PixelPilot threat-modeling.instructions.md

A security review method based on STRIDE, a framework for finding threats such as impersonation, data leaks, and unauthorized access.

In plain words
What is it for?
It helps assess authentication, user data, payments, uploads, APIs, and admin features, then plan mitigations and security tests.
Why use it?
It exposes security risks before code is written by mapping system boundaries, actors, data flows, and possible attacks.

Instructions file for GitHub Copilot

Install

Getting it into your agent

One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.

agentmods
npx agentmods add instructions/dev-lou/pixelpilot/threat-modeling
Clone the repo
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/dev-lou/PixelPilot

Made for: GitHub Copilot.

Per session 2,760 This file is loaded in full into every session.
When invoked 2,760 The same file — it is already loaded in full.
Security scan A 0 findings. Scan, not verified.
Origin original No closer match found in the catalogue.
Token cost

What it costs to keep this loaded

Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.

ModelPer sessionOnce invoked
Fable 5 $0.02760 $0.02760
Opus 5 $0.01380 $0.01380
Sonnet 5 $0.00552 $0.00552
Haiku 4.5 $0.00276 $0.00276

Measured yesterday against content hash ec5cc08744bf, method: parsed. Prices are Anthropic first-party input rates as of 2026-08-30, from the pricing page.

Security

Grade A, and why

PixelPilot threat-modeling.instructions.md scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured yesterday.

A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.

Nothing flagged

None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.

vscode/.github/instructions/threat-modeling.instructions.md · 356 lines

How it starts

The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 356 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.

Threat Modelling 2026

STRIDE threat model → trust boundary diagram → threat table → mitigations → security test cases. Run before writing security-sensitive code.


THE STRIDE MODEL

Letter Threat Violates Example
S Spoofing Authentication Attacker impersonates admin user
T Tampering Integrity Attacker modifies request payload
R Repudiation Non-repudiation User denies making a purchase
I Information disclosure Confidentiality API leaks other users' data
D Denial of service Availability Flood endpoint to make it unreachable
E Elevation of privilege Authorization Regular user accesses admin endpoint

STEP 1 — DECOMPOSE THE SYSTEM

Before applying STRIDE, map the system using Data Flow Diagrams (text format).

## System Decomposition

### Actors (external entities)
- **Anonymous user** — unauthenticated visitor
- **Authenticated user** — logged-in member
- **Admin** — internal staff with elevated access
- **Third-party service** — Stripe, OAuth provider, email service

### Processes
- **Auth service** — login, registration, session management
- **API gateway** — routes, rate limiting, auth middleware
- **Business logic** — core feature processing
- **Background workers** — async jobs (emails, reports)

### Data stores
- **Primary DB** — user records, transactions
- **Cache** — session tokens, temporary data
- **File storage** — user uploads (S3 / R2)
- **Audit log** — immutable event log

### Trust boundaries (draw these explicitly)
─────────────────────────────────────────
  [ Internet / untrusted zone ]
  ↓ HTTPS ↓
  [ Load balancer / WAF ]          ← Trust boundary 1
  ↓
  [ API gateway + rate limiter ]   ← Trust boundary 2
  ↓
  [ Application server ]
  ↓                    ↓
  [ Primary DB ]   [ External APIs ]  ← Trust boundary 3
─────────────────────────────────────────

STEP 2 — APPLY STRIDE TO EACH COMPONENT

Read the full file on GitHub · 356 lines

Changes

What this file has done since we first saw it

Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.

  1. yesterday First seen · 356 lines · 2,760 tokens per session scan A ec5cc08744bf

Subscribe to this mod's changes

PixelPilot threat-modeling.instructions.md is an instructions file published in the GitHub repository dev-lou/PixelPilot (2 stars, last pushed 4mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 2,760 tokens to every session, about $0.0138 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.