presonus-studiolive-mcp: Command for GitHub Copilot

.github/prompts/sfmea-create.prompt.md

sfmea-create is a command for GitHub Copilot from zarfld/presonus-studiolive-mcp. It costs 27 tokens per session (6,701 once invoked), scanned A, original, MIT.

A Software Failure Modes Effects Analysis guide for systematically listing possible software failures, their causes and effects, and their risks. SFMEA is a structured risk review used to identify problems before they cause harm.

In plain words
What is it for?
Use it to create an SFMEA document, assess risk with a priority number, identify mitigation actions, and maintain a critical items list.
Why use it?
It helps teams find high-risk failure modes and record actions to reduce or control those risks.

Command for GitHub Copilot

Written for GitHub Copilot: a Copilot chat mode or prompt.

This is zarfld/presonus-studiolive-mcp's own configuration. It tells GitHub Copilot how to work on presonus-studiolive-mcp itself, so it is not a mod to install elsewhere. Copy it as a starting point and replace the rules that are about this project. Everything presonus-studiolive-mcp configures →

Reuse

Borrowing it

Nothing to install: this file belongs to zarfld/presonus-studiolive-mcp. Take a copy, put it at the same path in your own repository, and replace the rules that are about this project with yours.

Copy the file
curl -O https://raw.githubusercontent.com/zarfld/presonus-studiolive-mcp/master/.github/prompts/sfmea-create.prompt.md
Clone the repo
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/zarfld/presonus-studiolive-mcp

Made for: GitHub Copilot.

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Per session 27 Only the description is in the session, so the agent can decide to use it. The body loads when it is invoked.
When invoked 6,701 The whole file, excluding the scripts and references it only reads on demand.
Security scan A 0 findings. A grade says what 26 rules found in the file — not that it is safe.
Origin original No closer match found in the catalogue.
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ModelPer sessionOnce invoked
Fable 5.1 $0.00027 $0.06701
Opus 5 $0.00014 $0.03351
Sonnet 5 $0.00005 $0.01340
Haiku 4.5 $0.00003 $0.00670

Measured 2d ago against content hash a86fde6dc400, method: parsed. Prices are Anthropic first-party input rates as of 2026-09-10, from the pricing page.

Security

Grade A, and why

sfmea-create scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 2d ago.

A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.

Nothing flagged

None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.

.github/prompts/sfmea-create.prompt.md · 663 lines

How it starts

The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 663 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.

Software Failure Modes Effects Analysis (SFMEA) Creation Prompt

You are an SFMEA Expert following IEEE 1633-2016 Clause 5.2 and Annex A standards.

📤 EXPECTED OUTPUT (ALWAYS DELIVER)

When user requests SFMEA creation, you MUST produce a complete SFMEA document with Critical Items List (CIL).

Complete SFMEA Document Structure

# Software Failure Modes Effects Analysis (SFMEA)

**Project**: [Project Name]
**Component**: [Component Name/ID]
**Version**: [X.Y.Z]
**Date**: [YYYY-MM-DD]
**Document ID**: SFMEA-[Component]-[Version]
**Status**: [Draft/Review/Approved]
**IEEE 1633-2016 Compliant** (Clause 5.2, Annex A)

---

## Document Control

| Version | Date | Author | Changes | Approved By |
|---------|------|--------|---------|-------------|
| [X.Y] | [Date] | [Name] | [Summary] | [Name] |

## Table of Contents
1. Introduction
2. SFMEA Scope and Approach
3. Component/Function Description
4. Failure Modes Identification
5. Root Cause Analysis
6. Consequences Analysis
7. Risk Assessment (RPN)
8. Mitigation Actions
9. Critical Items List (CIL)
10. SFMEA Validation

---

## 1. Introduction

### 1.1 Purpose
This SFMEA systematically analyzes potential software failure modes for [Component Name] to:
- **Identify failure modes** before they occur in operation
- **Assess risk** (severity × likelihood × detectability)
- **Define mitigation actions** to reduce risk
- **Create Critical Items List** (CIL) for tracking

### 1.2 SFMEA Benefits (IEEE 1633 Clause 5.2.1)
- Proactive defect prevention
- Improved design quality
- Focused testing on high-risk areas
- Reduced field failures
- Lower maintenance costs

### 1.3 Relationship to Other Documents
- **Source Documents**: 
  - Software Requirements Specification (SRS): [Document ID]
  - Software Design Document (SDD): [Document ID]
  - Architecture Document: [Document ID]
  - Interface Design Document (IDD): [Document ID]
- **Output Documents**:
  - Critical Items List (CIL): Section 9 of this document
  - Design Updates: [Tracked in design document]
  - Test Plan Updates: [Test plan location]

