Getting it into your agent
It runs from inside its repository, so the clone comes first — what it calls does not travel with the file alone.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/Zyrexnn/Cybermesnpx agentmods add commands/zyrexnn/cybermes/web3-auditWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/commands/zyrexnn/cybermes/web3-audit)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/commands/zyrexnn/cybermes/web3-audit"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/commands/zyrexnn/cybermes/web3-audit/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/commands/zyrexnn/cybermes/web3-audit"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/commands/zyrexnn/cybermes/web3-audit.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00000 | $0.01834 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00000 | $0.00734 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00000 | $0.00367 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00000 | $0.00183 |
Grade A, and why
web3-audit scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
This is a copy
98% identical to web3-audit — 1 line differ, which has more behind it and is treated as the original. This page carries a canonical link to it rather than competing with it.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 217 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
name: web3-audit description: Smart contract security audit — runs through 10 bug class checklist (accounting desync, access control, incomplete path, off-by-one, oracle errors, ERC4626, reentrancy, flash loan, signature replay, proxy/upgrade). Applies pre-dive kill signals first. Generates Foundry PoC template for confirmed findings. Usage: /web3-audit <contract.sol>
/web3-audit
Smart contract security audit using the 10-bug-class methodology.
Usage
/web3-audit VulnerableContract.sol
/web3-audit https://github.com/protocol/contracts
/web3-audit [paste contract code]
Step 0: Pre-Dive Kill Signals
ALWAYS check these BEFORE reading any code:
1. TVL < $500K → max payout too low for effort → SKIP
2. 2+ top-tier audits (Halborn, ToB, Cyfrin, OZ) on simple protocol → SKIP
3. Protocol < 500 lines, single A→B→C flow → minimal attack surface → SKIP
4. max_payout = min(10% × TVL, program_cap) → if < $10K → SKIP
Formula: Is [TVL * 10%] > [hours I'll spend * hourly rate]? If not, skip.
Only proceed if score >= 6/10:
- TVL > $10M: +2
- Immunefi Critical >= $50K: +2
- No top-tier audit on current version: +2
- < 30 days since deploy: +1
- Protocol you've hunted before: +1
- Upgradeable proxies present: +1
Step 1: Accounting State Desynchronization (28% of Criticals)
# Find accounting variables
grep -rn "totalSupply\|totalShares\|totalAssets\|totalDebt\|cumulativeReward" contracts/
# Find ALL early returns in critical functions
grep -rn "\breturn\b" contracts/ -B3 | grep -B3 "if\b"
Check: For each early return in claim/redeem/withdraw functions:
- Which state variables are updated in the normal path?
- Are ALL of them also updated in the early return path?
- If A updated but B isn't → potential desync bug
Step 2: Access Control (19% of Criticals)
# Sibling function families — do ALL have same modifier set?
grep -rn "function vote\|function poke\|function reset\|function update\|function claim\|function harvest" contracts/ -A2
# Ownership check: existence vs ownership
grep -rn "_requireOwned\|ownerOf\|_isApprovedOrOwner" contracts/ -B5
# Silent modifiers (if without revert)
grep -rn "modifier\b" contracts/ -A8 | grep -B3 "if (" | grep -v "require\|revert"
# Uninitialized proxy
grep -rn "function initialize\b" contracts/ -A3
grep -rn "_disableInitializers()" contracts/
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago First seen · 217 lines · 0 tokens per session scan A c6202c7230a9
web3-audit is a command published in the GitHub repository Zyrexnn/Cybermes (668 stars, last pushed 1mo ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It costs nothing until one of its globs matches a file; then it loads 1,834 tokens. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. It is 98% identical to web3-audit, differing in 1 line, and is treated as a copy.
Other commands, from other repositories
token-scan
Meme coin and token security scan — checks for rug pull vectors (hidden mint, honeypot, fee manipulation, LP lock bypass, authority retention, bonding curve exploits, fake renounce, sandwich amplification). Manual 8-class grep audit (with an optional automated scanner if present). Usage: /token-scan [--chain solana].
sicario.assess
Assess the repository against SicarioSpec guardrails.
sicario.review
Review the active spec, plan, tasks, staged changes, or branch for security and governance gaps.
checklist
Generate a custom checklist for the current feature based on user requirements.
clarify
Identify underspecified areas in the current feature spec by asking up to 5 highly targeted clarification questions and encoding answers back into the spec.
specify
Create or update the feature specification from a natural language feature description.