fence CLAUDE.md

fence CLAUDE.md is an instructions file for coding agents from hoophq/fence. It costs 1,815 tokens per session, scanned E, original, MIT.

A standalone Go command-line tool that checks AI coding-agent actions and can block or request confirmation before risky commands run. It covers dangers such as recursive deletion, secret exposure, shell-download execution, and force-pushes.

In plain words
What is it for?
Use it to build, test, format, or inspect Fence rules, or to check a command directly without an agent. It also documents how to exercise the hook adapter for Claude Code.
Why use it?
It adds local guardrails against destructive or dangerous actions while keeping the rules editable by the developer. Its tests help control false alarms.

Instructions file

Install

Getting it into your agent

One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.

agentmods
npx agentmods add instructions/hoophq/fence/claude-md
Clone the repo
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/hoophq/fence

Wrote this? Show the measurements

A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.

agentmods badge for fence CLAUDE.md

README.md
[![agentmods](https://agentmods.dev/badge/instructions/hoophq/fence/claude-md.svg)](https://agentmods.dev/instructions/hoophq/fence/claude-md)
Your own site
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/instructions/hoophq/fence/claude-md"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/instructions/hoophq/fence/claude-md.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>
Per session 1,815 This file is loaded in full into every session.
When invoked 1,815 The same file — it is already loaded in full.
Security scan E 3 findings. Scan, not verified.
Origin original No closer match found in the catalogue.
Token cost

What it costs to keep this loaded

Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.

ModelPer sessionOnce invoked
Fable 5 $0.01815 $0.01815
Opus 5 $0.00907 $0.00907
Sonnet 5 $0.00363 $0.00363
Haiku 4.5 $0.00181 $0.00181

Measured 5d ago against content hash 2e82b7e62bb5, method: parsed. Prices are Anthropic first-party input rates as of 2026-08-30, from the pricing page.

Security

Grade E, and why

fence CLAUDE.md scanned grade E with 3 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 5d ago.

A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.

Downloads and executes remote codehighSupply chain

curl | sh runs whatever the server returns today, which is not necessarily what it returned when this was reviewed.

`curl | sh`, force-pushes. Standalone Go module, Go 1.26, no runtime services.

Recursive force deletehighDestructive command

rm -rf with a variable or a broad path is one typo away from removing the wrong tree.

- Test a rule without an agent: `fence check 'rm -rf ~'` (prints a DENY/ASK/WARN/ALLOW card).

Makes network callslowCapability

Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.

`curl | sh`, force-pushes. Standalone Go module, Go 1.26, no runtime services.
CLAUDE.md · 111 lines

How it starts

The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 111 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.

CLAUDE.md

Project Overview

Fence is a standalone Go CLI: guardrails for AI coding agents. It inspects an agent's tool calls (through that agent's hook system) and blocks or asks before catastrophic ones run — recursive deletes of home/root, secret exfiltration, curl | sh, force-pushes. Standalone Go module, Go 1.26, no runtime services.

Scope is deliberate. Fence is local self-protection: dev-owned, dev-editable, and it fails open. It is intentionally not a compliance or central-enforcement product — keep un-bypassable policy, fleet management, central audit, and approval workflows out of scope.

Commands

  • make build./dist/fence · make test · make vet · make fmt · make tidy
  • Raw: go build ./... · go test ./... · go vet ./... · gofmt -l .
  • go test ./... is the gate — tests pin the false-positive discipline.
  • Test a rule without an agent: fence check 'rm -rf ~' (prints a DENY/ASK/WARN/ALLOW card).
  • Exercise the hook directly: echo '{"cwd":".","tool_name":"Bash","tool_input":{"command":"rm -rf ~"}}' | ./dist/fence hook claude-code

Architecture — agent-neutral core + per-agent adapters

  • internal/policy/ — engine (Evaluate, deny-overrides resolution), the neutral Action/Effect/Decision types, Rule/Match/Rulepack, and the embedded builtin/recommended.yaml default pack.
  • internal/analyzer/shell/ — shell-AST analysis via mvdan.cc/sh producing semantic facts (recursive-delete + target class, force-push, history-rewrite, net→shell pipe). This is the differentiator — see Conventions.
  • internal/adapter/<agent>/ — translate one agent's tool call ⇄ neutral Action. claudecode (Claude Code PreToolUse + the statusLine session proof, with the SessionStart banner as fallback when another status line owns the slot) came first; codex speaks Codex's Claude-compatible hook envelope with its own tool vocabulary (Bash, apply_patch — expanded to one file_write per touched file, most severe verdict wins); opencode has no hook protocol at all — a generated JS shim plugin (fence init opencode writes it, template embedded in internal/cli/opencode_plugin.js) pipes tool calls to fence hook opencode, and its only block primitive is throwing, so ask degrades to a soft block that routes the agent to the user. Adapters stay self-contained even where the wire formats coincide — the protocols are owned by different vendors and may drift. Decisions and chat notices ride the same JSON envelope; an explicit "allow" decision is never emitted (it would bypass the user's own permission settings).
  • internal/store/ — the user-level state dir (~/.fence): packs installed via fence add (the packs dir is the source of truth) + packs.lock.json metadata.
  • internal/registry/ — fetch + sha256-verify packs from a static index (registry/ in this repo, read raw off main). Only the explicit commands import it — nothing on the eval path may ever touch the network.
  • internal/cli/ — Cobra commands: check, hook, init, uninstall, add, search, update, remove, version. plugins.go detects a Claude Code plugin that already runs the Fence hook (see Conventions).
  • cmd/fence/ — entrypoint; version is injected via -ldflags "-X main.version=...".

Read the full file on GitHub · 111 lines

Changes

What this file has done since we first saw it

Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.

  1. 5d ago First seen · 111 lines · 1,815 tokens per session scan E 2e82b7e62bb5

Subscribe to this mod's changes

fence CLAUDE.md is an instructions file published in the GitHub repository hoophq/fence (19 stars, last pushed 1mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 1,815 tokens to every session, about $0.0091 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it E with 3 findings (downloads and executes remote code, recursive force delete, makes network calls). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.