---

## 2. SFMEA Scope and Approach

### 2.1 Scope
**Component Analyzed**: [Component ID/Name]
**Version**: [X.Y.Z]
**Analysis Level**: [Requirements / Architecture / Design / Code]

**Included**:
- [List of functions/modules analyzed]
- [Interfaces analyzed]
- [Data structures analyzed]

**Excluded**:
- [Out of scope items]
- [Deferred to separate SFMEA]

### 2.2 SFMEA Process (IEEE 1633 Clause 5.2.2)

Step 1: Identify Failure Modes → Step 2: Identify Root Causes ↓ Step 6: Generate CIL ← Step 5: Define Mitigation ← Step 4: Assess Risk (RPN) ↑ Step 3: Identify Consequences


### 2.3 SFMEA Team
| Role | Name | Contribution |
|------|------|--------------|
| **SFMEA Lead** | [Name] | Facilitation, documentation |
| **Requirements Engineer** | [Name] | Requirements traceability |
| **Designer/Architect** | [Name] | Design knowledge |
| **Developer** | [Name] | Implementation details |
| **Tester** | [Name] | Detectability assessment |
| **Reliability Engineer** | [Name] | Risk assessment |

### 2.4 Analysis Sessions
| Session # | Date | Duration | Scope | Participants |
|-----------|------|----------|-------|--------------|
| 1 | [Date] | [X hours] | [Functions 1-5] | [Names] |
| 2 | [Date] | [X hours] | [Functions 6-10] | [Names] |

---

## 3. Component/Function Description

### 3.1 Component Overview
**Component ID**: [SW-XXX]
**Component Name**: [Name]
**Description**: [Brief description of component purpose]

**Primary Functions**:
1. [Function 1] - REQ-F-[XXX]
2. [Function 2] - REQ-F-[YYY]
3. [Function 3] - REQ-F-[ZZZ]

### 3.2 Interfaces

| Interface ID | Interface Name | Type | Connected To | Protocol |
|--------------|----------------|------|--------------|----------|
| IF-001 | [Name] | Input | [Component/System] | [Protocol] |
| IF-002 | [Name] | Output | [Component/System] | [Protocol] |
| IF-003 | [Name] | Control | [Component/System] | [Protocol] |

### 3.3 Data Elements

| Data Element | Type | Range/Format | Source | Destination | Criticality |
|--------------|------|--------------|--------|-------------|-------------|
| [Name] | [Type] | [Range] | [Source] | [Destination] | [Critical/High/Med/Low] |

### 3.4 Operating Variables

| Variable | Description | Valid Range | Initial Value | Update Frequency |
|----------|-------------|-------------|---------------|------------------|
| [Name] | [Purpose] | [Min-Max] | [Value] | [Frequency] |

---

## 4. Failure Modes Identification

### 4.1 Failure Mode Categories (IEEE 1633 Annex A)

| Category | Description | Examples |
|----------|-------------|----------|
| **Faulty Data** | Incorrect data value, type, or structure | Wrong value, null pointer, buffer overflow |
| **Faulty Timing** | Incorrect timing or sequencing | Too slow, too fast, race condition, deadlock |
| **Faulty Sequencing** | Operations out of order | Steps skipped, incorrect order |
| **Faulty Error Handling** | Errors not detected or handled incorrectly | Exception not caught, wrong recovery |
| **Faulty Logic** | Incorrect algorithm or decision logic | Wrong calculation, incorrect condition |

### 4.2 Failure Modes by Function/Requirement

#### Function: [Function Name] - REQ-F-[XXX]

| FM ID | Failure Mode | Category | Description | Requirement Violated |
|-------|--------------|----------|-------------|---------------------|
| FM-001 | [Failure mode name] | Faulty Data | [Description of how function fails] | REQ-F-[XXX] |
| FM-002 | [Failure mode name] | Faulty Timing | [Description] | REQ-F-[XXX] |
| FM-003 | [Failure mode name] | Faulty Error Handling | [Description] | REQ-F-[YYY] |

**Example - Requirement REQ-F-001: "System shall validate user input before processing"**

| FM ID | Failure Mode | Category | Description |
|-------|--------------|----------|-------------|
| FM-001 | Input validation bypassed | Faulty Sequencing | Validation step skipped, invalid data processed |
| FM-002 | Validation logic incorrect | Faulty Logic | Validation allows invalid data (wrong regex, bounds check) |
| FM-003 | Validation error not handled | Faulty Error Handling | Validation failure doesn't stop processing |

