mncs-forge-mcp AGENTS.md

MNCS Forge agent guidance

• Use Forge for controlled candidate/evidence workflow when a project has a validated mncs-forge.toml. After modifying candidate content, call candidate refresh or Control's forge_candidate_refresh before another candidate-scoped evaluation. Refresh registers a successor identity; it does not reuse prior evidence as if it were still current.
• Forge does not replace MNCS or MNCDS offline validation and is not required for conformance.
• Modify candidate or generated files only within the declared paths. Never write to contracts, references, evaluators, policies, or protected authorities through Forge.
• Keep MNCS, MNCDS, evidence-class, and promotion statuses separate. Missing or unsupported evidence remains UNKNOWN; FAIL dominates UNKNOWN, which dominates PASS.
• Final evaluator-mode results are not repair feedback for the same development epoch.
• Do not claim independence, protected custody, witnessing, governance approval, certification, or promotion from a local Forge result.
• Use Forge provider discovery and capability blockers to select an appropriate declared structural, control-flow, or data-flow provider when a change requires that evidence.
• Source reading, grep, and line counts are review aids, not substitutes for unavailable structural evidence.
• Missing, unsupported, malformed, stale, or unavailable required capability remains UNKNOWN or a blocker, never PASS.
• When comparative graph-sensitive evidence is claimed, use the same provider, method, scope, and relevant bounds before and after the change.
• Treat suspicious or non-orthodox constructs as requests for bounded evidence, not automatic failures or automatic exceptions. Orthodoxy is a heuristic; declared invariants remain authoritative.
• An intentional-deviation declaration may explain purpose, assumptions, compiler envelope, and required checks, but it must never suppress, overwrite, or reinterpret a verifier FAIL.
• Keep local invariant results, attack-path reachability, freshness, severity, and workflow disposition separate. Absence of a demonstrated exploit chain does not convert a confirmed weakness into PASS.