Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx agentmods add commands/zyrexnn/cybermes/web3-auditgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/Zyrexnn/CybermesWhat it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5 | $0.00000 | $0.01834 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00000 | $0.00917 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00000 | $0.00367 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00000 | $0.00183 |
Grade A, and why
web3-audit scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured yesterday.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
This is a copy
98% identical to web3-audit — 1 line differ, which has more behind it and is treated as the original. This page carries a canonical link to it rather than competing with it.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 217 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
name: web3-audit description: Smart contract security audit — runs through 10 bug class checklist (accounting desync, access control, incomplete path, off-by-one, oracle errors, ERC4626, reentrancy, flash loan, signature replay, proxy/upgrade). Applies pre-dive kill signals first. Generates Foundry PoC template for confirmed findings. Usage: /web3-audit <contract.sol>
/web3-audit
Smart contract security audit using the 10-bug-class methodology.
Usage
/web3-audit VulnerableContract.sol
/web3-audit https://github.com/protocol/contracts
/web3-audit [paste contract code]
Step 0: Pre-Dive Kill Signals
ALWAYS check these BEFORE reading any code:
1. TVL < $500K → max payout too low for effort → SKIP
2. 2+ top-tier audits (Halborn, ToB, Cyfrin, OZ) on simple protocol → SKIP
3. Protocol < 500 lines, single A→B→C flow → minimal attack surface → SKIP
4. max_payout = min(10% × TVL, program_cap) → if < $10K → SKIP
Formula: Is [TVL * 10%] > [hours I'll spend * hourly rate]? If not, skip.
Only proceed if score >= 6/10:
- TVL > $10M: +2
- Immunefi Critical >= $50K: +2
- No top-tier audit on current version: +2
- < 30 days since deploy: +1
- Protocol you've hunted before: +1
- Upgradeable proxies present: +1
Step 1: Accounting State Desynchronization (28% of Criticals)
# Find accounting variables
grep -rn "totalSupply\|totalShares\|totalAssets\|totalDebt\|cumulativeReward" contracts/
# Find ALL early returns in critical functions
grep -rn "\breturn\b" contracts/ -B3 | grep -B3 "if\b"
Check: For each early return in claim/redeem/withdraw functions:
- Which state variables are updated in the normal path?
- Are ALL of them also updated in the early return path?
- If A updated but B isn't → potential desync bug
Step 2: Access Control (19% of Criticals)
# Sibling function families — do ALL have same modifier set?
grep -rn "function vote\|function poke\|function reset\|function update\|function claim\|function harvest" contracts/ -A2
# Ownership check: existence vs ownership
grep -rn "_requireOwned\|ownerOf\|_isApprovedOrOwner" contracts/ -B5
# Silent modifiers (if without revert)
grep -rn "modifier\b" contracts/ -A8 | grep -B3 "if (" | grep -v "require\|revert"
# Uninitialized proxy
grep -rn "function initialize\b" contracts/ -A3
grep -rn "_disableInitializers()" contracts/
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- yesterday First seen · 217 lines · 0 tokens per session scan A c6202c7230a9
web3-audit is a command published in the GitHub repository Zyrexnn/Cybermes (668 stars, last pushed 2d ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It costs nothing until one of its globs matches a file; then it loads 1,834 tokens. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. It is 98% identical to web3-audit, differing in 1 line, and is treated as a copy.
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