---

## 5. Root Cause Analysis

### 5.1 Root Cause Categories (IEEE 1633 Annex A)

| Root Cause Category | Description | Keywords |
|---------------------|-------------|----------|
| **Requirements** | Incomplete, ambiguous, incorrect requirements | Missing, unclear, conflict |
| **Design** | Design flaw, poor architecture | Single point of failure, coupling |
| **Implementation** | Coding errors | Off-by-one, null pointer, race condition |
| **Integration** | Interface mismatch | Protocol error, data format mismatch |
| **Environment** | External dependencies | Hardware failure, network timeout |

### 5.2 Root Causes by Failure Mode

| FM ID | Failure Mode | Potential Root Causes | Root Cause Category |
|-------|--------------|----------------------|---------------------|
| FM-001 | Input validation bypassed | 1. Developer forgot validation step<br>2. Design doesn't specify validation location<br>3. Refactoring removed validation code | Implementation,<br>Design,<br>Implementation |
| FM-002 | Validation logic incorrect | 1. Requirements don't specify validation rules<br>2. Regular expression has error<br>3. Boundary conditions not tested | Requirements,<br>Implementation,<br>Verification |
| FM-003 | Validation error not handled | 1. Requirements don't specify error handling<br>2. Exception not caught<br>3. Error message not logged | Requirements,<br>Implementation,<br>Implementation |

---

## 6. Consequences Analysis

### 6.1 Effect Levels

| Effect Level | Description | Examples |
|--------------|-------------|----------|
| **Local Effect** | Impact on the component itself | Function returns wrong value, crashes, hangs |
| **System Effect** | Impact on the overall system | System degraded, unavailable, incorrect results |
| **End User Effect** | Impact on the user | Inconvenience, data loss, safety hazard |

### 6.2 Consequences by Failure Mode

| FM ID | Failure Mode | Local Effect | System Effect | End User Effect | Severity |
|-------|--------------|--------------|---------------|-----------------|----------|
| FM-001 | Input validation bypassed | Invalid data processed | Corrupted data in database | User sees incorrect results, potential security breach | **Critical** |
| FM-002 | Validation logic incorrect | Some invalid data accepted | Occasional incorrect results | User experiences intermittent errors | **High** |
| FM-003 | Validation error not handled | Exception thrown, function exits | System continues with bad data | Unpredictable behavior | **Critical** |

### 6.3 Severity Ratings (Per FDSC)

| Severity | Definition | System Impact | Examples |
|----------|------------|---------------|----------|
| **1 - Critical** | Safety hazard, mission failure, data loss | System abort, critical function lost | Loss of life, data corruption |
| **2 - High** | Major function degraded | Reduced capability, manual intervention | Feature unavailable, degraded performance |
| **3 - Medium** | Minor function impacted | Workaround available | Cosmetic error, delayed response |
| **4 - Low** | Cosmetic, no functional impact | Minimal impact | Typo in message, UI alignment |

---

## 7. Risk Assessment (RPN)

### 7.1 Risk Priority Number (RPN)
**RPN = Severity × Likelihood × Detectability**

### 7.2 Rating Scales

#### Severity (S)
| Rating | Description |
|--------|-------------|
| 10 | Critical: Safety hazard, mission failure |
| 7-9 | High: Major function degraded |
| 4-6 | Medium: Minor function impacted |
| 1-3 | Low: Cosmetic, minimal impact |

#### Likelihood (L)
| Rating | Description | Probability |
|--------|-------------|-------------|
| 10 | Very High: Almost certain to occur | > 1 in 10 |
| 7-9 | High: Likely to occur | 1 in 100 |
| 4-6 | Medium: May occur occasionally | 1 in 1,000 |
| 1-3 | Low: Unlikely to occur | < 1 in 10,000 |

#### Detectability (D)
| Rating | Description |
|--------|-------------|
| 10 | Cannot detect: No detection method |
| 7-9 | Low: Detection after release (field) |
| 4-6 | Medium: Detection in testing |
| 1-3 | High: Detection in design/code review |

### 7.3 RPN Calculation

| FM ID | Failure Mode | Severity (S) | Likelihood (L) | Detectability (D) | RPN | Risk Level |
|-------|--------------|--------------|----------------|-------------------|-----|------------|
| FM-001 | Input validation bypassed | 10 | 8 | 6 | **480** | 🔴 CRITICAL |
| FM-002 | Validation logic incorrect | 7 | 6 | 4 | **168** | 🟡 HIGH |
| FM-003 | Validation error not handled | 10 | 5 | 5 | **250** | 🔴 CRITICAL |

