make decisions based on the results.
actions
Command "actions" from openclaw/crabbox, covering actions, subcommands, hydrate, register and dispatch.
dart-fix-ci
Command "dart-fix-ci" from dartsim/dart, covering required reading, workflow and output.
domains
Apply the CLI runtime and safety contract before executing a command. Runtime --help is authoritative.
access
Apply the CLI runtime and safety contract before executing a command. Runtime --help is authoritative.
check-release-health
Summarize the CI health of an OpenShift release using live data from the openshift-ci-mcp server.