Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/WdBlink/autoresearch-paperWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/commands/wdblink/autoresearch-paper/security)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/commands/wdblink/autoresearch-paper/security"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/commands/wdblink/autoresearch-paper/security/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/commands/wdblink/autoresearch-paper/security"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/commands/wdblink/autoresearch-paper/security.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00018 | $0.01282 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00007 | $0.00513 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00004 | $0.00256 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00002 | $0.00128 |
Grade A, and why
autoresearch:security scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 3d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
This is a copy
94% identical to autoresearch:security — 0 lines differ, which has more behind it and is treated as the original. This page carries a canonical link to it rather than competing with it.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 103 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
EXECUTE IMMEDIATELY.
Parse Arguments
Extract from $ARGUMENTS:
Scope:or--scope— file globs to auditFocus:— specific area (auth, API, data handling, etc.)Depth:or--depth— quick (5 iterations), standard (15), deep (30+)Iterations:or--iterations— default 15. "unlimited" for unbounded.--diff— delta mode: only audit files changed since last audit--fix— after audit, auto-fix Critical/High findings (chains to fix)--fail-on <severity>— exit non-zero if findings at/above threshold (CI gate)--evals,--evals-interval N,--chain,--<subcommand>
Setup (if required context missing)
If Scope missing and no --diff:
- Scan codebase for tech stack, frameworks, API routes
- AskUserQuestion (single batch): Q1 (Scope): "What to audit?" — entire codebase, API + middleware, auth, external-facing Q2 (Depth): "How thorough?" — quick (5), standard (15), deep (30+), unlimited Q3 (Action): "What to do with findings?" — report only, report + auto-fix, report + CI gate If all provided → skip.
Setup Phase (once, before loop)
- Reconnaissance — scan: package.json/requirements.txt (deps), .env.example (secrets), Dockerfile (infra), API route files (attack surface), auth/middleware (trust boundaries), DB schemas (data assets), CI/CD configs (supply chain)
- Asset Identification — catalog data stores, auth systems, external services, user inputs
- Trust Boundary Mapping — browser↔server, public↔authenticated, user↔admin, CI↔prod
- STRIDE Threat Model — generate threats per category. Load
references/security-checklist.mdfor checklist. - Attack Surface Map — entry points, data flows, abuse paths
- Baseline — count known issues, initialize coverage tracking
Create output directory: autoresearch/security-{YYMMDD}-{HHMM}/
Write: overview.md, threat-model.md, attack-surface-map.md
TSV header: # metric_direction: higher_is_better\niteration\ttimestamp\tfinding\tseverity\towasp\tstride\tevidence\tfile_line
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 3d ago First seen · 103 lines · 18 tokens per session scan A ad84882bb786
autoresearch:security is a command published in the GitHub repository WdBlink/autoresearch-paper (2 stars, last pushed 4d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 18 tokens to every session and 1,282 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. It is 94% identical to autoresearch:security, differing in 0 lines, and is treated as a copy.
autoresearch:security compared with commands from other repositories
| Mod | Type | Stars | Last push | Licence | Scan | Tokens | Works with |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| autoresearch:securityWdBlink/autoresearch-paper | Command | 2 | 4d ago | MIT | A | 18 | Claude Code |
| ars-planImbad0202/academic-research-skills | Command | 56k | yesterday | none | A | 19 | Claude Code |
| ars-revision-coachImbad0202/academic-research-skills-codex | Command | 14k | 5d ago | none | A | 27 | Claude Code |
| ars-3wImbad0202/academic-research-skills-codex | Command | 14k | 5d ago | none | A | 24 | Claude Code |
| nextProjectDXAI/labrat | Command | 237 | 3mo ago | MIT | A | 0 | Claude Code |
| ja-fallbackZaious/journal-atlas | Command | 2 | 10d ago | none | A | 37 | Claude Code |
| ai-reviewStill-chowline394/MagicTeX-mcp | Command | 0 | 1mo ago | AGPL-3.0 | A | 13 | Claude Code |