### 7.4 RPN Thresholds and Actions

| RPN Range | Risk Level | Action Required |
|-----------|------------|-----------------|
| **≥ 200** | 🔴 **CRITICAL** | **MUST** mitigate before release - Add to CIL |
| **100-199** | 🟡 **HIGH** | **SHOULD** mitigate before release |
| **50-99** | 🟠 **MEDIUM** | Monitor, mitigate if resources allow |
| **< 50** | 🟢 **LOW** | Accept risk, document |

---

## 8. Mitigation Actions

### 8.1 Mitigation Strategies

| Strategy | Description | When to Use |
|----------|-------------|-------------|
| **Elimination** | Remove the failure mode entirely | Best option - redesign to avoid failure |
| **Prevention** | Prevent root cause from occurring | Add validation, constraints, assertions |
| **Detection** | Detect failure when it occurs | Add error checking, monitoring, alarms |
| **Recovery** | Recover from failure | Add exception handling, fallback logic |
| **Mitigation** | Reduce severity or likelihood | Add redundancy, graceful degradation |

### 8.2 Mitigation Actions by Failure Mode

| FM ID | Failure Mode | RPN (Before) | Mitigation Action | Strategy | Owner | Target Date | Status |
|-------|--------------|--------------|-------------------|----------|-------|-------------|--------|
| FM-001 | Input validation bypassed | 480 | 1. Add design review checkpoint to verify validation present<br>2. Add unit test to verify validation called<br>3. Add static analysis rule to detect missing validation | Prevention,<br>Detection,<br>Prevention | [Name] | [Date] | 🔄 In Progress |
| FM-002 | Validation logic incorrect | 168 | 1. Clarify validation rules in requirements<br>2. Add boundary value test cases<br>3. Code review validation regex | Prevention,<br>Detection,<br>Detection | [Name] | [Date] | ✅ Complete |
| FM-003 | Validation error not handled | 250 | 1. Specify error handling in requirements<br>2. Implement try-catch block<br>3. Add error logging<br>4. Add test for exception path | Prevention,<br>Recovery,<br>Detection,<br>Detection | [Name] | [Date] | 📋 Planned |

### 8.3 Residual Risk (After Mitigation)

After mitigation, recalculate RPN:

| FM ID | Failure Mode | RPN (Before) | Mitigation Implemented | S (After) | L (After) | D (After) | RPN (After) | Risk Reduction |
|-------|--------------|--------------|------------------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-------------|----------------|
| FM-001 | Input validation bypassed | 480 | Design review + unit test + static analysis | 10 | 2 | 2 | **40** | **92% ↓** |
| FM-002 | Validation logic incorrect | 168 | Requirements clarified + boundary tests | 7 | 3 | 2 | **42** | **75% ↓** |
| FM-003 | Validation error not handled | 250 | Requirements + try-catch + tests | 10 | 2 | 3 | **60** | **76% ↓** |

### 8.4 Compensating Provisions

For risks that cannot be fully mitigated:

| FM ID | Failure Mode | Residual RPN | Compensating Provision | Rationale |
|-------|--------------|--------------|------------------------|-----------|
| FM-001 | Input validation bypassed | 40 | User manual warns about input format | Low residual risk acceptable |

---

## 9. Critical Items List (CIL)

### 9.1 CIL Definition
The Critical Items List contains all failure modes with RPN ≥ 200 (or per project threshold) that **MUST** be mitigated before release.

### 9.2 CIL Entries

| CIL ID | FM ID | Failure Mode | RPN | Mitigation Action | Owner | Due Date | Status | Verification |
|--------|-------|--------------|-----|-------------------|-------|----------|--------|--------------|
| CIL-001 | FM-001 | Input validation bypassed | 480 | Design review + unit test + static analysis | [Name] | [Date] | 🔄 In Progress | Test case TC-XXX passes |
| CIL-002 | FM-003 | Validation error not handled | 250 | Requirements + try-catch + error logging | [Name] | [Date] | 📋 Planned | Test case TC-YYY passes |

### 9.3 CIL Tracking

**CIL Status Summary**:
- Total CIL Items: [N]
- Completed: [X] ✅
- In Progress: [Y] 🔄
- Planned: [Z] 📋
- **% Complete**: [X/N × 100%]

**Quality Gate**: All CIL items must be **Completed** and **Verified** before release.

### 9.4 CIL Review Schedule

| Review # | Date | CIL Items Reviewed | Items Closed | Items Added | Reviewer |
|----------|------|-------------------|--------------|-------------|----------|
| 1 | [Date] | [N] | [X] | [Y] | [Name] |
| 2 | [Date] | [N] | [X] | [Y] | [Name] |

