Borrowing it
Nothing to install: this file belongs to jleechanorg/mcp_mail. Take a copy, put it at the same path in your own repository, and replace the rules that are about this project with yours.
curl -O https://raw.githubusercontent.com/jleechanorg/mcp_mail/main/AGENTS.mdgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/jleechanorg/mcp_mailWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/instructions/jleechanorg/mcp_mail/agents-md)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/instructions/jleechanorg/mcp_mail/agents-md"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/instructions/jleechanorg/mcp_mail/agents-md/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/instructions/jleechanorg/mcp_mail/agents-md"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/instructions/jleechanorg/mcp_mail/agents-md.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.05201 | $0.05201 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.02080 | $0.02080 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.01040 | $0.01040 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00520 | $0.00520 |
Grade D, and why
mcp_mail AGENTS.md scanned grade D with 3 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Asks for rootmediumPrivilege escalation
A mod that escalates privileges can change anything on the machine, not only the project.
chmod 600 ~/.mcp_agent_mail_git_mailbox_repo/credentials.json Recursive force deletehighDestructive command
rm -rf with a variable or a broad path is one typo away from removing the wrong tree.
1. **Absolutely forbidden commands:** `git reset --hard`, `git clean -fd`, `rm -rf`, or any command that can delete or overwrite code/data must never be run unless the user explicitly provides the exact command and state Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
curl -H "Authorization: Bearer $GITHUB_TOKEN" https://api.github.com/repos/owner/repo/pulls How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 336 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
RULE NUMBER 1 (NEVER EVER EVER FORGET THIS RULE!!!): YOU ARE NEVER ALLOWED TO DELETE A FILE WITHOUT EXPRESS PERMISSION FROM ME OR A DIRECT COMMAND FROM ME. EVEN A NEW FILE THAT YOU YOURSELF CREATED, SUCH AS A TEST CODE FILE. YOU HAVE A HORRIBLE TRACK RECORD OF DELETING CRITICALLY IMPORTANT FILES OR OTHERWISE THROWING AWAY TONS OF EXPENSIVE WORK THAT I THEN NEED TO PAY TO REPRODUCE. AS A RESULT, YOU HAVE PERMANENTLY LOST ANY AND ALL RIGHTS TO DETERMINE THAT A FILE OR FOLDER SHOULD BE DELETED. YOU MUST ALWAYS ASK AND RECEIVE CLEAR, WRITTEN PERMISSION FROM ME BEFORE EVER EVEN THINKING OF DELETING A FILE OR FOLDER OF ANY KIND!!!
First step in any clone/session: run ./scripts/ensure_git_hooks.sh to force core.hooksPath=.githooks so Ruff/ty/Bandit hooks run on every commit. Re-run if hooks ever stop firing.
IRREVERSIBLE GIT & FILESYSTEM ACTIONS — DO-NOT-EVER BREAK GLASS
- Absolutely forbidden commands:
git reset --hard,git clean -fd,rm -rf, or any command that can delete or overwrite code/data must never be run unless the user explicitly provides the exact command and states, in the same message, that they understand and want the irreversible consequences. - No guessing: If there is any uncertainty about what a command might delete or overwrite, stop immediately and ask the user for specific approval. “I think it’s safe” is never acceptable.
- Safer alternatives first: When cleanup or rollbacks are needed, request permission to use non-destructive options (
git status,git diff,git stash, copying to backups) before ever considering a destructive command. - Mandatory explicit plan: Even after explicit user authorization, restate the command verbatim, list exactly what will be affected, and wait for a confirmation that your understanding is correct. Only then may you execute it—if anything remains ambiguous, refuse and escalate.
- Document the confirmation: When running any approved destructive command, record (in the session notes / final response) the exact user text that authorized it, the command actually run, and the execution time. If that record is absent, the operation did not happen.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago First seen · 336 lines · 5,201 tokens per session scan D da70847fce58
mcp_mail AGENTS.md is an instructions file published in the GitHub repository jleechanorg/mcp_mail (11 stars, last pushed 2mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 5,201 tokens to every session, about $0.0208 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it D with 3 findings (asks for root, recursive force delete, makes network calls). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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