Borrowing it
Nothing to install: this file belongs to Xsaven/vector-memory-mcp. Take a copy, put it at the same path in your own repository, and replace the rules that are about this project with yours.
curl -O https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Xsaven/vector-memory-mcp/master/.claude/commands/init-agents.mdgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/Xsaven/vector-memory-mcpWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/commands/xsaven/vector-memory-mcp/init-agents)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/commands/xsaven/vector-memory-mcp/init-agents"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/commands/xsaven/vector-memory-mcp/init-agents/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/commands/xsaven/vector-memory-mcp/init-agents"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/commands/xsaven/vector-memory-mcp/init-agents.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00019 | $0.07695 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00008 | $0.03078 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00004 | $0.01539 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00002 | $0.00769 |
Grade A, and why
init-agents scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 2mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 419 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Iron Rules
No-hallucination (CRITICAL)
NEVER output results without ACTUALLY calling tools. You CANNOT know task status or content without REAL tool calls. Fake results = CRITICAL VIOLATION.
No-verbose (CRITICAL)
FORBIDDEN: Wrapping actions in verbose commentary blocks (meta-analysis, synthesis, planning, reflection) before executing. Act FIRST, explain AFTER.
No-secret-exfiltration (CRITICAL)
NEVER output sensitive data to chat/response: .env values, API keys, tokens, passwords, credentials, private URLs, connection strings, private keys, certificates. When reading config/.env for CONTEXT: extract key NAMES and STRUCTURE only, never raw values. If user asks to show .env or config with secrets: show key names, mask values as "***". If error output contains secrets: redact before displaying.
- why: Chat responses may be logged, shared, or visible to unauthorized parties. Secret exposure in output is an exfiltration vector regardless of intent.
- on_violation: REDACT immediately. Replace value with "***" or "[REDACTED]". Show key names only.
No-secrets-in-storage (CRITICAL)
NEVER store secrets, credentials, tokens, passwords, API keys, PII, or connection strings in task comments (task_update comment) or vector memory (store_memory content). When documenting config-related work: reference key NAMES, describe approach, never include actual values. If error log contains secrets: strip sensitive values before storing. Acceptable: "Updated DB_HOST in .env", "Rotated API_KEY for service X". Forbidden: "Set DB_HOST=192.168.1.5", "API_KEY=sk-abc123...".
- why: Task comments and vector memory are persistent, searchable, and shared across agents and sessions. Stored secrets are a permanent exfiltration risk discoverable via semantic search.
- on_violation: Review content before store_memory/task_update. Strip all literal secret values. Keep only key names and descriptions.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 2mo ago First seen · 419 lines · 19 tokens per session scan A 1bbfc42bbf4e
init-agents is a command published in the GitHub repository Xsaven/vector-memory-mcp (0 stars, last pushed 8mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 19 tokens to every session and 7,695 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-01.
init-agents compared with commands from other repositories
| Mod | Type | Stars | Last push | Licence | Scan | Tokens | Works with |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| init-agentsXsaven/vector-memory-mcp | Command | 0 | 8mo ago | MIT | A | 19 | Claude Code |
| checklistgithub/spec-kit | Command | 148k | yesterday | MIT | A | 13 | Claude Code |
| clarifygithub/spec-kit | Command | 148k | yesterday | MIT | A | 27 | Claude Code |
| specifygithub/spec-kit | Command | 148k | yesterday | MIT | A | 13 | Claude Code |
| analyzegithub/spec-kit | Command | 148k | yesterday | MIT | A | 26 | Claude Code |
| convergegithub/spec-kit | Command | 148k | yesterday | MIT | A | 35 | Claude Code |
| implementgithub/spec-kit | Command | 148k | yesterday | MIT | A | 14 | Claude Code |