Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx agentmods add instructions/cyanheads/attack-surface-mcp-server/agents-mdgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/cyanheads/attack-surface-mcp-serverWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/instructions/cyanheads/attack-surface-mcp-server/agents-md)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/instructions/cyanheads/attack-surface-mcp-server/agents-md"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/instructions/cyanheads/attack-surface-mcp-server/agents-md.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5 | $0.06640 | $0.06640 |
| Opus 5 | $0.03320 | $0.03320 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.01328 | $0.01328 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00664 | $0.00664 |
Grade A, and why
attack-surface-mcp-server AGENTS.md scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 3d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
This is a copy
78% identical to obsidian-mcp-server AGENTS.md — 369 lines differ, which has more behind it and is treated as the original. This page carries a canonical link to it rather than competing with it.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 414 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Developer Protocol
Server: attack-surface-mcp-server
Version: 0.2.1
Framework: @cyanheads/mcp-ts-core ^0.12.3
Engines: Bun ≥1.3.0, Node ≥24.0.0
MCP SDK: @modelcontextprotocol/server/client ^2.0.0
Zod: ^4.4.3
Read the framework docs first:
node_modules/@cyanheads/mcp-ts-core/CLAUDE.mdcontains the full API reference — builders, Context, error codes, exports, patterns. This file covers server-specific conventions only.
Authorized-use posture
This is a defensive external-attack-surface-mapping (EASM) server. It is passive and non-intrusive by mandate: it reads public records (Certificate Transparency, DNS, RDAP/WHOIS) and each target's own published surface (one TLS handshake, one HTTP GET per host). It does not port-scan, exploit, brute-force, fuzz, or probe for vulnerabilities — that capability is excluded from the surface by design, never gated behind a flag. Output is descriptive (what exists, what the posture is), never an exploitation plan.
- Keep the framing in the surface. The server
instructions, theattacksurface_map_domaindescription, andattacksurface_recon_guidanceall state the target must be owned or authorized for assessment. Preserve that when editing any of them. Don't add active/intrusive capability or amode: activetoggle — excluding it structurally is the safety property. - The SSRF guard is the security spine. Every outbound connection to a user-supplied target (DNS, TLS, HTTP) must pass
assertSafeDomain/assertSafeUrl/assertSafeResolverIp(src/utils/ssrf-guard.ts) before connecting. It rejects private, loopback, link-local, cloud-metadata, and reserved ranges. Never route a new outbound path around it. - No fabricated signal. Report detections with their triggering evidence; report absent CT/DNS/RDAP fields as unknown. No invented confidence composites.
Core Rules
- Logic throws, framework catches. Tool/resource handlers are pure — throw on failure, no
try/catch. PlainErroris fine; the framework catches, classifies, and formats. Use error factories (notFound(),validationError(), etc.) when the error code matters. - Use
ctx.logfor request-scoped logging. Noconsolecalls. - Use
ctx.statefor tenant-scoped storage. Never access persistence directly. - Secrets in env vars only — never hardcoded.
- Close the loop on issues. When implementing work tracked by a GitHub issue, comment on the issue with what landed and close it. Do both — a comment without a close leaves stale issues open; a close without a comment leaves no record of what shipped. The comment is for future readers — state the concrete changes, not the conversation that produced them.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 3d ago First seen · 414 lines · 6,640 tokens per session scan A 632ca3826e97
attack-surface-mcp-server AGENTS.md is an instructions file published in the GitHub repository cyanheads/attack-surface-mcp-server (1 stars, last pushed 3d ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 6,640 tokens to every session, about $0.0332 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. It is 78% identical to obsidian-mcp-server AGENTS.md, differing in 369 lines, and is treated as a copy.
Other instructions, from other repositories
osint-mcp-server CLAUDE.md
Instructions for badchars/osint-mcp-server, covering claude.md, project overview, build & development commands, architecture and core pattern.
gini-agent AGENTS.md
AGENTS.md instructions for Open-Curiosity/gini-agent, covering gini agent instructions, shape, adrs, boundaries and branches.
agentconfig.org AGENTS.md
Instructions for agentconfig/agentconfig.org, covering agent instructions for agentconfig.org, project overview, target audience, site structure and tech stack.
rosetta command-versions-vs-presence.instructions.md
Instructions for tikoci/rosetta, a project described as: MCP Server with RouterOS docs + commands + products + changelogs, using SQLite-as-RAG, sourced from MikroTik.
ob-1 AGENTS.md
Instructions for Overbrilliant/ob-1, covering agents.md, project index, stack, commands and key files.
bxc GEMINI.md
Instructions for aphrody-code/bxc: This repository's operating guide is CLAUDE.md — read it first.