Borrowing it
Nothing to install: this file belongs to fusebase-dev/fusebase-flow. Take a copy, put it at the same path in your own repository, and replace the rules that are about this project with yours.
curl -O https://raw.githubusercontent.com/fusebase-dev/fusebase-flow/main/.github/instructions/security.instructions.mdgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/fusebase-dev/fusebase-flowWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/instructions/fusebase-dev/fusebase-flow/security)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/instructions/fusebase-dev/fusebase-flow/security"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/instructions/fusebase-dev/fusebase-flow/security.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00667 | $0.00667 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00333 | $0.00333 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00133 | $0.00133 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00067 | $0.00067 |
Grade A, and why
fusebase-flow security.instructions.md scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured today.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 50 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Fusebase Flow — security & permissions instructions for GitHub Copilot / VS Code
These instructions apply when changes touch auth, permissions, secrets, env files, deploy config, external messages, data export/import, or production DB writes.
Hard prohibitions
- Never print secret values (FR-12). Redact in any output. Patterns at
policies/secret-patterns.yml. - Never
git add.env, credentials, private keys (FR-06). - Never write a customer-visible external message without
external_customer_visible_messageapproval artifact (FR-12). - Never use a session key / cookie without
session_key_or_cookie_useapproval artifact (FR-12). - Never modify auth / permission code without
auth_or_permission_changeapproval artifact (FR-12).
Approval artifacts
If an action requires approval per policies/approval-policy.yml, an approval artifact must exist on disk. The agent authors it on the operator's approval — never the operator by hand at a terminal. For a Full-lane deploy, on the DP.6 phrase approve deploy now (forgiving — any case/spacing; legacy APPROVE-DEPLOY-NOW also passes) — the operator types only the phrase, never a composed sentence (Lightweight lane: a plain chat go-ahead, recorded via approve-local.sh lightweight_deploy — DP.12); for any other approval-gated action (protected-path edit, FR-25 baseline adoption, database migration, auth/permission change), once the operator OKs that specific action in chat. Authoring with NO operator authorization is self-approval and forbidden:
state/approvals/<action>-<slug>-<YYYYMMDD>.json
The agent runs this on that approval — the operator types no command: bash hooks/local/approve-local.sh <action> <slug> "<reason>".
Hooks check for an unexpired artifact before allowing the action.
Categories that trigger this scope
- Auth middleware, permission checks, role / scope code, login / logout flows
.env, secrets handling, credential storage, encryption code- Outbound external messages (email, SMS, webhooks, public posts)
- Data export, bulk import, customer data movement
- Production DB writes outside the established repository pattern
- Deploy config, CI / CD pipeline, infra-as-code
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- today First seen · 50 lines · 667 tokens per session scan A 3e643ce4e6a8
fusebase-flow security.instructions.md is an instructions file published in the GitHub repository fusebase-dev/fusebase-flow (9 stars, last pushed today), licensed MIT. It adds 667 tokens to every session, about $0.0033 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-08.
Other instructions, from other repositories
next.js AGENTS.md
AGENTS.md instructions for vercel/next.js, covering next.js development guide, codebase structure, monorepo overview, core package: packages/next and other important packages.
codex AGENTS.md
AGENTS.md instructions for openai/codex, covering rust/codex-rs, the codex-core crate, code review rules, crate api surface and model visible context.
vscode buildNext.instructions.md
Working notes and architecture documentation for the new esbuild-based build system in build/next. Use when making changes to the new build pipeline (transpile/bundle commands, NLS plugin, source-map handling, resource copying, or self-hosting watch tasks).
vscode oss-third-party-notices.instructions.md
Instructions for microsoft/vscode, covering vs code oss third-party-notices pipeline, architecture, pipeline flow in ci, applying the notice (cutover) and fallback chain (never fail the build).
langchain AGENTS.md
AGENTS.md instructions for langchain-ai/langchain, covering global development guidelines for the langchain monorepo, corridor security analysis, project architecture and context, monorepo structure and development tools & commands.
spec-kit AGENTS.md
AGENTS.md instructions for github/spec-kit, covering agents.md, about spec kit and specify, quickstart — add a new integration in 5 steps, integration architecture and integrationmanifest — file tracking.