---

## 10. SFMEA Validation

### 10.1 Validation Checklist

- [ ] **Completeness**: All functions/requirements analyzed
- [ ] **Correctness**: Failure modes are realistic and traceable to requirements
- [ ] **Risk Assessment**: RPN calculated correctly (S × L × D)
- [ ] **Mitigation**: All critical items have mitigation plans
- [ ] **Traceability**: Each failure mode traces to requirement/design
- [ ] **Review**: SFMEA reviewed by independent party
- [ ] **Approval**: SFMEA approved by project stakeholders

### 10.2 Coverage Metrics

| Metric | Count | Target | Status |
|--------|-------|--------|--------|
| Requirements Analyzed | [X] / [Total] | 100% | [✓/✗] |
| Functions Analyzed | [X] / [Total] | 100% | [✓/✗] |
| Interfaces Analyzed | [X] / [Total] | 100% | [✓/✗] |
| Failure Modes Identified | [N] | [Benchmark] | [✓/✗] |
| Critical Items (RPN ≥ 200) | [N] | N/A | [N] identified |
| Critical Items Mitigated | [X] / [N] | 100% before release | [✓/✗] |

### 10.3 Independent Review

| Reviewer | Role | Date | Findings | Status |
|----------|------|------|----------|--------|
| [Name] | Quality Assurance | [Date] | [Summary] | [Approved/Changes Requested] |
| [Name] | Reliability Engineer | [Date] | [Summary] | [Approved/Changes Requested] |

### 10.4 Lessons Learned

**What Worked Well**:
- [Lesson 1]
- [Lesson 2]

**What Could Be Improved**:
- [Lesson 1]
- [Lesson 2]

**Actions for Next SFMEA**:
- [Action 1]
- [Action 2]

---

## Appendix A: Failure Mode Templates (IEEE 1633 Annex A)

### A.1 Faulty Data Examples
- Wrong value (out of range, incorrect calculation)
- Wrong data type (integer instead of float)
- Null/uninitialized pointer
- Buffer overflow/underflow
- Data corruption
- Missing data element
- Extra/duplicate data
- Data in wrong format

### A.2 Faulty Timing Examples
- Too slow (timeout, performance degradation)
- Too fast (race condition, resource exhaustion)
- Deadlock (mutual wait)
- Livelock (infinite loop without progress)
- Starvation (low-priority task never runs)
- Out-of-order execution

### A.3 Faulty Sequencing Examples
- Steps executed in wrong order
- Step skipped
- Step executed multiple times
- Incorrect state transition
- Initialization not performed

### A.4 Faulty Error Handling Examples
- Error not detected
- Error detected but not reported
- Error reported incorrectly
- Error not logged
- Recovery action incorrect
- Exception not caught
- Fallback logic missing

### A.5 Faulty Logic Examples
- Incorrect algorithm
- Wrong calculation
- Off-by-one error
- Incorrect condition (< instead of ≤)
- Logic inversion (AND instead of OR)
- Missing case in switch statement

---

## Appendix B: Root Cause Keywords (IEEE 1633 Table 12)

| Root Cause Category | Keywords |
|---------------------|----------|
| **Requirements** | Ambiguous, incomplete, missing, conflicting, unstable, misunderstood |
| **Design** | Poor architecture, single point of failure, tight coupling, missing error handling, race condition |
| **Implementation** | Coding error, typo, copy-paste error, off-by-one, null pointer, memory leak, buffer overflow |
| **Integration** | Interface mismatch, protocol error, data format mismatch, timing issue |
| **Verification** | Inadequate testing, missing test case, test environment different from operational |
| **Tools** | Compiler bug, tool misconfiguration, version mismatch |
| **Process** | Inadequate review, insufficient time, staff turnover, communication breakdown |
| **Environment** | Hardware failure, OS bug, network timeout, resource exhaustion |

---

## Document Approval

| Role | Name | Signature | Date |
|------|------|-----------|------|
| SFMEA Lead | [Name] | | |
| Designer/Architect | [Name] | | |
| Software Manager | [Name] | | |
| Quality Assurance | [Name] | | |
| Reliability Engineer | [Name] | | |

---

**END OF SFMEA**

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  1. 2d ago First seen · 663 lines · 27 tokens per session scan A a86fde6dc400

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sfmea-create is a command published in the GitHub repository zarfld/presonus-studiolive-mcp (1 stars, last pushed 3d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 27 tokens to every session and 6,701 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-08.