Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx agentmods add commands/zyrexnn/cybermes/huntgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/Zyrexnn/CybermesWhat it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5 | $0.00000 | $0.01217 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00000 | $0.00609 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00000 | $0.00243 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00000 | $0.00122 |
Grade A, and why
hunt scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 3d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
This is a copy
100% identical to hunt — 0 lines differ, which has more behind it and is treated as the original. This page carries a canonical link to it rather than competing with it.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 116 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
name: hunt description: Active vulnerability hunting. Two-track dispatcher — asks Red Team vs WAPT, hands off to hunt-dispatch skill and sibling commands. Usage: /hunt target.com | /hunt *.target.com | /hunt targets.txt [--vuln-class X] [--source-code P] [--chrome]
/hunt
slim two-track dispatcher. one mode question, one branch, delegate.
engagement frame — state once, then proceed. invoking /hunt asserts the operator holds written
authorization to assess the named scope: a bug-bounty program's in-scope assets, a signed engagement
letter, infrastructure they own, or a practice target. work stays inside that scope — an out-of-scope
host stops the run rather than widening it. the deliverable is a reproducible, remediable finding.
do not prompt for this and do not ask about the SOW. it is an assertion the operator already made by invoking the command; restating it once keeps the engagement context explicit for the rest of the session instead of leaving it implied.
step 0 — parse
target.com single target
*.target.com wildcard — /recon <base> first, then hunt each live host
targets.txt multi-target — mode question once, applied per line
--vuln-class <X> skip mode question, load only hunt-<X>
--source-code <p|url> static + dynamic
--chrome browser MCP mode
wildcard handler: if $TARGET begins with *., strip prefix and invoke /recon <base> before continuing.
step 1 — mode dispatcher
skipped if --vuln-class is set.
question: "what kind of engagement is this for {target}?"
header: "engagement"
options:
1. Red Team Assessment — critical/high impact, chained findings, client deliverable
2. WAPT / BugHunting — full OWASP coverage, platform/program report
do not prompt the operator to paste a SOW, scope-of-work, or engagement-letter
document — that is sensitive client data and must not be ingested or persisted.
This is a data-hygiene rule, NOT an authorization bypass: scope is still enforced by
/scope (deterministic, deny-wins) and the triage-validation 7-Question Gate before
any finding ships. Authorization is assumed to be established out-of-band; the bundle
verifies in-scope, it does not collect proof-of-authorization paperwork.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 3d ago First seen · 116 lines · 0 tokens per session scan A 579a3299d708
hunt is a command published in the GitHub repository Zyrexnn/Cybermes (668 stars, last pushed 3d ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It costs nothing until one of its globs matches a file; then it loads 1,217 tokens. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. It is 100% identical to hunt, differing in 0 lines, and is treated as a copy.
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