Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx agentmods add hooks/global-mindee/way/stopgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/Global-mindee/WAYGrade A, and why
Stop scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 2d ago.
A static scan of the commands this hook runs, not an audit. A hook is shell that executes on your machine at the event it names, which is why every command in it is printed with what was found.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
This is a copy
47% identical to SessionStart — 23 lines differ, which has more behind it and is treated as the original. This page carries a canonical link to it rather than competing with it.
What it actually says
{
"Stop": [
{
"hooks": [
{
"type": "command",
"command": "node \"$CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR/.claude/hooks/scripts/context-usage-monitor.js\""
}
]
},
{
"hooks": [
{
"type": "command",
"command": "node \"$CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR/.claude/hooks/scripts/full-loop-driver.js\""
}
]
},
{
"hooks": [
{
"type": "command",
"command": "node \"$CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR/.claude/hooks/scripts/svop-auditor.js\""
}
]
}
]
}What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 2d ago First seen · 28 lines scan A 1e3059c21f66
Stop is a hook published in the GitHub repository Global-mindee/WAY (11 stars, last pushed 1mo ago), licensed MIT. Its token cost is not measured: a hook is shell that never enters the context. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. It is 47% identical to SessionStart, differing in 23 lines, and is treated as a copy.
Other hooks, from other repositories
PostToolUse
Runs after a tool call finishes for Agent, WebFetch, WebSearch, mcp__.*, ToolSearch, AskUserQuestion, Read, Write, Edit, MultiEdit and Bash tool calls, executing AgentInvocation.hook.ts, Safety.hook.ts, TabState.hook.ts, ISAStaleWriteGuard.hook.ts, ISASync.hook.ts, CheckpointPerISC.hook.ts, ConfigEvalFire.hook.ts…
SessionEnd
Runs when a session ends, executing WorkCompletionLearning.hook.ts, SessionCleanup.hook.ts, UpdateCounts.hook.ts, MemoryHealthGate.hook.ts, DocIntegrity.hook.ts and IntegrityCheck.hook.ts (6 commands). From danielmiessler/LifeOS.
PostToolUseFailure
Runs when a tool call fails, executing EventLogger.hook.ts, AlgorithmNudge.hook.ts and LoopDetector.hook.ts (3 commands). From danielmiessler/LifeOS.
PermissionRequest
Runs when the agent asks permission for an action for Write, Edit, MultiEdit, Bash and mcp__.* tool calls, executing Safety.hook.ts (2 commands). From danielmiessler/LifeOS.
TaskCreated
Runs on the TaskCreated event, executing TaskGovernance.hook.ts. From danielmiessler/LifeOS.
ConfigChange
Runs on the ConfigChange event, executing EventLogger.hook.ts. From danielmiessler/LifeOS.