attack-surface-mcp-server AGENTS.md

attack-surface-mcp-server AGENTS.md is an instructions file for Codex, OpenCode from cyanheads/attack-surface-mcp-server. It costs 6,640 tokens per session, scanned A, a copy of obsidian-mcp-server AGENTS.md, Apache-2.0.

Contributor instructions for an MCP server that maps a domain’s publicly visible attack surface. An MCP server is a tool that an AI agent can call; this one reads public records such as DNS, certificate, and domain-registration data.

In plain words
What is it for?
Use it when developing this server, especially its public-domain mapping and reconnaissance guidance, while keeping checks passive and limited to owned or authorized targets.
Why use it?
It sets clear limits for authorized defensive checks and prevents contributors from adding intrusive behavior such as port scanning, exploitation, or brute force.

Instructions file for CodexOpenCode

Install

Getting it into your agent

One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.

agentmods
npx agentmods add instructions/cyanheads/attack-surface-mcp-server/agents-md
Clone the repo
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/cyanheads/attack-surface-mcp-server

Made for: Codex, OpenCode.

Wrote this? Show the measurements

A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.

agentmods badge for attack-surface-mcp-server AGENTS.md

README.md
[![agentmods](https://agentmods.dev/badge/instructions/cyanheads/attack-surface-mcp-server/agents-md.svg)](https://agentmods.dev/instructions/cyanheads/attack-surface-mcp-server/agents-md)
Your own site
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/instructions/cyanheads/attack-surface-mcp-server/agents-md"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/instructions/cyanheads/attack-surface-mcp-server/agents-md.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>
Per session 6,640 This file is loaded in full into every session.
When invoked 6,640 The same file — it is already loaded in full.
Security scan A 0 findings. Scan, not verified.
Origin 78% copy Near-identical to another mod in the catalogue.
Token cost

What it costs to keep this loaded

Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.

ModelPer sessionOnce invoked
Fable 5 $0.06640 $0.06640
Opus 5 $0.03320 $0.03320
Sonnet 5 $0.01328 $0.01328
Haiku 4.5 $0.00664 $0.00664

Measured 3d ago against content hash 632ca3826e97, method: parsed. Prices are Anthropic first-party input rates as of 2026-08-30, from the pricing page.

Security

Grade A, and why

attack-surface-mcp-server AGENTS.md scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 3d ago.

A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.

Nothing flagged

None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.

Origin

This is a copy

78% identical to obsidian-mcp-server AGENTS.md — 369 lines differ, which has more behind it and is treated as the original. This page carries a canonical link to it rather than competing with it.

AGENTS.md · 414 lines

How it starts

The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 414 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.

Developer Protocol

Server: attack-surface-mcp-server Version: 0.2.1 Framework: @cyanheads/mcp-ts-core ^0.12.3 Engines: Bun ≥1.3.0, Node ≥24.0.0 MCP SDK: @modelcontextprotocol/server/client ^2.0.0 Zod: ^4.4.3

Read the framework docs first: node_modules/@cyanheads/mcp-ts-core/CLAUDE.md contains the full API reference — builders, Context, error codes, exports, patterns. This file covers server-specific conventions only.


Authorized-use posture

This is a defensive external-attack-surface-mapping (EASM) server. It is passive and non-intrusive by mandate: it reads public records (Certificate Transparency, DNS, RDAP/WHOIS) and each target's own published surface (one TLS handshake, one HTTP GET per host). It does not port-scan, exploit, brute-force, fuzz, or probe for vulnerabilities — that capability is excluded from the surface by design, never gated behind a flag. Output is descriptive (what exists, what the posture is), never an exploitation plan.

  • Keep the framing in the surface. The server instructions, the attacksurface_map_domain description, and attacksurface_recon_guidance all state the target must be owned or authorized for assessment. Preserve that when editing any of them. Don't add active/intrusive capability or a mode: active toggle — excluding it structurally is the safety property.
  • The SSRF guard is the security spine. Every outbound connection to a user-supplied target (DNS, TLS, HTTP) must pass assertSafeDomain / assertSafeUrl / assertSafeResolverIp (src/utils/ssrf-guard.ts) before connecting. It rejects private, loopback, link-local, cloud-metadata, and reserved ranges. Never route a new outbound path around it.
  • No fabricated signal. Report detections with their triggering evidence; report absent CT/DNS/RDAP fields as unknown. No invented confidence composites.

Core Rules

  • Logic throws, framework catches. Tool/resource handlers are pure — throw on failure, no try/catch. Plain Error is fine; the framework catches, classifies, and formats. Use error factories (notFound(), validationError(), etc.) when the error code matters.
  • Use ctx.log for request-scoped logging. No console calls.
  • Use ctx.state for tenant-scoped storage. Never access persistence directly.
  • Secrets in env vars only — never hardcoded.
  • Close the loop on issues. When implementing work tracked by a GitHub issue, comment on the issue with what landed and close it. Do both — a comment without a close leaves stale issues open; a close without a comment leaves no record of what shipped. The comment is for future readers — state the concrete changes, not the conversation that produced them.

Read the full file on GitHub · 414 lines

Changes

What this file has done since we first saw it

Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.

  1. 3d ago First seen · 414 lines · 6,640 tokens per session scan A 632ca3826e97

Subscribe to this mod's changes

attack-surface-mcp-server AGENTS.md is an instructions file published in the GitHub repository cyanheads/attack-surface-mcp-server (1 stars, last pushed 3d ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 6,640 tokens to every session, about $0.0332 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. It is 78% identical to obsidian-mcp-server AGENTS.md, differing in 369 lines, and is treated as a copy.